Author: Sparsity
Compiler: Saoirse, Foresight News
"The on-chain trading environment is unfriendly to participants." "All KOLs are taking the opportunity to profit." "Yet we are still idolizing packaged traders."
These issues are widely criticized, but seeking the crux only from the end of the trading chain is akin to abandoning the root for the branch. The consensus of holding coins within the meme coin trading circle has already collapsed: no one is willing to hold positions long-term anymore. Participants are turning to front-running arbitrage, bulk coin issuance, block packaging, and incentive brushing — all because these paths are profitable. The root of the problem lies at a higher level, specifically with the platforms that control this trading ecology. As the largest meme coin issuance platform, Pump.fun's incentive mechanisms are precisely what foster these widely criticized behaviors, ultimately shaping the meme coin market into a pattern of unlimited supply expansion and ongoing demand loss.
Current public opinion generally calls for KOLs to be accountable for their calling remarks; this request is not unreasonable. However, if Pump.fun, which issues incentives, does not have to bear corresponding responsibility and only restricts the callers, it ultimately addresses symptoms rather than the root cause.
Pump.fun Gains Revenue from Zero-Value Tokens
In the past thirty days, Pump.fun accounted for 92% of the total coin issuance and 84% of the trading volume in the meme coin issuance sector across the entire chain. It is this platform that determines which behaviors can be profitable within this trading ecology.
95% of the platform's protocol revenue comes from trades involving tokens still in the binding curve phase or tokens with a market cap below $250,000. During the binding curve trading interval, every transaction incurs a 1.25% fee: 0.95% goes to Pump.fun, and 0.30% goes to the token creators. In other words, without considering the price fluctuations of the tokens, a complete buy-sell turnaround achieves transaction costs of 2.5%.

From September 2, 2025, to November 5, 2026, 95% of Pump.fun's protocol income came from tokens within the binding curve or tokens with market caps below $250,000.
The platform's revenue is concentrated in the early stages when tokens' market values rise to hundreds of thousands of dollars, and whether tokens can subsequently gain traction has little effect on platform revenues.
Analyzing the duration of token existence, the conclusion is equally clear: three-quarters of the platform's revenue comes from tokens that are listed for less than one hour, and 87% of the revenue comes from tokens that are listed for less than one day. Pump.fun's revenue is highly concentrated in the first hour window after token birth.

Since September 2, 2025, nearly 75% of Pump.fun's income comes from tokens listed for less than one hour; the tokens launched on the first day contributed a total of 87% of revenue.
Those tokens that eventually grow into top hits contribute almost negligible fees to the platform: fifteen peak tokens with a total market value of $1.4 billion only brought approximately $1.5 million in fees to Pump.fun; while small market cap tokens within the binding curve or with market caps below $250,000 contributed a total of $506 million in revenue. In summary, a thousand small market cap tokens that reach zero value with a market cap of $20,000 generate more revenue for the platform than a single popular token that grows to a market cap of $100 million.

Fifteen peak tokens with a total market value of $1.4 billion contributed only $1.5 million in fees to Pump.fun, far below the $506 million brought by small market cap tokens.
The fees contributed by these fifteen top hits account for less than 0.33% of the total contribution from small market cap tokens.
Thus, the design direction of the platform's product mechanisms is to continuously accept more new coins for listing. All of the platform's incentive rules guide the market to pursue the quantity of newly issued coins — the scale of trading volume is the foundation of platform earnings.
The Underlying Logic of Four Types of Incentive Behaviors
Every type of chaos condemned by the community exists within the platform's mechanisms corresponding to profit logic: packaged launches, bulk coin workshops, call incentives, and player confrontation modes ultimately generate trading fees, from which Pump.fun takes a cut from every transaction.

