Author: IOSG Legal
Having deepened in the cryptocurrency industry for many years, we have invested in hundreds of projects, moving from initial confusion and acceptance of investment terms in the industry, to today's reflection and questioning:
When a project's structure becomes increasingly complex and documents more specialized, are we truly enhancing safety, or merely making risks appear more respectable? When the agreement is filled with governance terms, can these rights truly be enforced, or are they just empty talk?
The systemic risks in Web3 investment often do not lie in the market, but in the lack of accountability in the structure itself. The documents may look good, with complete terminology, but in the worst-case scenario, investors cannot find responsible parties, cannot constrain control rights, and cannot follow a path for relief. Essentially, this is not risk control, but risk packaging.
Three recurrent structural issues:
1. Excessive separation of entities: Value, control rights, and responsibilities are artificially split. Research/development and operations are within one company, while token issuing and treasury are within another entity (foundation/SPV), and the investor may only sign with one of them. On the surface, this appears to be risk isolation; in reality, it is "risk without an owner": when something goes wrong, everyone can say, "it wasn't me." What investors truly fear is not decentralization, but the absolution of responsibility.
2. Governance being symbolized: There are documents, but no mechanisms; there are rights, but no enforceability. In the early days, verbal promises and gentlemen's agreements were common (looking back, this seems like the reckless spirit of the Wild West), evolving into later constructs like SAFTE/SAFE/SAFT/SAFE+Token Warrant, yet key aspects remain absent: substantial consent rights on critical matters, budgeting and auditing cadence of treasury expenditures, rules for replacing multi-signature signers, and the scope and boundaries of information disclosure, which read like corporate governance but act like wish lists.
3. Relief pathways being structurally weakened: Assets run faster than the law, entity changes occur faster than procedures, and cross-border costs are higher than compensations—all of these are reasons why crypto investors struggle to defend their rights. For investors, true risk control is not about writing longer clauses, but ensuring that in the worst-case scenario, they can "stem the bleeding," "reclaim," and "enforce" their rights.
This industry has emerged from the early "dark forest," yet project collapses are still common. The reasons are twofold: first, some founders lack respect for the spirit of contracts; second, the industry lacks structural memory, causing investors to repeatedly make the same structural mistakes.
This article discusses five real case scenarios, addressing those often overlooked structural issues that can be fatal in extreme situations, distilling lessons from practice into actionable principles.
Case One: From "Perfect Structure" to "Disappearing Defendant"
【Case keywords: Entity separation, legal entity existence】
Years ago, we encountered a project aimed at building blockchain gaming infrastructure. The team had impressive backgrounds and qualifications, with their "one-click on-chain" solution directly targeting the core pain points of traditional game manufacturers. To secure financing and avoid complex global regulation, the project designed a widely recognized "perfect" offshore structure at the time: registering a parent company in Delaware responsible for technology development, while establishing an SPV in crypto-friendly Gibraltar specifically for token issuance. The technology and team were in the U.S., the token with the offshore SPV—this was the default consensus within the investment community at the time.
Faced with such a structure, investors typically took two paths: traditional equity investors poured money into the parent company, reasoning that controlling the team means controlling the project. We chose a more "Crypto Native" path: signing a Token Purchase Agreement directly with the SPV in Gibraltar, exchanging investment for future token rights. Our judgment was that since tokens would be the core asset of this ecosystem, acquiring token rights directly was more straightforward than equity. At the time, it seemed like a rational judgment.
After the investment, there was a relatively calm period. The project's progress was slow but steady, and the team consistently maintained polite and restrained communication with investors.
However, one day, the SPV in Gibraltar suddenly announced a CEO change without notifying the U.S. parent company or any investors, almost simultaneously unilaterally starting token issuance. Internal strife became public, market confidence collapsed instantly, and the price of the token dropped sharply upon launch. Our "token rights" overnight turned from potential value into volatile digital chips.
Initially, we reacted with anger, but after calming down, we quickly assessed that this was more like a control struggle within the founding team. The SPV's management clearly attempted to break away from the parent company's control, and institutions that invested in the parent company's equity would inevitably take legal action, potentially steering the project back on track. We chose to observe.
As expected, the parent company and its equity investors quickly filed lawsuits in both the U.S. and Gibraltar, and achieved initial success: they successfully obtained a temporary restraining order from a U.S. court, restoring the parent company's access to key technological infrastructure, along with a freezing order from a Gibraltar court, freezing a significant portion of the tokens issued by the SPV. The parent company was likely to regain control.
Then, an unexpected twist occurred that no one anticipated.
The Gibraltar court overturned the freezing order. The reason was chillingly simple: that U.S. parent company had, due to continuously failing to submit required compliance documents for over a year, been legally dissolved by the Delaware government over a year ago.
