The core of today's macro hot events is still the game between the United States and Iran: the US attacked three Iranian oil tankers, and Iran attacked US warships and oil tankers. Until mid August, it was said that the US Iran game had a long-term trend, and now the signs of long-term development are becoming increasingly serious. Let's talk about a few points: 1. Why does Trump not have TACO recently? In my personal opinion, there may be the following three points: 1) Hegeseis should give Trump confidence that night escort allows most oil tankers to sneak through the Strait of Hormuz; It does have an effect, but only a partial effect; 2) Besant convinced Trump that blocking Iran's economic lifeline through stronger sanctions and blockades would make Iran yield. But this takes a long time to take effect; 3) When the mid-term election came, Trump could not easily admit Iran's control over Hormuz, so he was attacked crazily by the Democratic Party; For the past two days, I was wondering whether this was the "confidence of mystery" given to Trump by Hogsythe and Besant. 2. The core is that both sides have different judgments about "which side time stands on": 1) The United States may calculate in this way As long as non Iranian oil gradually recovers and the global market adapts, while Iran's new export revenue continues to be limited, if it persists for a longer period of time, Tehran's financial pressure will become even greater. 2) Iran may calculate in this way As long as the attack capability is retained to make ship owners, insurance companies, and the market worry, the economic and election pressures in the United States will not disappear. Continuing to persist may force Washington to accept better exchange terms. So two mutually reinforcing cycles are generated: 1) If the United States increases its navigation capacity (night escort), Iran will have an incentive to prove that the strait is still dangerous; Iran launched an attack, and the United States has reason to strike its radar, launchers, and related maritime assets. 2) If the United States compresses Iran's revenue, Iran will have an incentive to increase regional economic costs; The regional risks have increased, and the United States has further intensified economic and military pressure. Both sides may even understand each step as a limited action, but cumulatively, the scope of action and losses will still expand. 3. This time it is still due to control over the strait This week, US officials said that the nighttime escort effect of the US military is significant, and Iran is preparing for a new round of mine laying in the strait channel; Seeing Iran accurately laying mines and the US military starting to attack Iranian military facilities again. Iran counterattacks, US own Iranian oil tanker. This goes beyond the mere "occasional harassment of merchant ships" and reflects the mentality of Iran's hardliners: the more progress the US escort and blockade make, the more likely Iran is to worry about losing its chips and try a more impactful action. The short-term military or economic achievements of the US military do not necessarily bring immediate short-term cooling. 4. Who will hand over the chips first in the end? 1) Iran should stop interfering first, as they may be concerned about the continued blockade by the United States; If the United States lifts the blockade first, it will be concerned that Iran may retain the ability to restrict navigation at any time after obtaining income. Without synchronous steps, verification methods, and default handling mechanisms, a vague "agree to resume navigation" can easily fall back into disputes during the execution phase. The Oman joint statement still leaves a large number of permanent arrangements for subsequent negotiations, indicating that the implementation details have not yet been fully resolved. In the end, it still depends on which of the United States and Iran says that the people have stronger tolerance and more control, and the regime with less public discourse power can actually withstand it, because it doesn't have to care about how public opinion is. At the end of August, we talked about: Trump had more pressure before the mid-term elections; After the mid-term elections, Iran will have more pressure (because Trump has fewer concerns); So, Trump did not force Iran to give way quickly in August. The main difficulties lie in: the night navigation can relieve some supply pressure, but it is not enough to resume normal commercial shipping; The maritime blockade has indeed dealt a heavy blow to the export of Iranian crude oil, but it takes time for economic pain to translate into political concessions, and Iran needs to believe that credible returns can be obtained after concessions. The mid-term elections made it difficult for Trump to accept the obvious failure, and also made it increasingly difficult for him to bear the long-term high cost of living. He is more likely to maintain a tough stance, continue to exert pressure, and seek temporary arrangements that can claim success (depending on whether Iran can cooperate) The long-term signs of "continuous blockade, competition for air traffic, diplomatic fluctuations, and intermittent market shocks" are more suitable as current benchmarks than "rapid comprehensive reconciliation". Ultimately, it depends on who can withstand it first. We talked about it on August 13th, and I'm most worried that I won't be able to hold on for a long time. The longer I hold on, the more oil prices won't be able to keep up.