These market disruptions—the packaged launches, bulk coin issuance, calls, and PvP games—increase the frequency of trades, and each transaction allows Pump.fun to earn a fee.
Bundlers: Utilizing Extremely Low Initial Market Values and Liquidity to Achieve Front-Running
Bundlers can thrive because the standards for a token's initial market value and initial liquidity are set too low. Traders only need to invest a small amount of SOL, distributed across dozens of wallets, to absorb a large number of chips within the launching block, and then directly dump them onto ordinary traders. The lower the initial market value, the lower the cost of this operation, and this initial parameter is set by Pump.fun.
Bulk Issuers: Issuing Tokens in Batches; Creator Fees Calculated by Trading Volume
Developers who bulk issue tokens are emerging one after another because creator fees reward issuance rather than the long-term operation of the token. Whether a token lasts only an hour or circulates long-term, creators can extract a 0.30% fee from each transaction. Hence, the rational strategy is to issue as many tokens as possible, quickly harvest the early trading volume, and then swiftly shift to the next target. The top twenty-five issuing addresses issued a total of 761,000 tokens, but less than 1% of these tokens successfully "graduated"; nevertheless, these addresses have cumulatively profited $128 million.

The top 25 issuing addresses of Pump.fun issued a total of 761,000 tokens, earning $128 million, with a graduation rate of less than 1%.
Among them, the top-ranked wallet alone issued 171,195 tokens, with an average revenue of approximately $200 per token.
Of course, this type of bulk issuing workshop occasionally nurtures popular tokens: tokens issued by two wallets reached peak market values of $122 million and $327 million, respectively. However, for issuers, the emergence of hot tokens is merely a byproduct; the core profit source remains the early trading flow itself.
Call KOLs: Preferring Small Market Cap Tokens, Incentives Based on Trading Volume
The call incentive mechanism has opened new monetization channels for hype marketing, converting the calling behavior into a profit avenue. Since August, the platform has distributed $29.6 million in call rewards to 51,115 wallets, with prize distribution being extremely uneven: ten wallets share 16% of the total prize, while the median prize for ordinary recipients is merely $13. The top ten rewarding wallets average about $485,000 in income.

From August 12 to November 8, 2026, Pump.fun's call reward distribution was highly concentrated, with only 10 wallets sharing 16% of the total $29.6 million reward.
The incentive amount is calculated based on transactions brought by calls, while small-cap tokens with thin charts can most easily leverage trading to boost prices. In August, among the top fifty callers by earnings, forty of them promoted tokens averaging less than $100,000 in market value; twelve of them promoted tokens averaging below $10,000.

Of the fifty highest-earning callers on Pump.fun, forty promoted tokens with an average market value below $100,000.
The market's criticism has certainly been heard by Pump.fun. On October 10, the platform claimed that future incentives would be tied to followers' profits and losses while also reducing the reward weight for calls on small-cap tokens. However, within three weeks after the rule adjustment, the proportion of rewards for calls involving tokens with median market values below $100,000 among the top twenty callers rose from 68% to 94%, and the total weekly reward amount actually increased by 53%.

After Pump.fun announced a reduction in rewards for calls on low market cap tokens, the reward proportion for low market cap calls rose to 94%.
While the total prize pool expanded, the corresponding reward proportion for small-cap token calls also increased.
Ultimately, the traders following the calls bear the losses. Research teams tracked fourteen callers: among them, ten promoted tokens that had median market values below $100,000, and their followers collectively lost $926,000 the day after the calls were made. Tokens that were called saw a median price increase of 6% one minute after the announcement, but dropped 48% after one hour, and a 74% drop after one day. Regardless of token price fluctuations, callers receive rewards.

Among the fourteen top callers, ten focused on tokens with market values below $100,000, totaling $926,000 in losses for their followers.
Of the fourteen, only one caller allowed their followers to achieve a small profit of $10,000. The prices of all tokens called showed a decrease in their median prices the day after the calls.

