Scholar Sultan Barakat pointed out that in the first six months after the outbreak of the war, Iran seemed to be trying to avoid the Red Sea becoming another major front. Keeping Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the two key Arab countries bordering the Red Sea, out of the U.S.-led military camp was clearly in Iran's interest. It is reasonable to speculate that Tehran initially asked the Houthi forces not to provoke Saudi Arabia. However, the Saudi attack on Sana'a International Airport in July changed this calculation. Iran may not have wanted to see a confrontation between Saudi Arabia and the Houthi forces, but once the Houthis decided to respond, it was almost impossible for Tehran to ask them to remain passive, as this would undermine the credibility of the alliance Iran had been maintaining. The escalation of the situation also aligns with Iran's interests, but it does not necessarily mean that Iran ordered the Houthi offensive. Given the surge in fuel prices and inflation concerns in the United States, the Trump administration is likely closely monitoring the escalation in Yemen. However, this situation might present an unexpected advantage for the U.S. So far, the U.S. has struggled to persuade regional and international allies to join its confrontation with Iran. Saudi Arabia and Egypt have had ample reasons to maintain their distance from the U.S., but a direct threat to the Red Sea could change this dynamic. Even without formal cooperation, U.S. coordination could align Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and European forces on the same side in a maritime confrontation. As a result, the Houthi forces might produce outcomes contrary to Iran's initial intentions. By threatening the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, they could push Saudi Arabia and Egypt closer to Washington while fostering a new, largely unacknowledged coordination mechanism with Israel.