
Author | IOSG Legal
Having deeply engaged in the crypto industry for many years, we have invested in hundreds of projects, evolving from initial misunderstanding to acceptance, and now to reflection and questioning regarding investment terms in the industry:
When a project's structure becomes increasingly complex and the documents more professional, are we truly enhancing security, or are we merely making risks appear more dignified? When governance terms are written in abundance within agreements, can these rights actually be enforced, or are they just rhetoric on paper?
The systemic risks in Web3 investments often do not lie in the market, but in the insufficient accountability of the underlying structure. The documentation may look beautiful and terminology comprehensive, but in the worst-case scenario, investors find themselves unable to identify responsible parties, constrain control, or pursue remedies. Essentially, this is not risk management; it is risk packaging.
Three types of recurring structural issues:
1. Over-segmenting entities: Value, control, and responsibility are artificially separated. Research and operations are in one company, while token issuing and treasury are in another entity (foundation/SPV), and investors may only sign with one of them. On the surface, this resembles risk isolation, but in essence, it is "risk without ownership": when issues arise, everyone can say, "That's not me." What investors truly fear is not decentralization, but disassociation from responsibility.
2. Governance being symbolized: There are documents, but no mechanisms; there are rights, but no teeth. In the early days, investors relied on verbal commitments and gentleman agreements (which now seem like the inherent risk-taking spirit of Western cowboys), evolving to later instruments like SAFTE/SAFE/SAFT/SAFE+Token Warrant, yet key elements still remain absent: substantive consent rights for significant matters, budgeting and auditing rhythm for treasury expenditures, rules for replacing multi-signers, and clarity and boundaries on information disclosure. Reading these feels like corporate governance, but executing them resembles a wishlist.
3. Remedies being structurally weakened: Assets move faster than laws, entities change quicker than procedures, and cross-border costs can exceed compensation; these are all reasons why upholding rights in crypto investments is challenging. For investors, real risk management is not about making terms longer but ensuring that in the worst-case scenario, they can "stop the bleeding," "recoup," and "enforce."
This industry has emerged from the early "dark forest," yet project collapses still occur frequently. The root causes are twofold: first, some founders lack respect for the spirit of contracts; secondly, the industry lacks structural memory, causing investors to repeatedly fall into the same pitfalls in structural design.
This article discusses five real case scenarios, focusing on structural issues often overlooked but potentially fatal in extreme situations, extracting lessons from practice into actionable principles.
Case 1: From "Perfect Structure" to "Disappearing Defendant"
[Case keywords: entity segmentation, legal entity existence]
A few years ago, we encountered a project dedicated to building blockchain game infrastructure. The team had an impressive background, with an outstanding track record, and its "one-click on-chain" solution targeted the core pain points of traditional game manufacturers. To raise funds and avoid complex global regulations, the project created a widely recognized "perfect" offshore structure: registering a parent company in Delaware, USA, for technology research and development while establishing an SPV (special purpose vehicle) in crypto-friendly Gibraltar solely for issuing tokens. The technology and team were based in the US, while tokens were handled by the offshore SPV; this was the default consensus in the investment community at the time.
Faced with this structure, investors typically took one of two paths: traditional equity investors placed their money in the parent company, reasoning that controlling the team meant controlling the project. We chose a more "Crypto Native" route: directly signing a Token Purchase Agreement with the Gibraltar SPV to exchange investment for future token rights. Our judgment was that since tokens were the core asset of this ecosystem, directly acquiring token rights was more straightforward than equity. At the time, this seemed like quite a rational decision.
After the investment was completed, there was a relatively quiet period. The project's progress was slow but stable, and the team maintained polite and restrained communication with investors.
However, one day, the Gibraltar SPV suddenly announced a CEO change without notifying the US parent company or any investors, and almost simultaneously unilaterally initiated token issuance. Internal struggles became public, market confidence plummeted, and the token price dropped immediately upon listing. The "token rights" in our hands overnight shifted from potential value to highly volatile digital chips.
Our first reaction was anger, but after calming down, we quickly assessed that this resembled a control struggle within the founding team. The SPV management clearly tried to escape the control of the parent company, while institutions that invested in the parent company's equity would inevitably take legal action, possibly restoring the project to its proper track. We chose to observe.
Sure enough, the parent company and its equity investors swiftly filed lawsuits in the US and Gibraltar, achieving success in initial battles: they secured a temporary restraining order from a US court to restore the parent company's access to crucial technology infrastructure, and also obtained a freezing order from the Gibraltar court, freezing most of the tokens issued by the SPV. It appeared the parent company might regain control.
Then a reversal occurred that no one anticipated.
