On September 27, 2026, two almost opposite on-chain signals emerged on the same timeline: on one side, DYORSWAP publicly confirmed that the so-called "GIWA Mainnet" it previously integrated was actually a fake chain built by scammers, which reused the real GIWA Chain ID 9134. It misled users into cross-chain transactions through forged cross-chain bridges, resulting in real financial losses, and thoroughly exposed the blind spots in the current ecosystem regarding on-chain security and mainnet validation. On the other side, there was progress from Polygon — according to public news, the POL community has permanently burned 100 million POL tokens through on-chain revenue, accounting for about 1% of the total supply. Co-founder Sandeep also indicated that an additional 25 million POL will be burned, and the Polygon PoS chain is advancing upgrades, including blockstreaming, aiming to reduce on-chain confirmation times to about 1 millisecond. These two events, closely timed but unrelated, present a security incident involving a fake mainnet and a value reassessment attempt combining deflationary narratives and performance upgrades, providing a window to simultaneously examine current on-chain ecological risks and opportunities.
The Theft of the Real Chain ID
In this fake mainnet incident, the scammers' most critical step was directly reusing the real GIWA's Chain ID — 9134. Chain IDs are originally seen as the "identity number" that distinguishes networks, and many integrators lower their guard during preliminary verification as long as they see the Chain ID in the configuration matches expectations. The fake GIWA chain took advantage of this mentality by writing 9134 into its network configuration, claiming it was the "GIWA Mainnet", making it difficult for front-end integrators and ordinary users to realize they were actually connecting to a fake chain built by scammers during node connections and transaction initiations. On September 27, DYORSWAP confirmed in an announcement that the "GIWA Mainnet" it previously recognized and integrated was indeed a fake chain.
More insidiously, the fake GIWA mainnet was not isolated but operated in conjunction with a set of forged cross-chain bridges. When users selected to "cross to GIWA" on the cross-chain page, the front-end and back-end redirected requests to this fake chain, which reused the real Chain ID, and completed the fund transfer through contracts or addresses controlled by scammers. As a result, users indeed initiated cross-chain transactions from the source chain but fell into the black box preset by the scammers on the target end, with assets guided to addresses under the control of the other party along the on-chain path. Some users have already suffered financial losses during the cross-chain process. Both the media and project parties categorized this series of operations as a security incident and fake chain fraud, directly shaking the foundational security assumption that "as long as the Chain ID matches and the configuration works, it can be assumed to be the true mainnet," forcing the ecosystem to reassess the trust boundaries regarding mainnet identification, chain list maintenance, and cross-chain integration. This incident compelled the entire ecosystem to reevaluate the security boundaries concerning mainnet identification and chain list configurations.
DYORSWAP's Compensation Commitment and Responsibility Boundaries
From recognition to loss mitigation, DYORSWAP has been pushed to the forefront in this fake GIWA mainnet incident. When it initially integrated "GIWA Mainnet", the fake chain reused the real Chain ID 9134, making basic validations difficult to detect anomalies, ultimately leading to user losses through the forged cross-chain bridge. In the announcement on September 27, DYORSWAP both confirmed that the chain was a fake one built by scammers and initiated urgent delisting and investigations. On the other hand, it has contacted professional security teams for on-chain tracking and analysis, attempting to clarify the flow of funds on the on-chain path and provide a basis for follow-up remediation.
Crucially, DYORSWAP publicly stated its intention to utilize the project fund to compensate affected users. Although specific criteria for compensation qualification, process details, total amounts, and timelines have not been disclosed, this statement indicates that front-end integrators are willing to assume the actual costs of their chain selections and configurations, which helps to rebuild a certain degree of trust with users while also bringing the issue of "who pays for integration risks" to light. In contrast, the GIWA official emphasized on the same day that the mainnet has not yet been launched, denying the possibility of the so-called "GIWA mainnet RPC leak," and categorized all claims of having mainnet RPC as false information, thus outlining the responsibility boundaries of the misused project: the brand was abused, but there was no operational failure in mainnet maintenance or interface management. Along this axis, DYORSWAP's fund compensation and GIWA's clarification statements together form a practical division of labor model — the integrator must be responsible for their connection decisions and user losses, while the misused project defends its responsibility baseline through information disclosure and narrative corrections. This division of responsibility is redefining the role expectations of misused projects and integrators in security incidents.
