Let's talk about Arbitrum's controversial emergency freezing of hacker funds. From the perspective of potential stakeholders such as ARB holders, this time: Retaining the permission for emergency upgrades was a consensus at the beginning of the establishment of Ethereum L2, as the Optimal Rollup based on fraud proof and the ZK Rollup based on zero knowledge proof systems are very complex and there is a high possibility of bugs in the code. Once there is a system error, the assets of the entire L2 chain may face risks such as freezing, theft, and inability to withdraw. @Initially, Arbitrum was granted emergency upgrade privileges through multiple signatures by core team members. However, as early as 2023, this privilege was granted to the Security Council, which has a higher degree of decentralization, through community proposals (introducing a neutral and trusted third-party 12 person multiple signature system). Only after 9-of-12 was approved can this privilege be activated. The AIP-1 proposal, which introduces SC governance, is the result of ARB community voting consensus. If SC was born through community voting and democratic means, it is understandable for it to freeze hacker assets as an authorized institution in emergency situations. Since the launch of the Arbitrum mainnet, there have been numerous hacking incidents of various sizes during the more than four years of operation. However, only KelpDAO has enabled emergency freeze permissions for this SC. Layer 2 has never been absolutely decentralized, and they still have a long way to go before departing from centralization. But if you say that the recent freeze on the Arbitrum hacker incident is a step back towards decentralization for the Arbitrum chain, then you are reversing the truth.