Author: JamesX

Introduction - About "Making Money"

Since 2026, crypto protocols have earned a total of $7.42 billion.

During the same period, over 100 crypto projects have shut down, gone bankrupt, or stopped updates completely, with the vast majority of altcoins retracting by 70% to 90% from their peaks.

Zooming in on specific projects, this comparison becomes even starker:

• Hyperliquid has earned $758 million in the past 12 months, using most of it to buy back its own tokens - the token price has dropped nearly 30% from its historical high in June;
• Pump.fun generated $330 million in revenue in a year, spending $315 million on buybacks - the token has fallen by 60% since its launch;
• Aave holds $12 billion in deposits, capturing about 60% of the DeFi lending market, with annual revenue exceeding $100 million - the token has decreased by 86% from its peak in 2021.

The business is real, and money was genuinely made. Meanwhile, the token you hold continues to drop.

Where exactly is the problem?

Most people's answer is, "It's a bear market, fundamentals don't matter." This answer is too lazy and wrong—because it cannot explain why, in the same bear market, Hyperliquid increased by 1400%, while revenue-growing Pump declined by 60%.

To answer this question, we need to return to a more fundamental place: when we say "a company is cheap," what are we really saying?

In traditional finance, the method to judge whether an asset is undervalued is very simple and mature: look at how much money the business makes in a year, then look at how much the market pays for that money, and dividing the two yields the price-to-earnings ratio (P/E).

The reason P/E can become the most universal valuation language over the past century is not because the formula is particularly smart—it’s just one division. What truly makes it valid is that both the numerator and denominator are locked in by a complete set of regulations.

The numerator is locked in by accounting standards: what counts as income, what counts as cost, and when to recognize it all have unique answers. This unique answer is backed by independent audits. The shareholders' right to demand this answer is enforced by corporate laws and fiduciary duties—management cannot announce dividends one day and say no dividends the next.

Three layers of systems: definition, verification, enforcement. Lacking any of these three, P/E fails.

However, in the crypto industry, none of these three layers exist.

There is no unified definition of revenue—within the same protocol and time frame, the "revenue" reported by two data sources can differ by over 30 times (specific cases will be mentioned later). There are no independent audits—most protocols' financial states can only be inferred from on-chain data by third parties. More critically, there is no legal right to demand anything: what token holders possess is merely a promise of "the protocol party voluntarily sharing profits." This promise can be unilaterally modified and has already been changed more than once in the past 12 months.

Therefore, when you see "a certain project's annual revenue is $200 million, market cap is $500 million, P/S is only 2.5 times" on a data website and excitedly think you've found a severely undervalued target—you can almost be sure you've miscalculated.

Because of that $200 million, $180 million might go directly to liquidity providers, never belonging to the protocol; of the remaining $20 million, $15 million might sit in a treasury that the team can change the use of at any time; what truly flows through buybacks or dividends to you, the token holder, may only be $5 million.

And in the same year, this protocol issued $30 million worth of additional tokens to maintain that $200 million in business volume.

Net value flow: negative $25 million.

This is not an extreme assumption fabricated to illustrate a point. According to Castle Labs' calculations in July 2026, after accounting for token emissions, the net value flowing to token holders from traditional protocols like Aerodrome, Sky, and Uniswap was all negative.

Returning to the initial question: the project is making money, but your token is still falling—where exactly is the issue?

The answer is: it is not the market's fault, nor are fundamentals unimportant. Rather, there are four gates between the "money the protocol earns" and "the money you can receive"—and most people only looked at the first gate.

The reason Hyperliquid can rise 1400% is that it opened all four gates; the reason Pump plummeted 60% while revenues grew is that it reduced one of those gates by half in April 2026. The following sections will break down these two cases in detail.

This article aims to do three things:

• First, break down these four gates one by one, establishing a valuation screening method that can operate effectively in crypto contexts;
• Second, using the same criteria and timing, screen this batch of "revenue-generating" projects from 2026 to see who is genuinely cheap and who merely appears cheap;
• Third, answer a more crucial question than "which coin is undervalued"—as crypto projects increasingly resemble traditional companies, where exactly do token holders stand in this new structure.

Before we begin, I want to take you back four years.