Rumors about the Fake Mainnet and Cross-chain Bridge Risks
Before the incident was exposed, a round of self-consistent narrative had already been completed in the community around the so-called "GIWA mainnet RPC leak" and "early access" stories: some claimed to have obtained "internal RPC," while others boasted they could connect to the "unreleased mainnet" in advance. The fake GIWA chain integrated by DYORSWAP was packaged as a "hidden entry" in this narrative environment. Until September 27, the GIWA official explicitly stated that the mainnet had not yet been launched, denying any possibility of "RPC leaks" and categorizing all posts claiming to possess mainnet RPC information as untrue. This entire set of early access imaginings was subsequently categorized as an important prelude to the scam.
The key step that allowed the fake chain to complete the harvest was the forged cross-chain bridge. Users were not directly adding a "strange new chain" locally, but were guided to transfer assets from existing networks to the so-called new chain through "supporting the GIWA mainnet" cross-chain entry. In the context of reusing the real GIWA Chain ID 9134, this path appeared highly credible at the interface level. According to AiCoin data, users have already encountered financial losses in cross-chain operations related to the fake GIWA chain, while DYORSWAP also mentioned in its announcement that it has identified several suspicious messages and individuals within the community, but the relevant details have not yet been cross-validated by multiple parties, and the risk link cannot be fully retraced. At a stage where the mainnet has not officially launched, if users rely on unofficial channels to "rush access," they are effectively handing over their signature rights and asset paths to unverified cross-chain infrastructures, creating a structural vulnerability that constitutes a visible safety risk.
POL Burn and PoS Speed-up Reassessment Signals
In another narrative on-chain that is markedly different from the risks, POL chose to use "real money" revenue for deflation. According to AiCoin data, the POL community has recently permanently burned 100 million POL through on-chain revenue, accounting for about 1% of the total supply. This is not a one-time activity but is designed as part of a long-term path in the protocol. Polygon co-founder Sandeep further disclosed in a public statement that an additional 25 million POL will be burned later, and relevant tokens are continuously accumulating or prepared for burning, effectively locking in a predictable contraction curve at the total supply level and providing long-term holders with a verifiable deflation anchor on-chain.
Advancing alongside deflation is the aggressive upgrading of performance. The Polygon PoS chain is promoting technological solutions, including blockstreaming, aiming to reduce on-chain confirmation times to about 1 millisecond, which means further strengthening the infrastructure capability for high concurrency and low latency on the existing ecosystem. In the same round of statements, Sandeep emphasized that POL (formerly MATIC) is still a project he considers seriously undervalued and overlooked. He clearly attempts to package "revenue-driven burns" with "PoS performance acceleration" into a value reassessment narrative: responding to inflation worries with verifiable reductions on one side and supporting future application density with faster confirmations and stronger execution on the other. Whether this dual-line promotion ultimately translates into real valuation repricing still requires clearer answers from future on-chain behavior and market feedback.
Safety Alarms and Diverging Future of Value Narratives
On the same day, while DYORSWAP identified and disclosed the fake GIWA mainnet and initiated on-chain tracking and compensation commitments, Polygon told a deflationary narrative through revenue-driven POL burns and PoS performance upgrades. The on-chain world clearly presents two diverging paths of safety deficits and narrative premiums. The fake GIWA chain reused real GIWA Chain ID 9134, inducing user operations and causing losses alongside the fabricated cross-chain bridge, compounded by previous unofficial claims surrounding "RPC leaks/early access." This ultimately forced users to reassess the most basic connection habits: chain ID, RPC, and cross-chain bridge addresses are no longer "see and believe" technical parameters but must be cross-verified with official launch statements. For project parties, DYORSWAP's proactive contact with professional security teams for on-chain analysis and plans to utilize the project fund to cover affected users, even before publicly disclosing the total losses and compensation details, has not only raised expectations of responsibility for front-end and middleware in cross-chain fraud but also highlighted the systematic weaknesses exposed by the combination of "unlaunched mainnet + early access narrative" in cross-chain infrastructure. In contrast, Polygon's practice of accumulating on-chain revenue to permanently burn 100 million POL (about 1% of the total supply) and the subsequent plan to burn approximately 25 million more ties the PoS chain's upgrade to about 1 millisecond confirmation times with its self-positioning as "severely undervalued POL," attempting to leverage measurable reductions and performance acceleration to enhance the long-term narrative of the asset without disclosing a clear upgrade timeline. The real variables worth tracking ahead are not complex: whether DYORSWAP can implement its compensation commitment and deliver interim safety tracking results under open and transparent rules, and how the market will respond to the narrative of POL through on-chain behavior and price performance as Polygon gradually implements PoS upgrades and incremental burns. These two independent processes will jointly shape the actual direction of the current safety alarms and value reassessments.
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