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Cross-chain bridges are not "secure bridges"; analyzing recent attack incidents to uncover vulnerabilities in DeFi security.

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PANews
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1 hour ago
AI summarizes in 5 seconds.

Introduction

In April 2026, two cross-chain bridge attack incidents occurred one after another, shaking the DeFi world once again.

First, on April 18, KelpDAO was attacked by hackers who forged messages due to a flaw in the cross-chain verification configuration, resulting in the theft of approximately $293 million; shortly after, on April 29, the Syndicate Commons cross-chain bridge experienced a nearly 35% drop in tokens due to a lack of message verification.

The attackers did not touch the core smart contract code but exploited the "trust blind spot" in the design of the cross-chain bridge—by forging a message, the system complied and allowed the transfer.

These two incidents reveal a core issue:

👉Cross-chain bridges are becoming "one of the biggest weak points" in blockchain security.

For ordinary users and project parties, the alarm sounded by these two incidents is that the underlying trust model of cross-chain bridges is being systematically challenged. This article provides actionable protection advice based on the essence of risks.

Part 01 — Why are cross-chain bridges prone to "failures"?

Frequent accidents involving cross-chain bridges stem from several common design flaws:

1. Validation mechanisms are too simple

With just a single node confirmation, if a hacker breaks into one node, they can forge instructions. This "single point trust" model is equivalent to having no defenses in a decentralized world.

2. Lack of two-way reconciliation

What doesn't happen on the source chain cannot be recognized by the target chain, allowing forged messages to pass without obstruction. It's like a bank only looking at the check in your hand but not calling to verify the account balance.

3. Concentration of permissions

Large fund pools without limits, delays, or multi-signature protection can be entirely drained with a single breach. It's like giving the safe key to only one person—if lost, everything is gone.

4. Insufficient auditing

Many vulnerabilities are discovered months after operation, leaving a long attack window. Audits conducted upon launch do not guarantee ongoing security; new methods always emerge post-audit.

These two incidents fundamentally illustrate that "trust was placed in a single link that should not have been trusted."

Part 02 — Common risk types in cross-chain bridges

Every step of a cross-chain bridge can become a breakthrough point; users should remain vigilant while using them.

1. Vulnerabilities in validation mechanisms

Single-point validation can easily be compromised, allowing forged messages to pass. Once hackers control a validation node, they effectively have the "release button" for all cross-chain assets.

2. Logic flaws in contracts

Such as omitted permission validation, reentrancy vulnerabilities, etc. These minor oversights at the code level often become frequently exploited "backdoors."

3. Centralized node risks

If servers, APIs, or keys are compromised, the system can go out of control. Centralized components that cross-chain bridges depend on are the preferred breakthrough points for nation-state hackers.

4. Issues of data credibility

External data being hijacked or tampered with can lead to erroneous executions. Poisoned or compromised oracles or off-chain data sources can cause the entire bridge to "go in the wrong direction."

5. Fund pool concentration

Large assets without risk control can rapidly deplete once breached. Pooling all users' funds into one place effectively sets up a "one sweep" opportunity for hackers.

Users do not need to remember all technical details; they just need to know: every step of a cross-chain bridge can have issues.

Part 03 — How can ordinary users protect themselves?

This section is the most critical—many losses are actually a matter of operational habits.

✅Minimize the frequency of cross-chain operations

Every cross-chain operation is a process of handing assets over to a third party. Any issue in any link can result in asset loss.

💡 Recommendation:

• Avoid frequent, multiple cross-chain transfers unless necessary.

• Prioritize established and mature cross-chain bridges, avoiding niche tools.

📌 Core principle:

The more cross-chain occurrences, the higher the exposure to risks.

✅Do not use "newly launched" cross-chain bridges

Many cross-chain bridges when first launched:

• The code has not been sufficiently validated through practical use.

• Audits may have omissions.

• Risk control mechanisms are still unfinished.

This is exactly the "window period" that hackers love.

💡 Recommendation:

• Avoid new projects that are newly launched or overly hyped.

• Observe for some time to see if any anomalies or security events arise.

👉 Remember this phrase:

Newer does not equal safer; many times, the risks are actually higher.

✅Test with small amounts before proceeding with large operations

Many users habitually transfer large amounts directly, which is highly risky. It is advisable to first test with a small amount on unfamiliar cross-chain bridges, confirming a successful transfer before proceeding with larger operations. This way, even if issues arise, the losses are manageable.

👉 The significance of this approach is:

Even if problems occur, the losses are manageable, rather than "stepping on a mine all at once."

✅Be cautious with approval and signature operations

The entire process of cross-chain operations almost always involves wallet contract authorization actions, which are the core entry points for the theft of most user assets.

⚠️ Key risk points:

• Unlimited contract authorizations: can unrestrainedly transfer all corresponding assets in your wallet.

• Blindly authorizing unknown contracts can easily lead to phishing thefts.

💡 Protection advice:

• Revoke authorization in a timely manner after operations.

• Do not casually confirm unknown signatures, check addresses and permissions before signing.

✅Manage assets with multiple wallets to avoid "total loss in one go."

Many users concentrate all their assets in one wallet, which leads to losses of all assets once risks occur (authorization abuse, key leakage, etc.).

👉 A safer approach:

• Main wallet: only for storing large assets (not for interaction).

• Operation wallet: for daily operations in DeFi, cross-chain, etc.

• High-risk operations: can separately use a new wallet.

📌 Protective effect:

Even if the operation wallet used for daily interactions unfortunately encounters an attack or theft, your core large assets will remain unaffected, preventing total loss of assets.

Part 04 —Security issues that project parties must prioritize

If users can "reduce risks," then project parties must "avoid accidents."

1. Decentralized validation

Multi-node consensus eliminates single-point failures. There should be at least three independent validation nodes, and they cannot share the same underlying infrastructure.

2. Minimum permissions + time lock

Split administrative permissions and impose mandatory delays on critical operations (e.g., 24 hours). Thus, even if permissions are compromised, the team and users have a reaction window.

3. Continuous auditing and monitoring

Auditing before launch is just the starting point; after launch, monitor for abnormal transactions 24/7. Many attacks occur "after audits"; dynamic protection is more important than one-time checks.

4. Asset isolation

Do not place all assets in one pool; manage them in layers. Store protocol-owned funds, user collateral, and platform fees separately so that if one pool has issues, it won't drag everything else down.

Conclusion

The KelpDAO and Syndicate Commons incidents once again prove that:

Cross-chain bridges are not "functional components," but rather "high-risk infrastructures."

From validation vulnerabilities to permission loss control, every link can become an attack entry point. While the techniques of the two incidents differ, their essence is similar: the trust assumptions are too singular.

For ordinary users:

👉 Reducing cross-chain operations, being cautious with authorizations, and diversifying assets are the most effective protective measures.

For the industry:

👉 Decentralized validation, permission controls, and transparency mechanisms are key directions for cross-chain security.

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