1. The Foreshadowing Four Years Ago

In April 2022, I wrote a lengthy report on DeFi on-chain liquidity titled "[The Current Situation and Future Outlook of DeFi Liquidity." The core proposition of that report, looking back today, is actually a very basic question: how can project teams obtain the most liquidity at the lowest cost?

At that time, the industry's answers all fundamentally were the same—issue tokens.

Liquidity mining is issuing tokens. Olympus’s (3,3) is issuing tokens. Curve’s ve model is using locked assets to obtain larger portions of token issuance rights. Convex is to issue tokens to vie for distribution rights of others’ tokens. Votium’s bribery mechanism involves spending money to buy the voting rights that decide how others issue tokens. The entire innovation history from DeFi 1.0 to 2.0 is a history of how to more cleverly print money to rent liquidity.

The report offered three judgments, which after four years have proven to have much farther-reaching implications than I initially envisioned.

Judgment 1: The Lesson of FCoin - Metrics Generated by Manipulation Are Not Metrics

I spent a significant amount of space in the report reviewing FCoin’s "Trading is Mining." The original wording was:

FCoin's liquidity mining model failed most in its reliance solely on trading volume to release rewards; it misunderstood the cause-and-effect relationship between trading volume and liquidity: in traditional markets, larger trading volumes usually indicate more abundant liquidity, but once those volumes are generated for token incentives, they do not represent the quality of liquidity at all.

FCoin’s daily trading volume once soared to $5.6 billion, appearing to be "one of the most liquid exchanges in the world." Everyone knew that was false.

Now, replace "trading volume" with "revenue" and "liquidity" with "cash flow":

Once the revenue is generated through token incentives, it cannot represent the quality of cash flow at all.

This is the first knife to pick up in the valuation screening of 2026. If a protocol earned $100 million this year but issued $200 million worth of tokens to achieve that $100 million trading volume—it is not a money-making business; it is a money-printing machine that has lost $100 million. And on DefiLlama's fees leaderboard, it looks identical to truly profitable protocols.

Four years ago, the mistake was conflating falsified trading volumes with genuine liquidity. Today's mistake is conflating purchased revenue with genuine cash flow. The mechanism of the errors is exactly the same: using an easily observable, easily manipulatable metric to proxy something that is hard to observe and really significant.

Judgment 2: Tokemak's "Singularity" - Whose Assets Are in Your Treasury

In traditional blockchain projects, most protocol treasuries' "value" is reflected merely in the market value of their own tokens. However, if that token is sold off, the treasury becomes worthless. As the singularity approaches and is realized, the value of the Tokemak protocol's treasury will consist of non-TOKE assets, effectively making TOKE an index of the various assets it supports.

Tokemak itself did not reach that singularity. Yet the state described in that paragraph—the treasury holding other people's money instead of tokens they minted—accurately represents the clearest dividing line between projects that survived in 2026 and those that died.

Look at the 2026 names that are genuinely profitable: Tether and Circle earn from U.S. Treasury interest and mint-redeem fees; Hyperliquid earns from trading fees, settled in USDC; Aave earns from lending spreads and GHO interest; ether.fi's Cash business earns from a 1.38% card transaction fee; Spark earns from the spread of placing Sky’s reserves.

All these revenues are dollar-denominated and come from actual payers outside the protocol.

While more than 100 projects that died saw the vast majority of their "revenues" come from a closed cycle: issuing tokens → subsidizing → creating activity → storytelling with activity data → issuing tokens again. There is no money coming from outside in this cycle. The moment the secondary market stops paying for that story, the entire cycle instantly goes to zero.

This is the simplest criterion I can offer after four years: look at what a protocol's revenue is denominated in. If it’s denominated in dollars, it’s a business; if it’s denominated in their own tokens, it’s a variant of a Ponzi scheme.

Judgment 3: The Fate of (3,3) - High Yields Mean High Inflation

The third judgment concerns Olympus:

The core issue with this mechanism lies in the unsustainability of the (3,3) state: higher APY also means greater inflationary bubbles, leading to large amounts of OHM being incentivized to generate inflation, while users, to gain cash yields, will sell OHM tokens in the market, causing OHM's price and the protocol’s staking APY to continuously drop, until panic selling from the majority of users occurs.

In 2026, the term (3,3) is no longer mentioned. Instead, its mechanism has returned under a different name called “Real Yield.”