Legally speaking, this company had ceased to exist.
A company that has "died" in legal terms cannot qualify as a plaintiff to sue anyone. It has no legal personality, no rights-bearing status, and no interest that a court can protect.
Those institutions that invested in the parent company's equity were completely ousted overnight. Their investment’s legal entity had vanished, and all claims to rights lost their foundation. Investment, reduced to zero.
We, who invested in the SPV’s token rights, although our assets depreciated due to internal strife, at least still held tradable tokens. In contrast, those thought to be "safer" equity investors completely lost their legal standing.
Rather than relief, that moment felt more like a chill of fear. The most fatal risk in this industry might not be market collapse, technical flaws, or even the character of the founders, but a forgotten compliance document that costs only a few hundred dollars.
Case Conclusion
The continuity of legal due diligence (Legal DD) is crucial. The essence of investment decision-making lies not just in confirming a company's status as "Good Standing" at the moment of signing the agreement, but in establishing a continuous compliance monitoring mechanism throughout the entire investment cycle. Ensuring that each legal entity in the investment chain is "alive" and compliant is the most basic bottom line of investment management, yet it is often overlooked.
One must penetrate understanding the actual control of offshore structures. When core assets (such as token issuance rights) are placed within an offshore SPV, and the parent company's control over that SPV relies solely on a piece of paper, investors must remain highly vigilant. Strong constraints (Covenants) should be incorporated into investment agreements, such as: without majority consent from investors, the board or controllers of the SPV cannot change; the parent company must maintain its legal existence status, or else default clauses will be triggered; any significant decisions (such as Token Launch) must gain consent from directors appointed by investors. These clauses must be explicitly written into the investment at the outset, rather than patched up after problems arise.
Never blindly trust lead investors. Even the top funds in the industry may have blind spots in their due diligence or undisclosed conflicts of interest. Independent, cross-verified background checks (Reference Checks) are indispensable. Investors must take responsibility for their own funds based on independent judgments.
Case Two: The "Evaporation" of Value—Entity Switching and Dilution of Early Investors
【Case keywords: Entity separation, entity switching dilution】
Another type of structural risk is more covert and often occurs within a "legal" framework.
In 2021, amidst market enthusiasm, we invested in a technology company specializing in formal verification. The team comprised experts with top academic backgrounds, demonstrating strong technical capabilities and consistently showing great respect for investors, with a harmonious partnership.
However, about two to three years later, we gradually discovered that the founder began to build a completely new token issuing entity, intending to advance the token project under an entity entirely separate from the originally invested company. Even more unacceptable was the fact that this new entity neither recognized the early equity investors nor attempted to include them in the new token rights framework.
From a legal perspective, their operation was technically flawless: the new entity was independently registered, and the original investment contracts did not directly constrain the actions of this new entity. However, from a business logic perspective, this represented a systematic deprivation of value from early investors—those early investors nurtured a team and a technology with their funds and trust, only to see these resources "regrow" within the new entity as the original rights structure was quietly undermined.
We subsequently represented all early investors in protracted and difficult negotiations with the founder, arguing for our rightful entitlements. Ultimately, we secured more favorable valuation terms for early investors than those for new investors. However, this process nearly exhausted our relationship with the founder.
This episode led us to a profound realization: entity switching could be one of the “most elegant” forms of value plundering.
Case Conclusion
Include "entity switching protection clauses" in investment agreements. Clearly stipulate that if a founder establishes a new affiliated entity within a specified timeframe after investment (recommended 2-3 years) and advances the issuance of core assets (especially tokens), early investors are entitled to a corresponding share of equity. This clause should be incorporated into the agreement at the time of the initial investment, rather than patched after issues arise.
Governance rights are more important than valuation. Board seats, rights to be informed and approve significant structural changes, are the last line of defense in protecting early investors’ interests. Relying solely on relationships and trust is insufficient.
Case Three: When Humanity Becomes a Variable—Rescue Financing and Commitment Failure
【Case keywords: Relief pathways being structurally weakened】
If the first two cases revolve around the cold game of law and structure, this case is filled with the entanglements of humanity and human nature. Sometimes, it is not complex terms that defeat you, but a rapidly changing face in the face of interests.
That was during the depths of a bear market; a project we had invested in was running out of funds and on the verge of collapse. The founder earnestly expressed that there were no funds left, and without new funding injections, operation could not be sustained.
In a bid to protect our existing investment and in a glimmer of hope for the project, we decided to lend a hand, conducting a round of rescue financing at a lower valuation. The founder expressed deep gratitude at the time.
Once the funds arrived, the project was able to persist. Shortly after, the market began to warm up, and the sector in which the project operated became a hotspot. With this "lifeline," the founder sustained operations until the upturn, coupled with exceptional storytelling skills, eventually attracting new investments from well-known institutions, successfully listing on mainstream exchanges.
