The election rules in British Columbia have begun to allow everyone to vote by mail. What are the potential risk points of mail voting? Can the existing system block these risks? Common risks are generally concentrated in several aspects: one ️⃣ Application for identity fraud Someone attempted to use the identity of another eligible voter to apply for mailed ballots. two ️⃣ Coercion/proxy filling in family or caregiving environment After leaving the polling station through secret voting, if voters are under pressure from their families, caregivers, or others, there may be issues of others taking over, forcing them to choose, or even controlling their votes. three ️⃣ Ballots intercepted or not processed by the individual In theory, there is a risk of ballots falling into the hands of others during the mailing process, home email, or collection process. four ️⃣ Repeated voting attempt For example, if someone has already applied for or submitted a mailed ballot and attempts to vote again through other means. five ️⃣ Intervention in the third-party collection and transfer process The risk increases as more and more people come into contact with a ballot that has already been filled out or has not yet been filled out, so "who has been in contact with the ballot and how it was delivered to the electoral institution" is very important. six ️⃣ There are issues with election processing or chain of custody Including errors or insufficient records in the process of receiving, verifying, registering, storing, and counting ballots. This may not necessarily be cheating, but if the program is opaque, it can easily raise reasonable questions. But it must be emphasized that: 'There are risk points' ≠' Fraud has already occurred '. Any accusation of election cheating should ultimately be based on concrete evidence: how many votes? Which stage? what time? Who implemented it? Is there any record? Taking the 2026 Richmond city election as an example, the current rules have established some important defenses: Online application for mailing ballots must provide valid identification; The postal ballot application will only be sent out after it is approved; Once you apply for the mail balloon package, you cannot participate in early voting or on-site voting on Election Day; Mailed ballots must be delivered to the Chief Election Officer before 8pm on October 17th; The recipients of mailed ballots will be registered. So what is truly worthy of public supervision is not the general slogan 'mailing ballots is unsafe', but rather the item by item inspection: Is the identity verification strict enough? Can one person, one vote be locked by the system? Is there a complete record of the ballot between leaving the voters and entering the vote counting system? Is there an audit mechanism for abnormal applications and abnormal quantities? Can candidates and the public verify the entire process? The credibility of elections does not rely on a single phrase 'trust us' or' they are cheating '. But every key link can be verified.