Rather than provide additional info on how and why LayerZero Labs' centralized infrastructure was infiltrated by North Korean (DPRK) hackers, which resulted in the $292M rsETH bridge exploit Bryan decides throwing the user under the bus the first time wasn't good enough, they just had to do it again for good measure! All for the crime of trusting the LayerZero Labs team and their infra, using a 1/1 config that ~50% of LZ OApps use (per @Dune), that the LZ Labs DVN supported (until it was blocked), and that the LZ Labs team monetized (DVN fees) Why take responsibility, and therefore legal liability, over the exploit when finger pointing is just as good 👆👉👇👈 And nevermind the fact that there are multiple chains in the LZ docs where the LZ Labs DVN is the only one listed, and therefore the only possible config ! Why did the LZ Labs DVN support a 1/1 config up until now if it was such an obviously dangerous thing? Why isn't this config blocked at the protocol level if its always been so obviously bad? People have been pointing out the massive centralization problem in the LayerZero ecosystem for YEARS now, including the 2/2 multisig Stargate bridge run by the LZ Labs team (does anyone genuinely think a 2/2 multisig bridge setup is really all that much better than 1/1?) But only after the $292M bridge hack is such centralization now such an obvious risk, give me a break Why should anyone integrate LayerZero, knowing they're going to be thrown under the bus as disposable meat the moment the LZ Labs fucks up and gets hacked by North Korea?(Zach Rynes | CLG)