However, communication with the founder became exceedingly difficult afterwards. When investors wished him to honor his initial commitments, he began a series of excuses—from initially refusing to distribute tokens to investors due to Coinbase listing requests, to various delays citing his own illness and family sickness. The entire process spanned months. Ultimately, it came to a standoff: either accept the same terms as other new investors or walk away. The initial act of rescue was disregarded in the face of substantial interests.
Fortunately, our legal and post-investment teams never gave up. Through long, patient communication and advocacy, we eventually recovered the vast majority of the tokens owed. However, this experience revealed a fundamental problem: changes in the interest landscape can systematically alter human behavior. This is not a pessimistic view of human nature but a variable that should be pre-designed into contractual structures.
Case Conclusion
All business commitments, regardless of size, must be formalized in legally binding documents. One should not relax legal document requirements simply because the other party is humble in demeanor. Business decisions should always be based on worst-case scenarios. Rescue financing during bear markets often occurs at times of utmost information asymmetry and emotional pressure—precisely when legal requirements are most likely to be relaxed. Especially in situations where the other party is at their lowest, and our negotiation leverage is the greatest, we must insist on writing all commitments into formal agreements.
Due to the scarcity of contractual spirit, it is essential to design provisions with "teeth" to safeguard the execution of agreements. Investment agreements must clearly delineate default responsibilities. For example, if the other party fails to fulfill specific terms, it triggers substantial penalties or grants investors the right to acquire additional tokens at an extremely low price. The costs of breaching must far exceed the potential gains from dishonesty. Simultaneously, ensure that investors possess sufficient negotiation leverage, such as board seats, rights to veto major decisions, or joint control over company bank accounts/multi-signature wallets.
Before deciding to provide a rescue, first answer a fundamental question: What is the root cause of this team's financial crisis? Do their values withstand pressure testing? Upholding transparency and compliance is not due to a lack of trust in the founders, but rather the most basic protection for both parties' relationship.
Case Four: Governance Displacement—The Cost of Silence
【Case keywords: Governance being symbolized】
There is a type of risk that is neither a legal structure flaw nor a subjective betrayal by the founders but arises from the absence of investors at crucial moments.
We once invested in a promising Web3 infrastructure project at the time. Behind the project was a well-respected, asset-rich major shareholder, which was one of the key reasons we were optimistic about the project. However, during an all-staff meeting, this major shareholder publicly dismissed the CEO, catching the entire team off guard.
We later heard about this event not from the project’s official notification but from the former CEO.
At that time, the judgment was that this was merely a normal management adjustment and did not constitute an immediate crisis signal. We didn't call for audits, didn't request a special shareholder meeting, didn't initiate evaluation procedures, but opted for silence and observation.
About six months to a year later, the new management declared a liquidation of the foundation. We ultimately recovered less than twenty percent of our initial investment.
In retrospect, that abrupt dismissal of the CEO was the clearest warning signal marking the project's decline. When a company undergoes significant abnormal management changes, it often indicates that core governance structures have developed deep fractures. At such a time, what investors should do is immediately call for an independent audit and intervene in governance reconstruction instead of standing by.
Case Conclusion
Establish significant governance events as mandatory "trigger points" for intervention. Investment agreements should clearly state that abnormal CEO departures, changes in core shareholders, lawsuits, or arbitration initiation will automatically trigger special rights for investors, including demanding independent financial audits, convening special shareholder meetings, suspending significant financial expenditures, etc.
Continuously monitor, rather than passively wait. Post-investment management should not stop at routine quarterly updates. Investors need to establish proactive channels for information acquisition, including communication with key project staff (not just the founders). It is suggested to require that the project provide quarterly independent updates at the CFO/CTO level in the post-investment agreement, rather than only through the single channel of the founder.
Case Five: The Halo of Credentials—The Black Hole of Character
【Case keywords: Governance being symbolized, relief pathways being structurally weakened】
In the investment world, it is often said, "Investing is about investing in people." However, we can easily be misled by a shiny résumé. Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, top hedge funds… these names seem to carry a halo, leading people to subconsciously equate "elite background" with "professionalism, discipline, and reliability." But the harsh reality is that sometimes the most dangerous individuals are precisely these "golden boys." Training on Wall Street taught them to package narratives, exploit rules, and manipulate emotions. These abilities can be neither inherently good nor bad, but when applied in misdirection, their destructive power can exceed expectations.
We once “luckily” missed out on a project. The founder had an impeccable résumé, having gone from Goldman Sachs to JPMorgan before becoming an executive and then starting his own venture. What he aimed to create was an "absolutely fair" on-chain casino. The narrative was sensational, the team magnificent, and many well-known institutions scrambled to join. However, due to our significant concerns about the compliance risks of the "casino" track, our risk control department ultimately rejected the investment after multiple discussions with the founder regarding compliance pathways.