One hour after the paid call, the median price decreased by 48%, and decreased by 74% after one day.
The reasons the public is confused about KOLs continually recommending tokens that lead to losses for followers lie largely in this: the platform's incentive design encourages this behavior through paid means.
PvP Player Confrontation Modes: Aim to Increase Individual User Trading Frequency
The underlying logic of the player confrontation mode is that the market lacks new capital, and seasoned traders profit from inexperienced traders. The original intention of this mode is to facilitate faster transactions, increase the trading frequency of individual users, and generate fees from every transaction. Pump.fun itself has also discontinued one mode—Tokenized Agent—on June 30, with the rationale being that too many token issuance channels had spurred a "malignant player confrontation ecology."
Unlimited Supply Expansion, Continuous Demand Shrinkage
This incentive mechanism's long-term operation leads the market to split into two ends: Demand side: participating in speculation on "dog coins," which statistically results in most losses in the long term, with only a very few wallets achieving substantial profits; Supply side: issuing tokens, earning profits almost without bearing risks.
Becoming a supplier has almost no threshold; coins can be issued with just one click. Arbitrage methods are already mature: quickly riding the hype of popular tokens, creating false trading volume to build an illusion of activity, bulk purchasing old wallets for new token issuance, and this method is iterating and optimizing every month.
Consequently, more and more participants originally inclined to hold coins have transformed into token issuers. Issuing tokens is profitable, but holding positions tends to result in losses; every new participant who sees this will become an additional token issuer, sharing in the continually shrinking buyers' funding pool. This is the root of the collapse of the holding consensus: it is not that traders are subjectively unwilling to hold coins, but rather that the platform rules make long-term holding an inferior choice.
This trend is reflected in the quality of new coin performance: the total issuance of Pump.fun is currently nearly at the same level as the peak market levels at the end of 2024. In the fourth quarter of 2024, there were 3.16 million issuances, giving birth to 207 tokens with a market cap exceeding $10 million; whereas in the third quarter of 2026, there were 3.05 million issuances, yielding only 24.

One hour after the paid call, the median price of tokens decreased by 48%, and the decrease reached 74% after one day.
The weekly number of newly issued tokens has returned to over 300,000. The probability of a hit emerging from every 100,000 issuances has dropped from 6.5 to 0.8.
Some opinions suggest that the trading volume within the binding curve has steadily increased since June, which is true. However, the total scale of trading volume from the binding curve and PumpSwap has shrunk from $25-$30 billion monthly in the first quarter of 2026 to $13.8 billion in October. The platform profits from drawing fees based on trading volume; while traders buying tokens derive their earnings from whether the tokens become popular—now the scale of generating hits is merely one-ninth of what it used to be.
The survival data of tokens also corroborates this conclusion: out of 24.4 million issuance records on Pump.fun, as of the date of the statistics, only 312 tokens maintain a market value above $100,000, approximately one in every 78,000 tokens survives, yielding a survival rate of merely 0.0013%.