Many projects now claim to distribute token holders "real yields," at annual rates of 8%, 12%, 20%. The questions you need to ask are identical to those four years ago: what currency is the numerator of this yield in, and what is the denominator? If a protocol distributes you $10 million worth of yields in a year while issuing $30 million worth of tokens, what you receive is not a real yield but a diluted version of yourself.

Curve's ve model was the first serious answer to this question—it thoroughly binds the interests of liquidity providers with the platform's long-term development. In 2026, this answer evolved into two routes: buyback and burn, and fee distribution. The traps of these two routes are the main contents of the second and third parts of this article.

Four years in a nutshell: DeFi has transitioned from "issuing tokens to buy liquidity" to "charging fees to earn dollars."

This is a genuine advancement. But the progress has only occurred at the protocol level and has not automatically transmitted to the token level. The dollars earned by protocols are separated by four gates from the value that token holders can receive through their tokens. We will break them down one by one.

2. How to Calculate Crypto P/E: Four Layers of the Funnel

The reason traditional stock P/E is useful is that it’s backed by a complete set of accounting standards, auditing systems, and fiduciary duties: the definition of "net profit" is unique, and shareholders have a legally binding right to it.

The crypto world lacks all of this. There is no unified definition of income, no audit, and token holders have no legal right to protocol income. Therefore, directly applying P/E does not work. We need a clumsier but more honest method: follow the money and see where it leaks at which level.

First Layer: Fees ≠ Revenue (What Users Pay ≠ What the Protocol Keeps)

This is the most fundamental and frequently misused layer.

Fees are the total amount actually paid by end-users. Revenue is the portion left over for the protocol after distributing funds to the "supply side."

The discrepancy between these two numbers can be enormous. For example, Spark:

• According to DefiLlama, Spark's annualized fees are about $202 million
• Under the same criteria, annualized revenue is only $22.44 million

That’s a ninefold difference. Where did that $180 million go? It went to depositors putting money into Spark. This is reasonable—Spark is an interest margin business; it must give most of the interest to depositors, keeping a spread for itself. But if you calculate P/S using $202 million, you'll come to an absurd conclusion.

More troubling is the fact that different data sources can completely misalign on the "revenue" of the same protocol. Take Spark again: DefiLlama states annualized income of $22.44 million, while the project’s quarterly report mentions Q1 2026 income of $31.5 million (a quarterly year-on-year decrease of 31%). One is annual, one is quarterly, and the latter's number is larger.

This is not about who is lying; it’s about differing metrics: DefiLlama's revenue typically refers to "the fees actually retained by the protocol," while the project's quarterly report’s "revenue" may include gross earnings from the entire balance sheet.

Ethena is another extreme case. DefiLlama defines Ethena's revenue very narrowly—only including minting fees and that portion of staking rewards entering the reserve fund, while the earnings paid to sUSDe holders are classified as SupplySideRevenue. Under this criterion, Ethena's past 12 months' revenue is only $7.7 million. According to the project’s quarterly report, Ethena's gross protocol revenue for just Q1 2026 was $65.06 million.

In the same protocol, during the same period, two metrics can differ by over 30 times.

Practical advice: Use only one data source and thoroughly read its methodology page. Each adapter from DefiLlama has publicly detailed methodology fields that clarify it well. Cross-source comparisons of "revenue" between protocols almost inevitably lead to errors.

Second Layer: Revenue ≠ Holders Revenue (What the Protocol Keeps ≠ What You Can Get)

The money the protocol retains may not relate to you at all.

DefiLlama breaks Revenue further into two parts: ProtocolRevenue (going to the treasury, controlled by governance) and HoldersRevenue (flowing to token holders through buybacks or dividends).

The critical insight at this layer is: ProtocolRevenue has uncertain value for token holders. It sits in the treasury, with its use decided by governance, while governance voting power in most projects is highly concentrated among the team and early investors. The protocol can suspend, reduce, or cancel buybacks at any time—there's no contractual or legal obligation binding it.

This is not theoretical risk; 2026 has already seen two textbook-level cases:

• Aave: Buybacks were initiated in April 2025, totaling approximately $45 million spent. In 2026, due to the Kelp DAO incident, it was suspended. Cash flow to token holders can be stopped at any moment.
• Pump.fun: This is even more noteworthy. According to DefiLlama’s recorded distribution rules, Pump’s protocol revenue allocation has undergone three stages—

Before July 14, 2025: 100% goes to the protocol treasury From July 14, 2025: 0% to the treasury (i.e., all goes to buybacks) From April 28, 2026: 50% to the treasury

Translation: On April 28, 2026, Pump cut its revenue that originally flowed 100% to buybacks in half, bringing it back to the treasury. This happened while Pump’s business was in a growth phase (data on this will follow).