The Gibraltar court overturned the freezing order. The reason was chillingly simple: that US parent company, due to failing to submit a required compliance document for over a year, had been administratively dissolved by the Delaware government over a year ago.
Legally, this company had ceased to exist.
A company that has legally "died" cannot qualify as a plaintiff to sue anyone. It lacks legal personality, rights, or any interests that can be protected by the court.
Those institutions that invested in the parent company’s equity were completely out of the running overnight. The legal entity they invested in had vanished, and all claims lost their foundation. Investment: zero.
We who invested in the SPV's token rights saw our assets diminished due to the internal strife but at least still held tradable tokens. In contrast, those who were considered the "safer" equity investors found themselves legally without footing.
Rather than relief, that moment was filled with apprehension. The deadliest risk in this industry may not be market crashes, technical vulnerabilities, or even the character of founders, but a forgotten compliance document that costs merely a few hundred dollars.
Case Conclusion
- The continuity of legal due diligence (Legal DD) is crucial. The key to investment decisions lies not only in confirming the company’s good standing at the moment of signing the agreement, but in establishing a continuous compliance monitoring mechanism throughout the entire investment cycle. Ensuring that every legal entity involved in the investment chain is “alive” and compliant is a fundamental bottom line of investment management, yet often overlooked.
- One must deeply understand the actual control of offshore structures. When core assets (like token issuance rights) are placed in an offshore SPV, and the parent company's control over that SPV relies solely on a piece of paper, investors must remain vigilant. Strong covenants must be incorporated into the investment agreements, for example: without majority consent from investors, SPV’s directors or controllers cannot be changed; the parent company must maintain its good standing; otherwise, it will trigger default clauses; any significant decisions (like Token Launch) must gain consent from directors appointed by investors. These clauses must be clearly stated from the start of the investment rather than attempting to rectify after issues arise.
- Do not blindly trust lead investors. Even the top funds in the industry can have blind spots or undisclosed conflicts of interest in their due diligence. Independent and cross-verified background checks (Reference Checks) are indispensable. Investors must take responsibility for their own funds based on independent judgment.
Case 2: The "Evaporation" of Value – Entity Switching and Dilution of Early Investors
[Case keywords: entity segmentation, entity switching dilution]
Another type of structural risk is more insidious and often occurs within a "legal" framework.
In 2021, during the market boom, we invested in a tech company focused on formal verification. The team comprised experts with top academic backgrounds, demonstrating solid technical capabilities and consistently showing great respect towards investors, maintaining a cordial working relationship.
However, about two to three years later, we gradually discovered that the founder began constructing a new token-issuing entity, looking to advance the token project under an entity completely separate from the original investment company. What was even more unacceptable was that this new entity neither recognized early equity investors nor attempted to incorporate them into the new token rights framework.
Legally, their actions were technically impeccable: the new entity was independently registered, and the existing investment contract did not directly bind the actions of this new entity. However, from a business logic perspective, this represented a systematic deprivation of value from early investors—early investors used funds and trust to cultivate a team and technology, yet these resources ultimately "re-sprouted" within the new entity, while the original rights structure was quietly undermined.
We then represented all early investors in months of arduous negotiations with the founder, arguing vigorously for rightful entitlements. In the end, we secured better valuation terms for early investors than those of the new round investors. However, this process nearly depleted our relationship with the founder.
This incident highlighted for us the fact that: entity switching can be one of the "most elegant" forms of value plunder.
Case Conclusion
- Add "entity switching protection clauses" in investment agreements. Clearly stipulate that if founders establish new affiliated entities and promote core assets (especially tokens) issuance within a certain period (recommended 2-3 years) post-investment, early investors should receive corresponding equity shares. This clause should be included in the agreement at the initial investment, rather than being addressed after issues arise.
- Governance rights are more important than valuation. Board seats, rights to be informed and consent for significant structural changes are the last line of defense to protect early investors' interests. Relying solely on relationships and trust is insufficient.
Case 3: When Humanity Becomes a Variable – Rescue Financing and Commitment Failure
[Case keywords: remedies being structurally weakened]
If the first two cases centered around cold legal and structural games, this case brims with nuances of human emotions and relationships. Sometimes, it is not the complex terms that break you but a quickly altering human face in the face of interests.
It was during the depths of the bear market when one of our early investments faced a cash shortage, nearing shutdown. The founder earnestly stated there was no money left on the books, and without new capital infusions, operations could not be sustained.
Out of a desire to protect our existing investment and hold a glimmer of hope for the project, we decided to lend a helping hand by initiating a down-round rescue financing at a lower valuation. The founder expressed deep gratitude at that time.
After the funds arrived, the project was able to survive. Soon afterward, the market began to recover, and the track in which the project operated became a hotspot. The founder managed to sustain the project with this "lifeline," couple it with impressive narrative skills, ultimately gaining follow-on investments from renowned institutions and successfully listing on mainstream exchanges.
