The numbers in the repost below, are often cited, but overstate the incremental mitigation from reroutes by counting full pipeline/terminal capacities as entirely new supply. Most were already flowing (at lower levels) pre-war. Realistic total incremental bypass from pipelines/terminals: ~3.5–5.5M bpd (15–30% of the ~20M bpd Hormuz flow), not 80%. Here's a clearer breakdown based on recent shipping data (Kpler, Reuters, Bloomberg, IEA, etc.): * Saudi East-West Pipeline + Yanbu: Pipeline capacity is ~7M bpd, but pre-war flow was only ~770k bpd (Jan/Feb). Yanbu terminals max out at ~4.5–5 M bpd in loading (with ~2 M bpd often needed for local refineries/power/desalination). Post-closure, Yanbu crude exports ramped to ~3.3M bpd average in March (up from <800k), targeting ~4–5M. Net incremental export gain: roughly +2.5M to +4M bpd, not +7M. * UAE ADCOP to Fujairah: Capacity 1.5–1.8M bpd. Pre-war: ~1.1M (71% utilization). Spare capacity: only ~0.4–0.7M bpd incremental at best. * Iran Jask bypass: Designed for up to 1M bpd, but historically ~300–500k and rarely/ineffectively used pre-war. Not a reliable full 1M addition. China/India "safe passages" (~2.4M): These are mostly diplomatic permissions for continued flows (Asia already took ~80% of Hormuz oil). Real tanker traffic remains a fraction of normal—only a handful of vessels per day vs. dozens pre-war, even with partial reopenings. * Pre-war surplus (~4.25M): This one tracks—the IEA did project a large Q1 2026 market surplus that provided a buffer via inventory draws. But it's not "new" daily production; it's a stock that gets depleted. * Strategic reserves: China (1.1–1.3B barrels) and India (hundreds of millions) give those countries weeks-to-months of cover, but global release rates are limited by logistics. Reroutes helped avoid total meltdown and explain why markets stabilized, but they didn't replace most of the lost volume on day one—bottlenecks at ports and pre-existing flows matter.(Jim Bianco)