Vitalik discusses AI brakes, on the same day as an on-chain attack alert.

CN
22 hours ago

On July 20, 2026, the technical world saw two seemingly unrelated ripples emerge on the same timeline. On one end, Ethereum co-founder Vitalik Buterin posted a long thread on X about the evolution of AI capabilities and the risks of AGI, continuing to think about the differences between human and machine intelligence from the perspective of a "multidimensional capability spectrum," and calling for a slowdown in the advancement of frontier AI, urging for more exploration of governance paths for human-machine integration. On the other end, the security agency Slow Mist released a report disclosing a malicious extension juannegro.solidity targeting the commonly used TRAE IDE for developers: this extension disguised itself as an ordinary Solidity plugin, executing automatically when the IDE starts, and dynamically managing command and control (C2) endpoints and payload configurations through Ethereum smart contracts, allowing attackers to continuously adjust attack instructions and targets without the need to republish the extension. The two incidents are currently independent under the available information and merely juxtaposed by date, yet they accurately outline the same tension: the technological optimism represented by Ethereum and AI collides with the security risks of tools being misused and on-chain protocols being embedded into attack chains within the same developer ecosystem. This is not a market report revolving around price fluctuations, but rather a questioning of how developers, tools, and on-chain governance can seek a new balance between accelerating innovation and ensuring safety, starting from the two signals of this day.

Vitalik's Three Waves of Technology Outline the Path to Machine Ascendancy

In this speech, Vitalik initially attempted to rewrite our intuitive scale of "intelligence." He emphasized that the capabilities of humans and machines are more like a "multidimensional capability spectrum," rather than a single intelligence scale ranging from low to high: in some dimensions, machines have far surpassed humans, while in others, they remain clumsy, and humans also exhibit significant differences across various capability dimensions. From this spectral perspective on intelligence, he opposes the simplistic ranking that merely places humans and future AGI in a single line comparing "who is smarter," as it obscures the gradual rewriting of the boundaries of machine capabilities under different technological waves.

Along this perspective, he compressed the history of machine capability expansion into three waves of technology: the first wave is the Industrial Revolution, which embedded mechanical power into production and transportation, rapidly overflowing the "physical strength" dimension of machine capabilities; the second wave is the computer era, where general computation provided the infrastructure for abstract information processing, allowing machines to start rewriting human roles in dimensions such as computation and memory; the third wave is the current LLM era, where language models have enabled machines to quickly approach human intuition in understanding and generating text. Vitalik clearly stated in his tweets that he maintains a high vigilance regarding the risks of continuing to push this evolutionary chain toward frontier AI, especially AGI, believing that accelerating solely in the direction of "stronger intelligence" could bring systemic harms for which we are not yet prepared. Therefore, he called for a slowdown in the sprint of frontier AI, urging more resources and designs to be dedicated to paths of deep human-machine integration, with further expansion of machine capabilities based on enhancing rather than replacing human potential.

AGI Acceleration Faction vs. Cautious Faction: A Route Struggle in the Crypto Circle

In a broader technological narrative, the pursuit of more powerful and versatile AI systems has almost become a consensus: numerous tech companies and institutions continuously ramp up computing power, data, and talent, treating "reaching AGI as soon as possible" as their competitive goal. This "acceleration faction" logic has been consistently reinforced within capital markets and the R&D community. At this time, Vitalik openly advocates hitting the brakes on frontier AI in his tweets, emphasizing the path of human-machine integration, which adds a constraint to this mainstream narrative—it's not about denying the capability expansion itself, but rather reminding the crypto technology and broader tech community that both speed and direction need to be included in governance discussions.

This reminder resonates in the crypto circle due to Vitalik's long-term influence on technology and governance. For many years, he has viewed Ethereum as a foundational protocol for financial applications and has repeatedly discussed AI risks and governance issues, emphasizing that decentralized technology can participate in designing new generation technical rules. Within the Ethereum ecosystem, there have also been explorations around the combination of AI and decentralized governance, giving his AI viewpoints inherent discourse power and agenda-setting capability. From an on-chain perspective, "hitting the brakes" is not merely a call to laboratories; it points to a possible structural adjustment: by decentralizing some decision-making power regarding frontier AI into a wider group of participants through smart contracts and on-chain governance, establishing publicly verifiable rules to constrain the training, deployment, and invocation boundaries of models, allowing for transparent review and remediation mechanisms for the expansion of high-risk capabilities. For the crypto community, this presents both an opportunity for redistributing power and a serious new risk management proposition—caught between the AGI acceleration faction and the cautious faction, Ethereum and its surrounding decentralized technologies are likely to be embroiled in a long-term game regarding who sets the boundaries of machine intelligence.