However, subsequent communication with the founder became extraordinarily challenging. When the investors sought to have them fulfill their initial commitments, the founder started a series of excuses—from refusing to distribute tokens to investors on the grounds of Coinbase listing requirements to personal illnesses of themselves and family members delaying matters; the entire process dragged on for months. Eventually, it came to a confrontation: either accept terms identical to those of other new investors or back away entirely. The initial spirit of rescue was disregarded in the face of immense interests.
Fortunately, our legal and post-investment teams never gave up, and through long-term, patient communication and rights protection, we ultimately recouped the vast majority of the tokens we were owed. Nevertheless, this experience revealed a fundamental issue: changes in interest dynamics can systematically alter human behavior. This is not a cynical view of human nature, but a variable that should be designed into contract structures in advance.
Case Conclusion
- All business commitments, regardless of size, must be embedded in legally binding formal documents. One should not relax the demands for legal documentation simply because the other party shows a humble posture. Business decisions should always be based on worst-case assumptions. Rescue financing in a bear market often occurs during times of greatest information asymmetry and emotional pressure—precisely when legal demands are most likely to be relaxed. The lower the counterparty's stance and the greater our negotiation leverage, the more all commitments should be written into formal agreements.
- Given the scarcity of the spirit of contracts, it is essential to design clauses with "teeth" to ensure contract execution. Investment agreements must explicitly state default liabilities. For instance, if the counterparty fails to fulfill specific terms, it should trigger substantial penalties, or grant investors the right to acquire more tokens at a very low price. The cost of breaching must significantly exceed any potential benefits gained from acting in bad faith. Meanwhile, ensure that investors possess adequate negotiation leverage, such as board seats, veto powers over major matters, or joint control over the company bank account and multi-signature wallets.
- Before deciding on rescue, answer a fundamental question: What is the root cause of this team's financial crisis? Can their values withstand pressure tests? Upholding transparency and compliance does not stem from a lack of trust in founders, but rather it is the most basic protection for the relationship between both parties.
Case 4: Governance Failure – The Cost of Silence
[Case keywords: governance being symbolized]
There exists a type of risk that is neither a legal structure flaw nor a subjective betrayal by founders, but rather the absence of investors during critical moments.
We once invested in a Web3 infrastructure project that seemed promising at the time. A prominent and wealthy major shareholder backed the project, which was one of the critical reasons we had high hopes. However, during an all-staff meeting, this major shareholder publicly dismissed the CEO, catching the entire team off guard.
We only learned of this from the departed CEO afterward, not from any official notification from the project team.
Our judgment at the time was that this was merely a normal management adjustment, not a crisis signal requiring immediate intervention. We did not request an audit, did not call for a special shareholders’ meeting, nor did we initiate an evaluation process; we chose to remain silent and observant.
About half a year to a year later, the new management announced: the foundation would undergo liquidation. We ultimately recovered less than 20% of our initial investment.
Upon reviewing, that sudden dismissal of the CEO was the clearest warning signal of the project’s decline. When a company experiences significant abnormal managerial changes, it often indicates deep fractures in the core governance structure. At such times, what investors should do is to promptly request an independent audit and engage in governance reconstruction, rather than standing idly by.
Case Conclusion
- Include significant governance events as mandatory "trigger events." The investment agreement should specify that significant events, such as the abnormal departure of the CEO, changes among core shareholders, or the initiation of litigation or arbitration, will automatically trigger special rights for investors, including requests for independent financial audits, holding extraordinary shareholder meetings, or suspending major financial expenditures.
- Continuous monitoring is essential, rather than passive waiting. Post-investment management should not cease with routine quarterly updates. Investors need to establish proactive information-gathering channels, maintaining communication with core project personnel (not just founders), suggesting that post-investment agreements require the project to provide independent updates quarterly from CFO/CTO levels, rather than relying solely on a single channel through the founder.
Case 5: The Resume’s Halo – The Black Hole of Character
[Case keywords: governance being symbolized, remedies being structurally weakened]
In the investment community, it’s often said, "Investing is investing in people." However, we can be easily misled by a flashy resume. Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, top hedge funds… these names seem to bring an aura, making one subconsciously equate "elite background" with "professional, disciplined, reliable." But the harsh reality is that sometimes the most dangerous individuals are precisely those "golden boys." Wall Street’s training teaches them to package narratives, exploit rules, and move hearts. These abilities are inherently neutral, but when misused, their destructive power far exceeds expectations.
