Reviewing Traditional Big Banks Entering Web3: Who Made Money and Who Lost Seriously?

CN
21 minutes ago
The answer is not in what coins they bought, but in whether they sold a pipeline or risk.

Written by: EX.IO

1. Two Directions in the Same Week

On November 11, 2026, two events occurred simultaneously: Deutsche Bank officially launched institutional crypto custody (covering Bitcoin, Ethereum, USDC, EURC, and AllUnity Euro stablecoin EURAU, operating under the MiCA and German regulatory framework) and signed a memorandum of understanding with its asset management subsidiary DWS to explore tokenized products; on the same day, Bloomberg reported that Nomura Holdings was in talks with potential buyers like Marex to sell its crypto subsidiary Laser Digital (no final decision yet, and it may be retained).

One firm enters while another exits. This article does not recount the events but focuses on one task: breaking down who made money and who incurred heavy losses, summarizing the common actions of those who earned.

2. List of Profits: How They Made Money

This section refers to “making money” as income models based on fees or transaction volumes, with disclosed revenue or a clear business model; it does not refer to any firm that has disclosed profitability data for these business segments.

In August 2026, BlackRock launched digital shares for its six European ICS series UCITS money market funds (totaling about $311 billion), operating on the Ethereum network through JPMorgan’s Kinexys platform. This money did not “turn into tokens,” but the entry was tokenized—the fees were not reduced by being on-chain, and the on-chain transfer opened new distribution and settlement channels. The key action: connecting existing assets with new interfaces rather than creating new assets.

JPMorgan's Kinexys has a daily trading volume of about $5 billion (DL News), with management aiming to increase it to over $10 billion; in October 2026, JPMorgan expanded its JPM Coin deposit token (JPMD) to Ethereum. This path does not require a bull market or for tokens to be classified as securities—just that “settlements are cheaper than now.”

Citi expanded its Citi Token Services to Japan and the UAE in September 2026; WSJ reported that several large banks were planning a shared tokenized deposit network. Such businesses typically do not charge directly, with revenue reflected in deposit retention and customer stickiness—defensive income that protects the most expensive deposits.

BNY and Goldman Sachs launched a tokenized money market fund solution for asset management clients in 2025 (BNY press release: participants include BlackRock, Fidelity, Goldman Sachs Asset Management, etc.), selling a full set of services to “enable your fund to be held on-chain.”

In April 2026, Morgan Stanley launched its Bitcoin ETF, cutting fees to 0.14% (then the lowest tier), attracting about $100 million in the first week. The way to make money is clear: fees multiplied by channels, unrelated to crypto price direction.

Deutsche Bank does not engage in trading or proprietary trading but starts with custody, signing an MOU with its asset management branch on the launch day to explore tokenized products—a typical “first occupy, then expand products” approach.

Commonalities: All six firms' revenues derive from fees and transaction volumes; none of them make money by holding token inventories.

3. List of Heavy Losses: How They Lost

This section's term “losses” refers to losses disclosed in public financial reports or news for specific periods, not an evaluation of the firm’s operational capabilities or overall performance.

Laser Digital was established in 2022, covering institutional trading, market making, asset management, and venture capital, achieving profitability by 2024 (Ledger Insights). The turning point came in October 2025: during the flash crash on October 10, altcoins plummeted by 20%–27% within minutes, some dropping nearly 70% (AmberData). By the December 2025 quarter, Nomura recorded about 10 billion yen in losses outside its four major divisions (EMEA), attributing it to digital asset operations; the CFO stated they had “tightened positions and risk exposure”; for its European business, pre-tax losses were 13.8 billion and 7.4 billion yen in the March and September 2026 quarters, respectively. The two sets of figures cannot be directly correlated, and Nomura also did not disclose the proportion of Laser's performance in Europe—“the sale is because Laser incurred losses” is an analytical judgment, not a corporate figure.

The mechanism is key: what market makers fear most is not price drops, but an inability to hedge inventories during declines—Laser’s market making is not limited to Bitcoin and Ethereum; when the inventory has a large amount of illiquid mid- to small-cap tokens, and the market reprices in minutes, you are not profiting from price differences but passively taking on risk. The quarterly market value measurement, VaR limits, and parent company capital scrutiny of listed banks do not provide the flexibility for market makers to “withstand drawdowns”—this is a mismatch of mechanisms, not a team capability issue. Another equally important fact: Nomura's investments during this period did not cease (acquiring a new crypto exchange license in Japan and receiving preliminary approval from the US OCC for its trust bank application), with the firm reporting record revenues in the quarter it disclosed losses.

ASX announced in November 2022 that it would abandon the use of blockchain to rebuild the clearing system CHESS, a project lasting about seven years and costing roughly AUD 250 million. The failure was not due to technical infeasibility, but because it treated an extremely complex institutional engineering problem as a mere technical upgrade; Reuters noted: not just money was burned, but also market trust.

