Written by: Zhao Ying

The demands from the United States regarding South Korea's semiconductor industry are shifting from "building factories" to "sharing profits".

On Friday, the Korea Times reported, citing informed sources, that Rick Switzer, the deputy representative of the U.S. Trade Representative's Office, explicitly stated during his meeting with South Korea's Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy, Yoon Han-koo, last month that the U.S. has the right to share the massive profits of SK Hynix and Samsung Electronics, on the grounds that large purchases by U.S. companies have directly driven the profit growth of South Korean chip firms. This statement has not yet been officially confirmed by the U.S. side, but it has raised widespread attention in South Korea's industry and government sectors.

The backdrop of this trend is that South Korea's semiconductor exports to the U.S. surged more than 90% year-on-year in the first half of this year, with South Korean memory companies continuing to secure high profits in the global AI industry chain.

A research report by CITIC Securities points out that based on historical experience, when foreign companies consistently gain high shares or profits in important industries, it often triggers political intervention from the U.S. government, accelerating the global redistribution of industrial interests—the experiences of Japan's semiconductor industry in the 1980s and Taiwan's panel industry in the 2000s serve as precedents.

U.S. Logic: Procurement Contributes to Profit, Should Share Revenue

According to the Korea Times citing an industry insider familiar with the situation, Rick Switzer proposed to Yoon Han-koo in the meeting that U.S. companies' significant procurement of South Korean semiconductors directly contributed to the profit growth of South Korean chip firms, and therefore, the U.S. is equally entitled to share this portion of profit.

"The logic of the U.S. side is that if local partners in South Korea are entitled to a share of the profits for their contributions, then U.S. companies should have the same rights," the insider stated. A senior South Korean government official also confirmed to the Korea Times that the U.S. side indeed made this claim but did not provide further elaboration.

The Korea Times has repeatedly contacted the U.S. Trade Representative's Office, as well as the Departments of Commerce and the Treasury for comments, but received no response. Officials from South Korea's Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy stated they were not aware of this matter and reiterated that South Korea's basic position is that "industry-related affairs should be promoted based on the principle of commercial rationality".

Historical Reflection: High Profits Often Ignite Political Intervention

The research report from CITIC Securities analyzed two typical cases that reveal the U.S. government's action logic in similar situations.

• Japanese Semiconductor (1980s): As the Japanese semiconductor industry rapidly rose and continuously squeezed the competitive advantage of U.S. companies, the U.S. government, under pressure from the business community and industry associations, subsequently imposed various pressures on Japan through tariffs, Section 301 investigations, the U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Agreement, and 100% punitive tariffs. The compounded impact of these policies combined with the bursting of Japan's bubble economy ultimately led to a redistribution of global semiconductor market shares and profits. Notably, the market share lost by Japan did not return to the U.S., while South Korea, supported by policies, became the ultimate beneficiary.
• Taiwan's Panel (2000s): In 2006, Taiwan's large-sized LCD panel shipments ranked first in the world. In the same year, the U.S. Department of Justice launched an antitrust investigation on grounds of price manipulation, leading to major Taiwanese panel companies incurring over $800 million in criminal fines, with several executives imprisoned. The compounded policy impact combined with the financial crisis and industry cycle downturn ultimately shifted global panel industry shares and profits toward mainland China.

CITIC Securities points out that both of these cases exhibit a common pattern: once the U.S. government reclassifies the high profits of foreign companies as detrimental to domestic industrial competitiveness, political intervention soon follows, often utilizing multiple tools such as trade, industry, or antitrust regulations collaboratively.

Current Landscape: Supply Priority, Political Pressure Yet to Form

CITIC Securities believes that determining whether the high profits of South Korea's memory industry will trigger U.S. government intervention hinges on understanding its technological and economic policy decision-making mechanism.

At this stage, U.S. policies are still led by the core team of the White House, including figures like Trump and Peskin, and as the influence of right-wing technology figures like Michael Kratsios and David Sacks has risen, the impact of U.S. tech giants on policy agendas is also strengthening. Once issues are defined within the core circle of the White House, agencies such as the Department of Commerce, USTR, Department of Justice, and FTC typically execute using trade, industry, or antitrust tools.

At the current stage, against the backdrop of still strong demand for AI, the U.S. business community is more focused on ensuring memory supply rather than pressing South Korean firms to lower prices and profits. The political arena tends to combine "Make America Great Again" with technology industry policies, promoting South Korean companies to expand production in the U.S. to drive manufacturing, job creation, and supply chain rejuvenation. In response to rising memory prices from South Korea, although there have been scattered voices of opposition from U.S. politicians, industry organizations, and consumers, a systematic political pressure has yet to materialize.

Risk Inflection Point: Cost Transmission Capability is Key Variable

CITIC Securities warns that as long as memory costs can still be transmitted downstream, price increases will more easily be viewed as part of the expansion of AI prosperity, resulting in relatively limited political intervention incentives. However, if prices continue to rise and significantly squeeze U.S. companies' profits and investment returns, the high profits of South Korean memory companies may be redefined by the U.S. government as harmful to U.S. AI competitiveness.

The research report suggests closely monitoring two signals: first, whether U.S. tech giants pivot from securing supply to openly opposing price increases; second, whether the policy decision-making layers shift from ensuring supply and promoting expansion in the U.S. to intervening on grounds of "monopoly," "price manipulation," or "supply chain security".

Rick Switzer's above statement may be an early signal that this risk is shifting from latent to explicit. For SK Hynix and Samsung Electronics, the battleground of the U.S.-South Korea semiconductor game has quietly extended from localizing manufacturing to the distribution of profits.

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