While business grows, the proportion allotted to you decreases. This is the true nature of the second layer of the funnel.

Third Layer: Holders Revenue − Emissions = Net Value Flow (The Harshest Cut)

This is the most important layer in the entire framework, and also the most easily overlooked.

If a protocol disburses $100 million to you while emitting $200 million worth of tokens, your net gain is −$100 million.

This arithmetic is simple enough for elementary school students, but almost no one truly calculates it when making crypto valuations. The reason is simple: Holders Revenue is a prominent number, easily trumpeted by project parties; whereas Emissions are scattered across a release schedule, liquidity incentives, ecosystem funds, team allocations, and require proactive effort to piece together.

Castle Labs made this calculation in July 2026. The conclusion is: after deducting emissions, the net token flows for Aerodrome, Sky, and Uniswap became negative—the value they distributed was less than the value of the tokens they had to emit to maintain current revenue levels.

The ve model is inherently a disaster area for this layer. ve protocols (Curve, Aerodrome, etc.) route 50%–100% of trading fees to ve holders, making "fee distribution growth" on paper look very appealing. However, the design core of the ve model relies on high emissions to operate—it must continuously emit to keep the bribery market and liquidity incentives functioning. Much of the growth in distribution is simply a reflection of inflation.

Practical advice: Place Holders Revenue and annualized emission value in the same table and only look at the difference. That difference is what you, as a token holder, truly receive. Protocols with a negative difference, regardless of how impressive their "revenue" might seem, don't form a buying argument.

Fourth Layer: MC vs FDV (Today’s Cheap = Tomorrow’s Emissions)

The final layer is about time.

Tokens with low circulation and high FDV may appear very cheap based on market cap (MC) calculated P/S. However, the untapped supply will not simply disappear—they represent emissions that will eventually need to be absorbed by the market.

Spark is the purest sample of this layer:

• FDV of about $15.3–21.2 million compared to annualized fees of $202 million, giving FDV/Fees of about 1x—looking stunningly cheap
• Total supply of 10 billion tokens, with only 21.71% unlocked, with unlocking schedules stretching to 2035
• Moreover, 65% of total supply consists of ongoing emissions from Sky Farming, not one-time allocations, indicating continuous selling pressure over a ten-year period
• Correspondingly, the first round of buybacks utilized only $572,000 USDS to repurchase 26.6 million SPK tokens for destruction

To compare the scale: annualized revenue is about $22.44 million, while the first round of buybacks was only $572,000—approximately 2.5% of annual revenue. Meanwhile, emissions follow a ten-year release plan for 6.5 billion tokens.

FDV/Fees being about 1x is among the most misleading valuation metrics encountered in this article. It appears cheap because the numerator (FDV) does not reflect the emission pressures of the next decade, while the denominator (Fees) employs the broadest criteria. Combining deviations from both directions leads to a number that looks like found money but is actually a hot potato.

Conclusion: Spark is characterized by "real business + false cheapness." The quality of its business ranks among the top three in this entire article, while the value capture of its tokens ranks at the bottom. If the Sky ecosystem shifts its revenue more toward SPK buybacks in the future, the narrative may change—but based on the current design, there's virtually no systemic connection between SPK holders and that $12.6 billion in interest.

By the way, who benefits from that $12.6 billion, Sky or Spark?

This remains an unresolved issue left by the subDAO model and represents a specific aspect of the overarching theme of "token holders being structurally downgraded."

The funding for Spark comes from Sky’s reserves, and Spark's earnings flow back to the Sky ecosystem. In this mother-child structure, SPK holders receive only the (symbolic) buybacks at the Spark level, while the actual interest value sinks into the side of Sky. Moreover, according to Castle Labs' calculations, after deducting emissions, the net token flow for Sky appears to be negative as well.

Two-layer structure, two-layer funnel, ultimately none of them manage to pass real money to the token holders.

This is not a unique problem for Sky or Spark. It’s a common ailment in all "multi-token ecosystems": with each additional structural layer, a node for value to be legally intercepted is added.