In November 2026, OKX and ICE’s tokenized U.S. stock program was scheduled to launch under the SEC’s temporary innovation exemption framework, facing collective pushback from issuers: the number of opponents grew from 22 to 67; IMF research revealed that the volatility of tokenized stocks is 1.5 times that of their traditional market counterparts (the above is compiled by Cointelegraph). This route has not yet disclosed losses, but it indicates that they are being repriced by the market. A more telling comparison: CoinDesk reported that the crypto-native market maker B2C2 (part of SBI) was also in talks for sale. Even those “most adept at this industry” are seeking exits, rendering statements like “traditional institutions are losing to native teams” invalid—the business model itself of selling inventory risk is being repriced overall. Ownership is not a variable; the business model is.

4. Boundary Line: Four Revenue Models

Behind both lists is one statement: where the income comes from determines how much risk exists.

  • Model One: Management fees and custody fees (based on total assets) — BlackRock, BNY, Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank custody; do not bear directional risk, the larger, the more stable.
  • Model Two: Gate and settlement fees (based on transaction volume) — Kinexys, Citi Token Services; can even be free, with revenue reflected in deposit retention and stickiness.
  • Model Three: Price differences and inventory (based on balance sheets) — market making, proprietary trading, OTC; it is the best business when markets are good, with no lower limit downward.
  • Model Four: Asset appreciation (revenue comes from cycles) — crypto venture capital, token treasuries; upside potential is good, downside can be poor.

The first two models earn “the toll fees that others must pay you,” while the latter two earn “how much uncertainty you are willing to bear.”

5. The Positions of Winners

Looking at the profit list in reverse shows the same set of actions. The following is a general summary of publicly available cases and does not constitute advice:

  • Establish the revenue model first, followed by the technical solution—first have a clear fee basis (AUM or transaction volume), then choose the technology.
  • Align assessment cycles with business types—businesses needing to withstand a 40% drawdown usually are not included in quarterly market value reports; either place them in independent entities with long-term funding or refrain from pursuing.
  • Buy time, not pride—acquisitions solve “where the capability comes from,” but do not solve “who bears the risk.”
  • Secure authorizations and registers, rather than deals—fee bases lie in issuer authorizations, shareholder registers, and corporate actions; the opposition list of 67 issuers is proof of this reality.
  • Align with regulators to create compliance barriers—MiCA, Hong Kong's licensed platform system, Singapore's licensing framework, all turn compliance from a cost into a moat.
  • Write exit scripts at project initiation—setting exit clauses and valuation anchors in advance allows similar disposals to be much more dignified (this point is an observation inferred from results, rather than an industry-verified fact).

6. Three Calculations: Clarifying Revenue Structures

The following is indicative estimation used to demonstrate differences in revenue structures and does not constitute any predictions or assessments of any firm's revenues or costs.

With a scale of $10 billion and fees of 5–10 basis points, annual revenue is about $5 million to $10 million; the value lies in zero directional risk, high stickiness, and the ability to layer staking, settlement, forex, etc. fees.

Revenue = AUM × management fee rate × sharing ratio, more dependent on distribution than custody—only institutions with end-user channels can push fee wars down to 0.14%, leaving little room for newcomers to fight back.

Inventory of $1 billion, daily fluctuation of 3%, a single-day inventory profit and loss standard deviation is around $30 million. Capital adequacy, hedging speed, and risk limits determine if market making is a money printer or a shredder—these three factors are precisely the most difficult for the banking system to adjust flexibly.

In summary: revenue from the first two calculations grows linearly with scale, with limited tail risk; revenue and risk from the third calculation stem from the same variable and cannot be separated.

7. The Position of Hong Kong

The choice for Hong Kong is clear: to thicken the system rather than enlarge leverage. The VATP licensing framework, the "Stablecoins Regulation" (Cap. 656) effective August 1, 2025, and the tokenized bond and settlement pilot led by the Monetary Authority form a combination of “official registry + regulated custody + local currency settlement.” According to this article's classification, Hong Kong has nearly refined “selling pipelines” into a main road: custody, settlement, issuance, and secondary trading must all go through licensed entities, while pure speculative routes are compressed to the smallest space.

This does not mean there is no competitive pressure: when BlackRock connects $311 billion in money market funds to the blockchain, JPMorgan spreads deposit tokens to Ethereum, and Deutsche Bank formalizes custody products, the real challenge is getting these “pipelines” to agree to connect the Asian node to this system rather than elsewhere.

(This section is merely a general description of Hong Kong's regulatory system and does not involve or constitute an explanation or introduction to the business, products, or licensing arrangements of this company.)

8. Conclusion

The most profitable in Web3 have never been the ones who understand tokens the best, but the ones who can collect toll fees the best. The past five years can be summarized in two sentences: those selling pipelines are building scale on top of cost barriers; those selling risk are turning volatility into lessons. The next stage's watershed moment lies not in whose trading desk is faster, but in whose registers are thicker, custodians more trustworthy, and settlements cheaper.