Of the tokens issued by Pump.fun, only 0.0013% currently have market values exceeding $100,000, approximately one in every 78,000.
Pump.fun's token survival rate is lower than that of most other platforms with far smaller issuance scales.
This is the first market we have observed with rapid supply expansion and simultaneous ongoing demand decay. Without the platform's incentive mechanism continually nourishing this system, it could have never developed to its current scale.
Market Participants Also Propel the Cycle
This system is built by Pump.fun, but the trading volume that sustains its operation comes from the traders themselves. The various arbitrage behaviors mentioned can realize profits only if there are counterparties to complete the transactions, and most of the time, this counterparty is us.
We condemn the chaos while simultaneously contributing traffic to it with our own behavior: We criticize bundlers but then turn to follow and pay attention to their next launch; some leverage popular tokens for arbitrage but within the community, instead praise their clever operations; certain KOLs call out twenty coin types daily, and their audience only values the advance notice of news rather than whether their followers can profit. Among the previously tracked fourteen callers, only one allowed their followers to achieve profits; the rest collectively lost $926,000 on the day.
We pay a double price for this: First, for the trading volume we contribute, Pump.fun and creators take a slice; second, for our attention, every subsequent round of hype speculation or each call harvest essentially competes for this attention.
Long-term Holding is No Longer a Feasible Strategy
The mainstream thinking a year ago was to discover potential coins early on and withstand fluctuations for long-term holding. Now, however, the prices of called-out tokens decrease by 74% in median price one day after the call. Those traders who can remain are those who sell off most quickly. For individuals, selling ahead makes rational sense, but when everyone operates this way, it eliminates the possibility of a token entering a long-cycle market. If no one is willing to hold tokens beyond the first hour post-listing, the tokens will never grow to a market cap of millions, and precisely that first hour window contributes to three-quarters of Pump.fun's revenues.
Changes Traders Can Make
We do not need to wait for Pump.fun's permission to make adjustments. Hold the tokens you genuinely believe in rather than frequently replacing them at slight market fluctuations; evaluate call KOLs based on whether their followers can profit rather than the frequency of their posts; stop spreading the idea that front-running and packaged launches are wise trading strategies; shift trading flow to other issuance platforms — those that promote the long-term survival of tokens rather than encourage high-frequency trading.
Any single action mentioned above cannot directly amend the underlying incentives, but every trade that does not flow into this harvesting system will reduce the platform's fee income.
Reconstruction Direction of the Incentive Mechanism
We are not contract engineers; the following is merely a reform idea and not an immediately implementable engineering solution. The core of all proposals is to shift the revenue distribution node from the first hour post-token listing to later stages:
Increase the initial market value of tokens, paired with deeper initial liquidity; liquidity grows in compound with trading volume, with the funding pool continuously expanding;
Fees are distributed not only to creators but also to token holders and liquidity providers; creators' fee settings have unlocking mechanisms, with the release schedule tied to the duration of token existence;
Call incentives should no longer be based on trading volume; instead, they should lean towards holding behavior: Whether KOLs can obtain rewards should depend on whether followers still hold positions and are in profit several days later, rather than the transaction volume brought by calls.
Such adjustments could sustain the vitality of the meme coin trading ecology, and Pump.fun itself has the capital conditions to experiment: It holds approximately $2.84 billion in on-chain assets and has control over the entire issuance chain. A market that can continually nurture long-cycle popular meme coins would generate long-term profits for the platform far exceeding the harvesting model that consumes buyers' funds. The platform opts for short-term harvesting simply because the current model is more profitable, but this model is unsustainable.
Even if the above proposals are implemented, they may still be insufficient. Such reforms would elevate the costs for suppliers (issuers and bundlers), but cannot change one reality: the tool advantages held by suppliers are always difficult for the demand side to catch up with.
Concept of Issuance Model Detached from the Binding Curve
All previous proposals are still based on the binding curve. A further innovative idea is to completely abandon the binding curve issuance model:
In this new model, the purchase price for all participants is entirely consistent. Without a binding curve, entering blocks early no longer has a premium advantage, and targeting front-running becomes meaningless. Fundraising limits are set by the issuing parties; if the fundraising lower limit is not met within a fixed window (24 or 48 hours), the contract automatically refunds the full amount, and failed issuances do not incur losses for buyers. Once the fundraising reaches the upper limit, the contract automatically generates a liquidity pool, with LP certificates destroyed or permanently locked; the developer cannot leverage the fundraising funds. Each wallet is assigned a purchase limit, for example, no more than 1% of the total fundraising amount, to prevent whales or bots from absorbing the majority of chips.
The platform charges fees only upon successful fundraising; it will not earn any revenue from the thousands of failed fundraising attempts. The charging point of the issuance platform is transformed from each trade to each successful fundraising.

In the current binding curve model, early buyers have the lowest costs, suitable for living off stacking bots to buy early; while in the fixed-price fundraising model, everyone pays the same purchasing price, eliminating the advantage of front-running.
This plan can eliminate issues related to bundling front-running, block sniping, and developers running off with liquidity under the binding curve mechanism, as well as the incentives for "issuing dozens of tokens in bulk to bet on one becoming popular."
However, this model itself still has shortcomings that need to be objectively explained: the effect of single wallet limits to resist witch attacks is limited; currently, the cost of bulk purchasing old wallets is low, allowing bundlers to still split funds and use numerous witch wallets to bypass restrictions. Uniform purchasing prices cannot prevent token price crashes on the first day of listing; it merely achieves fairness in the starting phase.
Future Development Trends
The current narrative of meme coins has reached its endpoint. We believe that unless the underlying issuance model undergoes a thorough overhaul (similar to the aforementioned plan of obtaining income based on successful fundraising rather than profiting from trading and tokens reaching zero), it will be difficult for meme coins to restore their previous ecology.
As long as there are still issuance platforms that profit from tokens reaching zero and frequent trading, this fertile ground of meme coin trading will lose vitality, and long-term holding will continue to remain an inferior strategy. New things will eventually appear, but they will not take the form of the meme coins we have today, and will not come soon.
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