4. At a Deeper Level: What is Really Happening in This Cycle

Looking at these nine projects together reveals four more important structural judgments than "which coin is undervalued."

Judgment 1: Over 100 Project Deaths Are the True Valuation Clearance of This Industry

In 2026, over 100 crypto projects shut down, went bankrupt, or ceased updates altogether. This has been widely described as "a dot-com shuffle."

This analogy is accurate, but many people only take its pessimistic half. The collapse of the internet bubble in 2000 killed Pets.com while leaving behind Amazon and eBay. The significance of the shuffle lies not in how many died but in the market finally starting to distinguish who should perish and who should survive using uniform standards.

Prior to this, the valuation logic for crypto projects was "narrative + liquidity." A project without revenue, no users, solely a white paper, could attain the same or even higher valuation than a project with a genuine business during a bull market—because the pricing basis relied on "the efficiency of spreading stories," not "the efficiency of business profitability."

What happened in 2026 is that after the tide of liquidity receded, the market was forced to examine balance sheets. When it did begin to look, it discovered that the vast majority of projects had only tokens they had minted on their balance sheets.

This clearance process is painful, but it is a necessary condition for the maturation of this industry. A market where all assets are priced uniformly is fundamentally not a market.

Judgment 2: The Cash Flow Narrative Itself Is Becoming the Next Trap

This is the point I want to emphasize most in this article.

In 2026, "looking at fundamentals," "looking at protocol revenues," and "looking at P/S" have transitioned from minority viewpoints to mainstream consensus. This is a good thing in itself, but the speed of consensus forming is so fast that most people have learned the slogans without the algorithms.

Specifically, this manifests as three emerging misconceptions:

• Misconception 1: Treating Fees as Revenue. The ninefold difference for Spark and the thirtyfold difference for Ethena have already pointed to the problem. Moreover, many lists of "the most undervalued DeFi protocols" utilize the broadest metrics. That widely circulated 4.4x P/S for Pendle should actually be 17.4x.
• Misconception 2: Confusing Buybacks with Value. Aave serves as the best counterexample: with a $45 million buyback at an average cost of $182, and a current price around $89, it is sitting on a loss of over $23 million. In a downtrend, using protocol revenue to buy their own tokens amounts to continually pouring shareholders’ money into a declining asset.

This raises the debate over buybacks versus dividends. The advantages of buybacks include creating real buying pressure, being verifiable on-chain, and forming positive feedback with protocol success; however, the downside is incurring losses in downturns and that effectiveness depends on really reducing the circulating supply (BNB’s early destruction of non-circulating tokens is a typical case of ineffective destruction). The merits of dividends lie in token holders receiving stablecoins directly, unaffected by token prices; the downsides are that they provide no direct support to prices and if the token itself lacks other utility, dividends can transform it into a purely bond-like asset, stripping it of growth premiums.

Currently, the vast majority of projects are choosing buybacks. Yet Aave’s losses remind us that this choice comes with costs in a bear market, a cost ultimately borne by token holders.

• Misconception 3: Using TTM P/S as Valuation. This is the central data revelation of this article. Most major protocols' current revenue run rates are generally only about half of the past 12-month average—Hyperliquid −48%, Aave −57%, Pendle −46%, Ethena −96%.

When you calculate a "cheap" P/S using TTM data, you are essentially dividing the numerator from a bull market by the denominator from a bear market.

The genuine criterion isn’t "what is the P/S," but rather: how much of that revenue will remain in the next cycle's low point? For Tether, the answer is "almost all" (interest from U.S. Treasury regardless of token price). For ether.fi’s Cash business, the answer is "most" (card消费不看币价). For Ethena, the answer is “close to zero” (funding rates disappear in bear markets). The answer to this question is an order of magnitude more important than the P/S itself.

Judgment 3: Token Holders Are Being Structurally Downgraded—This Is the Most Underrated Risk of This Cycle

This is a trend line I think deserves considerable vigilance.

