Kava lending agreement HARD Lend suffered an attack resulting in a loss of 1.83 million dollars and plans to permanently close new lending.

CN
16 minutes ago
Kava disclosed that its HARD Lend suffered an attack due to a dormant BUSD accounting vulnerability, resulting in a loss of approximately $1.83 million, and plans to permanently close new lending through governance voting.

Author: Deep Tide TechFlow

On November 16, the Layer 1 public chain Kava Chain officially released a security handling update, stating that its lending application HARD Lend encountered an attack. The attacker transferred approximately 53.9 million KAVA from the lending pool, valued at about $1.83 million.

The Kava team has urgently patched the contract vulnerability and is tracking the funds in collaboration with multiple parties, while also initiating a 7-day community governance proposal to permanently close new lending operations in HARD Lend and implement an orderly withdrawal and redemption guidance for existing positions.

Dormant BUSD account accounting vulnerability becomes attack breakthrough

According to details disclosed in the Kava official security handling announcement, the attack originated from the accounting vulnerability in the dormant BUSD collateral market within the HARD Lend lending account. This historical market had long been in a low-activity dormant state, yet retained the original collateral pricing logic.

The attacker exploited the pricing defect to artificially inflate the book value of the BUSD collateral within the lending account. By taking advantage of the inflated amount, the attacker repeatedly executed borrowing and liquidation cycles, draining the available liquidity in the fund pool and illegally transferring approximately 53.9 million KAVA.

Over 90% of stolen tokens sold off via LayerZero cross-chain

In the fund transfer path, the attacker employed a rapid cross-chain monetization strategy. On-chain data shows that approximately 49.2 million stolen tokens were subsequently transferred to the BNB Chain and sold off through the LayerZero official cross-chain explorer, with a cross-chain ratio of 91.28%.

In response to the outflow of funds, the Kava team quickly identified the vulnerability and triggered risk control upon detecting anomalies, successfully blocking further fund outflow. As of November 16, some of the involved funds have been successfully frozen at centralized exchanges and cross-chain bridging endpoints.

Currently, Kava contributors are working with the ecological security team, mainstream trading platforms, and law enforcement to continuously conduct on-chain tracing and judicial recovery of the funds flowing to the BNB Chain, striving to compress the attacker's monetization space and promote asset return.

Attack strictly isolated to application layer, mainnet consensus unaffected

Regarding community concerns about the underlying network security, Kava has clearly defined the risk boundary: this incident is strictly limited to the single application layer contract of HARD Lend and has not affected the underlying consensus mechanism and blockchain network infrastructure of Kava Chain, with no unauthorized token issuance occurring at the protocol level.

By promptly isolating contract permissions, the security loss has been completely locked within the old version lending fund pool. The network's validating nodes continue to operate normally for block production and cross-chain communication, and the vast majority of other independently deployed decentralized applications and ordinary users' personal on-chain deposits have not been affected at all.

Initiating seven-day community governance to completely shut down new lending operations

To thoroughly eliminate historical technical debts, the Kava team is accelerating the phasing out of the old version functions and officially initiating a 7-day community governance proposal. If approved, HARD Lend will permanently close new lending operations, and existing positions will be orderly phased out according to the guidelines.

External audits and independent agencies' investigations into historical legacy contracts have become an industry consensus. According to the community timeline, this permanent shutdown proposal will be formally executed after the 7-day voting period, providing a typical reference example for code retirement and risk control handling of subsequent multi-asset lending protocols.

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