The plot twist occurred the day after we made our decision. The project announced it had completed several million dollars in funding. However, just minutes after the funds arrived, the founder began transferring the company’s money into his personal wallet. Over the following week, he lost several million dollars of it in another on-chain casino app. He promised to build a fair casino, yet took the funds meant for building a casino and went gambling elsewhere. This was not a failure of risk management; it was outright fraud and embezzlement. Eventually, the FBI intervened, and the founder was arrested, facing years of imprisonment.
Another case we experienced involved a 3A game blockbuster praised as the "on-chain Call of Duty." The team members came from top game studios, but the project was burning cash at an alarming rate, up to two or three million dollars a month, while development was severely lagging. The company quickly fell into a financial crisis, reducing its team from over a hundred to just over ten.
At this critical juncture, we discovered that the co-founder and CTO had continually sold their team tokens in the secondary market for seven months, cashing out nearly 700,000 dollars. Legally, they sold their vested portion, seemingly without issue. However, from a business ethics standpoint, with the company hanging by a thread and many employees being laid off, a core leader was cashing out like crazy. The signal this sent to the market was unmistakable: "The ship is sinking; I'm jumping off first."
In these two cases, investors focused too much on the founder's past prestige while neglecting in-depth examination of their current character and behavior patterns. At the same time, a lack of key controls such as "multi-signature" and "milestone payments" was the direct cause of fund mismanagement.
Case Conclusion
Character due diligence (Character DD) must be prioritized. Resumes can be embellished, stories can be packaged, but a person's character and behavioral patterns remain relatively stable. Investment institutions need to develop a more systematic methodology for character due diligence, involving not just routine background checks but potentially deeper interviews and even behavioral stress tests. Especially concerning is whether there are fundamental contradictions between the founder's personal history and the project mission they claim to pursue. For instance, someone with a gambling history entering the casino business is itself a huge red flag.
Fund control is a non-negotiable investment bottom line. For early projects, particularly when a single founder has overwhelming power, all funds must not be placed in a personal wallet they completely control. A multi-signature wallet should be a mandatory requirement, and investors or their designated trustworthy third parties must be among the signers. Fund releases should be based on clear and quantifiable milestones; upon completion of a task, the next batch of funds can be released. These risk control measures, already well-established in traditional VC sectors, should be strictly enforced in the crypto industry.
Deeply bind the interests of the core team with the long-term development of the project. The unlocking of team tokens should not only be time-based but should be tied to project milestones, such as product launch, reaching a certain number of users, or achieving a certain level of protocol revenue. Additionally, the agreement should clearly stipulate that during financial difficulties or major crises, core member token sales will be restricted. This serves as both constraint and stance, showing the community and all investors the team's determination to share the project's fate.
Conclusion: Return to Common Sense, Navigate Through Cycles
After going through all this, we are no longer those passionate "Web3 believers." We have become more like realists, assessors of risk, observers of humanity. We no longer get easily excited by grand narratives but examine every detail like auditors and test every assumption like engineers.
When evaluating a project, we now repeatedly ask ourselves:
Do we really understand this founder? Apart from the story they tell, have we gathered insights from other angles, from former colleagues, previous bosses, or even rivals, about what kind of person they are?
Do we truly understand this project's legal structure? Are there hidden "backdoors"? If the founder runs away, is the contract we hold a piece of worthless paper or a sharp sword?
Once the funds are injected, do we have control over how they are used? Or can we only hope for the founder's moral awareness?
Are the interests of the founding team completely aligned with those of us investors? Is their token unlocking mechanism encouraging long-term commitment or facilitating short-term cashouts?
When we see signs of problems, do we have the courage to say no?
Ultimately, good investment structures are not designed to guard against honest individuals but to guard against extreme situations. When everyone is dignified, any structure operates well; the true test is whether the contracts in hand can speak for you in moments of interest divergence, market upheaval, and trust collapse.
We have paid real money for these lessons. Writing them down is because we believe that the cost of industry advancement should not be repeatedly paid by every new generation of entrants.
Because of this, we have systematically introduced mechanisms for continuous compliance monitoring, entity switching protection clauses, and mandatory multi-signature wallets into our investment processes. These are not just improvements on paper, but institutional upgrades that have resulted from real costs endured time and again.
免责声明:本文章仅代表作者个人观点,不代表本平台的立场和观点。本文章仅供信息分享,不构成对任何人的任何投资建议。用户与作者之间的任何争议,与本平台无关。如网页中刊载的文章或图片涉及侵权,请提供相关的权利证明和身份证明发送邮件到[email protected],本平台相关工作人员将会进行核查。