In recent years, the security of crypto assets has shown significant structural changes: on one hand, large-scale DeFi attacks that relied on "exploitable code vulnerabilities" still occur; on the other hand, more covert and targeted social engineering attacks, data breaches, and physical intrusions are becoming the preferred paths for attackers. A series of recent events clearly indicate that attackers are shifting their focus from purely technical breaches to "attacking people, processes, and information."
Technical vulnerabilities still exist: cases where certain decentralized protocols have been exploited reveal that improper combinations of complex contracts and permission controls can amplify risks. Meanwhile, while on-chain observability and security audits can identify some issues, when project designs heavily rely on inter-calling contracts, single-point audits struggle to cover all combination risks, allowing a single chain vulnerability to escalate into significant losses. Addressing these risks requires embedding audits into a continuous governance process rather than treating them as one-time compliance actions.
Even more concerning is the vulnerability of the "human governance" aspect. Attackers implement precise strikes through data breaches, social engineering, or tracking key individuals, thereby obtaining private keys, mnemonic phrases, or access to terminal devices, ultimately emptying hot wallets or self-managed wallets. Several violent home invasions and coercion incidents targeting individuals or small holders highlight the real dangers of linking keys with personal identity and address information. In other words, even if the underlying cryptography is flawless, external information leaks can expose crypto assets to violence and fraud in the real world.
In response to these threats, law enforcement and international cooperation have taken action and targeted some criminal infrastructures. Multinational law enforcement operations have made progress in dismantling criminal servers, freezing domains, and capturing suspects, which has somewhat suppressed the rapid regeneration of large-scale criminal networks. However, law enforcement actions cannot replace the daily security operations of businesses and individuals; they can only mitigate the external shocks caused by systemic crime. The long-term effect still depends on information sharing and technical collaboration between cybersecurity firms, on-chain investigation agencies, and judicial departments.
Centralized platforms are also becoming increasingly proactive in protection and asset management. Large exchanges are gradually standardizing internal processes, executing internal wallet migrations, and decentralizing management to reduce the risk of single points of failure. Although such measures are not always triggered by external intrusions, they reflect the emphasis centralized services place on operational security and their increasingly cautious attitude towards transparent communication. Users should pay attention to platform announcements but should not place all their trust in any single custodian.
Based on the current situation, three practical suggestions are provided: First, prioritize strengthening "human factor security." This includes limiting the scale of key permission groups, adopting multi-signature and time-lock mechanisms, implementing tiered custody and security drills for high-net-worth holders, and migrating private key management from a single device to isolated and decentralized solutions. Second, enhance information governance and external monitoring capabilities. Regularly clean up publicly available information related to private keys or addresses, subscribe to alerts for abnormal on-chain migrations, and maintain communication with reputable tracking agencies. Third, businesses and project parties should treat security as a continuous governance issue: routine audits, emergency drills, third-party insurance, and incident disclosure policies should be institutionalized to ensure rapid and transparent handling of events and protection of investor rights.
Conclusion: The security of crypto assets is no longer a one-way "patching vulnerabilities" task but a comprehensive project that spans technology, operations, and real-world risk governance. Both institutions and individuals should adjust their mindset: treat security as a long-term, systematic investment rather than a hurried remedy after an incident occurs. By combining ongoing technical audits, human factor protection, and law enforcement cooperation, the dual threats of "visible attacks" and "invisible threats" to crypto assets can be weakened to a controllable range.
Related: DWF Labs launches a $75 million fund, betting on the "institutional phase" of DeFi.
Original text: “When 'on-chain vulnerabilities' are no longer the number one enemy—The new battlefield of crypto asset security”
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