• Phenomenon 1: The Popularity of Dual-Track Equity - Token Systems. Increasingly, projects operate two systems: company equity and tokens. The clearest example is XRP: since 2025, Ripple Labs’ equity has risen 105%, while XRP tokens have dropped 45%. The commercial success of the same company is experienced completely differently by shareholders and token holders—because token holders have no legal claim to company revenues, while shareholders do.
• Phenomenon 2: The Best Businesses Do Not Issue Tokens from the Start. Tether and Circle account for about 70% of protocol revenues in rankings, and neither company has opened cash flow claims to the public. Circle's value capture is on NASDAQ, not on-chain.
• Phenomenon 3: Distribution Ratios Can Be Unilaterally Adjusted. Pump reduced buyback allocation from 100% to 50% in April 2026. Maple's MIP-019 revision changed buybacks from a fixed 25% to income scaling, practically dropping to 10% at H1 2026 income levels—this proposal passed with 99.97% approval. Aave can pause buybacks at any time.

Looking at these three phenomena together, an uncomfortable conclusion emerges:

The crypto industry is undergoing a "re-centralization"—not on a technical level, but on an economic rights level. Protocols are increasingly resembling companies, while token holders are left with certificates that lack voting rights, obligations for distribution, priorities in liquidation, and can be diluted at any time.

The traditional equity system took centuries to enforce, through corporate laws, fiduciary responsibilities, and securities regulations, which gradually made "shareholders are owners" a mandate. The crypto industry currently only has the slogan "the treasury belongs to the community."

I wrote a hopeful sentence at the end of my report four years ago: "Transplanting the trading liquidity of various financial products in traditional financial markets to an on-chain environment." It is happening, but in an opposite direction. It's not traditional finance moving on-chain to accept on-chain rules, but instead, on-chain projects are maturing into traditional companies, concomitantly inheriting the worst aspects of traditional corporate governance—information asymmetry, insider preference, and dilution of shareholder rights—without regulatory constraints.

This sentence is the most worth recording in this cycle's retrospective.

Judgment 4: Competitive Landscape Is Shifting Towards Non-Charging Parties

This was foreshadowed in the section discussing Morpho, and here I will elaborate.

With a TVL of $11.8 billion and zero protocol revenue, Morpho directly challenges Aave. It can do this precisely because it returns 100% of the interest to depositors.

In a market where infrastructure is highly homogeneous and switching costs are close to zero, charging entities have nearly no defenses against non-charging entities.

This poses a fundamental challenge to the entire "protocol revenue" narrative: if the optimal strategy for gaining market share is to charge nothing, while the premise of token value capture is to charge, then **"good protocols" and "good tokens" directly conflict at some point in the competition**.

Uniswap hesitated for four years over activating the fee switch, not because of governance inefficiency, but because this balance is real. The timing of its eventual activation (late 2025) was perfect: its market position was solid enough, and in bear markets, its competitors were out of funds for subsidies. The choice of timing itself underscores the sensitivity of this balance.

My judgment is that in the next two years, rates at the DeFi infrastructure level will continue to converge toward zero while value capture will shift toward the application and distribution layers. Whoever controls user entry points (wallets, brokers, trading interfaces) will hold pricing power. The fact that nearly 40% of Uniswap’s buyback revenue originated from Robinhood Chain hints at this direction—only in that structure, Uniswap is on the receiving end of charges, not the initiating end.

Final Thoughts

Reflecting on the conclusion of my report four years ago, I cited a remark from the UK's Economic Secretary to the Treasury: "We are at the forefront of change."

Looking back four years later, changes have indeed occurred, but they are not what everyone at the time imagined. We anticipated the decentralization of finance; what we actually received was the corporatization of crypto projects.

This may not be a bad thing. An industry that can sustain itself through charges is much healthier than one that survives by printing money. The $7.42 billion in protocol revenue for 2026 is real, and those over 100 projects that died should have perished.

But as a token holder, you need to be clear about where you stand in this structure: you are not a shareholder; you are a holder of a "promise from the protocol party to voluntarily share profits." This promise has no legal binding force, can be modified unilaterally, and has been changed at least twice in the past 12 months.

This is not to say you shouldn't invest. It is to say that before you invest, you should carefully pass through each layer of the funnel one by one, and then use the remaining number to make decisions, rather than just the number from the first layer.

Truly undervalued targets do not show up on revenue boards. They are listed on net value flow boards—and you need to do that math yourself.

Risk Warning: All data in this article are sourced with timestamps noted, but differences in on-chain data metrics exist, and secondary market prices fluctuate in real time. The valuation multiples mentioned in the article are only calculations at specific points in time. This article does not constitute any form of investment advice. Crypto assets are highly volatile, please make independent judgments and assume risks.

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