The reported sale is not a surrender but possibly a dignified retreat; Deutsche Bank's launch is not a declaration but a quiet takeover. History does not grade righteous wars; it only prices business models.

🔗 Sources

  1. Bloomberg — Nomura Explores Possible Sale of Laser Digital Crypto Unit (2026-11-11) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-11-11/nomura-explores-possible-sale-of-laser-digital-crypto-unit
  2. Cointelegraph — Nomura explores sale of crypto unit Laser Digital (2026-11-12) https://cointelegraph.com/news/nomura-sale-crypto-unit-laser-digital
  3. Ledger Insights — Nomura temporarily tightens crypto exposure at Laser Digital following losses (2026-02-02) https://www.ledgerinsights.com/nomura-temporarily-tightens-crypto-exposure-at-laser-digital-following-losses/
  4. The Japan Times — Nomura stock hit after research affiliate writedown and Europe loss (2026-04-27, paywall, not independently verified) https://www.japantimes.co.jp/business/2026/04/27/companies/nomura-shares-fall/
  5. Bloomberg — BlackRock Launches Tokenized Money Market Funds in Europe (2026-08-03) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-03/blackrock-launches-tokenized-money-market-funds-in-europe
  6. Ledger Insights — BlackRock launches first European tokenized MMFs (2026-08-04) https://www.ledgerinsights.com/blackrock-launches-first-european-tokenized-mmfs/
  7. DL News — JPMorgan expands digital assets push with Mitsubishi deal as it targets $10bn in daily transactions (2026-03-31) https://www.dlnews.com/articles/markets/jpmorgan-expands-digital-assets-push-with-mitsubishi-deal-as-it-targets-dollar10bn-in-daily-transactions/
  8. the Block — JPMorgan expands 'JPM Coin' deposit token to Ethereum for institutional clients (2026-10-19) https://www.theblock.co/news/business/2026-10-19-jpmorgan-jpm-coin-deposit-token-ethereum-418874
  9. PaymentsJournal — Citi Expands Token Services Into Japan and UAE (2026-09-30) https://www.paymentsjournal.com/citi-expands-token-services-into-japan-and-uae/
  10. The Wall Street Journal — JPMorgan, Citi and Big Banks Plan New Tokenized Deposit System to Answer Crypto (2026-06-04, paywall, not independently verified) https://www.wsj.com/finance/banking/jpmorgan-citi-and-big-banks-plan-new-tokenized-deposit-system-to-answer-crypto-6b2d696b
  11. BNY — BNY and Goldman Sachs Launch Tokenized Money Market Funds Solution (2025-07-23) https://www.bny.com/corporate/global/en/about-us/newsroom/company-news/bny-and-goldman-sachs-launch-tokenized-money-market-funds-solution.html
  12. CoinDesk — The cheapest bitcoin ETF yet: Morgan Stanley uses 0.14% fee to draw $100 million in first week (2026-04-16) https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2026/04/16/morgan-stanley-s-bitcoin-etf-reaches-usd100m-in-first-week-marking-the-bank-s-strongest-launch
  13. Cointelegraph — Deutsche Bank debuts digital asset custody services in EU (2026-11-11) https://cointelegraph.com/news/deutsche-bank-debuts-digital-asset-custody-services-eu
  14. Reuters — Insight: Australian stock exchange's blockchain failure burns market trust (2022-12-19) https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/australian-stock-exchanges-blockchain-failure-burns-market-trust-2022-12-19/
  15. CoinDesk — Crypto market maker B2C2 held sale talks with multiple potential buyers (2026-06-29) https://www.coindesk.com/business/2026/06/29/crypto-market-maker-b2c2-held-sale-talks-with-multiple-potential-buyers
  16. Cointelegraph — OKX/ICE tokenized stocks: blue chips push back (2026-11-12) https://cointelegraph.com/news/okxice-tokenized-stocks-blue-chips-push-back
  17. CoinDesk — Circle overtakes BlackRock in tokenized Treasuries as market hits record $11 billion (2026-03-13) https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2026/03/13/circle-overtakes-blackrock-in-tokenized-treasuries-as-market-hits-record-usd11-billion
  18. Hong Kong SFC — Virtual Asset Trading Platform Licensing System https://www.sfc.hk/en/Welcome-to-the-Fintech-Contact-Point/Virtual-assets/Virtual-asset-trading-platforms-operators
  19. Hong Kong Monetary Authority — Regulatory Framework for Stablecoin Issuers https://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/key-functions/international-financial-centre/stablecoin-issuers/
  20. Hong Kong Electronic Version of Laws — “Stablecoin Regulation” (Cap. 656, effective August 1, 2025) https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap656 
  21. Hong Kong Monetary Authority — Bond Market Development (including tokenized bond-related pilot) https://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/key-functions/international-financial-centre/bond-market-development/

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