We once "luckily" missed an investment opportunity. The founder’s resume was flawless, transitioning from Goldman Sachs to JPMorgan to become an executive before launching his startup. He aimed to create a "completely fair" on-chain casino. The story was enticing, and the team was lavish; renowned institutions in the circle scrambled to engage. However, due to significantly high concerns about compliance risks in the "gambling" arena, after several futile discussions about compliance pathways with the founder, our risk management department ultimately vetoed this investment.
The plot twist occurred the day after we made our decision. The project announced that it had secured millions of dollars in financing. However, just minutes after the funds arrived, the founder began transferring company money into his personal wallet. Over the following week, he lost several million dollars in another on-chain casino app. He promised to establish a fair casino but instead took the funds meant to build one and gambled with them elsewhere. This was not a risk management failure; it was plain fraud and embezzlement. Ultimately, the FBI intervened, the founder was arrested, and faced potential years behind bars.
Another case we experienced involved a project lauded as the "on-chain Call of Duty," a AAA game project. Team members came from top gaming studios, but the project burned cash at a terrifying rate, reaching two to three million dollars monthly, while development timelines fell severely behind. The company quickly plunged into financial crisis, reducing the team from over a hundred to just a handful.
At this critical juncture, we discovered that the project’s co-founder and CTO had been continuously selling his team tokens on the secondary market for seven months, cashing out nearly $700,000. Legally, he was selling his vested shares, which seemed unimpeachable. However, from a commercial ethics perspective, with the company hanging by a thread and many employees laid off, as one of the core leaders, he was aggressively cashing out. The signal being sent to the market was unmistakable: "The ship is sinking; I’m jumping first."
In both these cases, investors focused excessively on the founders' past glories, neglecting a thorough investigation into their current character and behavioral patterns. Additionally, the lack of "multi-signature" and "milestone payments" control were direct causes of the loss of funding control.
Case Conclusion
- Character due diligence (Character DD) must take precedence. Resumes can be polished, narratives can be packaged, but a person's character and behavior are relatively stable. Investment institutions need to establish a more systematic approach to character due diligence, going beyond regular background checks to potentially include deeper interviews, even behavioral stress tests. It is especially crucial to consider: Do the founder's personal history and the stated project mission hold any fundamental contradictions? Having a gambling history and seeking to run a casino is, in itself, a massive red flag.
- Funding control is a non-negotiable investment bottom line. For early-stage projects, especially when the founder holds unilateral control, absolutely no funds should be placed in a wallet entirely controlled by them. Multi-sig wallets should be a requirement, with investors or their trusted third parties as one of the signers. The release of funds should be based on clear, quantifiable milestones; a task must be completed before the next disbursement is released. These risk control measures that are mature in traditional VC should also be strictly enforced in the crypto industry.
- Bind the core team’s interests closely with the long-term development of the project. Token unlock mechanisms for the team should be tied not just to time but also to project milestones, such as product launch, user numbers reaching a certain level, or protocol revenues hitting specific thresholds. Moreover, the agreement should clearly stipulate that during periods of financial difficulty or major crises, the sales of tokens by core members will be restricted. This serves both as a constraint and a demonstration, signaling to the community and all investors the team’s commitment to the project’s survival.
Conclusion: Return to Common Sense, Endure Through Cycles
Having undergone so much, we are no longer the impassioned "Web3 believers." We have become more like realists, risk assessors, and observers of humanity. We no longer get easily stirred by grand narratives; instead, we scrutinize every detail like auditors and test every hypothesis like engineers.
When evaluating a project, we now repeatedly ask ourselves:
- Do we truly understand this founder? Apart from the stories they tell, have we gained insights from side angles, from their former colleagues, former bosses, or even competitors, regarding what kind of person they are?
- Do we really comprehend the legal structure of this project? Are there hidden "backdoors"? If the founder were to abscond, would the contracts in our possession be worthless scraps of paper or effective swords?
- Once funding is injected, do we have control over its use? Or must we solely rely on the founder's ethical self-discipline?
- Are the interests of the founding team and our investors truly aligned? Is their token unlock mechanism designed to encourage long-term development, or to facilitate short-term cash-outs?
- When we notice signs of problems, do we have the courage to say no?
In the end, good investment structures are not designed solely to protect gentlemen, but to safeguard against extreme scenarios. When everyone is dignified, any structure operates smoothly; the real test is whether the contracts in your hands can speak for you in times of fragmented interests, market turbulence, and trust collapse.
We learned these lessons at the cost of real money. We write them down because we believe that the cost of industry progress should not be borne repeatedly by each new generation of entrants.
For this reason, we have systematically introduced mechanisms in the investment process for continuous compliance monitoring, entity switching protection clauses, and mandatory multi-signature wallets. These are not mere improvements on paper, but institutional upgrades that have solidified after numerous real costs.
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