The Assassination of a Disguised Plugin: Ethereum Contracts as Attack Console

The juannegro.solidity disclosed by Slow Mist appears to be an exceptionally ordinary Solidity plugin: its name looks like that of an individual developer, and the installation process is no different from conventional extensions; once added to the TRAE IDE environment, developers often subconsciously view it as part of their toolchain. The true attack begins the moment the IDE starts; this extension automatically executes pre-embedded malicious code and attempts to establish some form of "persistent existence" at the system level, ensuring that even when developers close or update the IDE, it can continue to operate during subsequent development and debugging processes. This latent form, disguised as a productivity tool, is tailored as an assassination design for the developer scenario.

What is even more concerning is that its command and control do not rely on the traditional concealed servers commonly used by hackers but are directly attached to the Ethereum chain. The extension reads and updates C2 endpoint and attack payload-related configurations through a pre-set smart contract; attackers only need to modify parameters in the on-chain contract to adjust the command server address, the activation state of attack modules, and even target information in real-time, without the need to republish the extension or touch the victim's local environment. Here, the blockchain is thoroughly utilized as an attack control plane: public, programmable, and persistently present, yet logically serving the remote dispatch of malicious programs perfectly. This time, the target is not a particular DeFi protocol, but the entire developer toolchain itself, where the development environment has been silently integrated into an on-chain "war room," providing a highly covert and maintainable paradigm for similar attacks in the future.

Two Signals on the Same Day: Intertwining of Technological Ideals and Security Shadows

On July 20, 2026, two seemingly unrelated technical messages juxtaposed into a thought-provoking facet: on one side, Vitalik's lengthy article on X reviewed the three waves of the Industrial Revolution, the Computer Era, and LLM, redefined the relationship between human and machine intelligence with a "multidimensional capability spectrum," calling for a slowdown in the development of frontier AI, moving more towards human-machine integration and governance exploration; on the other side, Slow Mist disclosed juannegro.solidity, disguised as an ordinary Solidity plugin, which executes automatically when the TRAE IDE starts and maintains remote command and control configurations through Ethereum smart contracts. The current publicly available information clearly shows that there is no causal connection between these two events; they just happened to occur on the same day, yet they form a strong contrast in time from technological ideals to security shadows: one side discusses how to involve decentralized infrastructures like Ethereum in responsible governance of new technologies, while the other side sees the same type of infrastructure being used as an on-chain "battleboard" that attackers can modify at will.

More ironically, the malicious extension targets not the end user's wallet or a specific on-chain protocol but rather the IDE toolchain that developers are accustomed to—an environment regarded as a "productivity accelerator" has been silently integrated with a smart contract-driven centralized control panel. Attackers utilize contracts to store and update C2 endpoints and payload configurations, essentially borrowing the characteristics of "code is law" and "on-chain outreach" to provide a convenient maintenance center for their malicious commands that is difficult to arbitrarily take offline. This directly punctures the comfortable illusion of technical neutrality: the same set of decentralized tools can support the ideals of AI governance, but can also be reconfigured into an attack dispatch system. When IDE extensions, automated scripts, and on-chain contracts are uniformly viewed as "capability upgrades," developers are most likely to overlook the security exposure surfaces and psychological blind spots that come with these capabilities—believing that familiar tools are inherently secure and that decentralization inherently stands on the "good side." The two independent events of this day remind us that how technology is used always requires scrutiny that is more rigorous than simply what technology can do.

From Writing Code to Using AI: Developers Must Reshape Security Boundaries

These two independent events of the day have pulled developers, protocols, and the entire ecosystem back to the same reality: every step forward in technical capability must come with a simultaneous elevation of the governance and security baseline. The juannegro.solidity disclosed by Slow Mist is not a traditional on-chain contract vulnerability, but rather an attack at the toolchain level targeting the TRAE IDE. The attacker uses Ethereum smart contracts as the C2 configuration hub, allowing them to remotely dispatch extension behaviors simply by changing parameters on the chain; parallel to this, Vitalik views "human-machine integration" as the path of the future, indicating that more and more developers will integrate AI-assisted programming into their IDEs, delegating more decision-making power to unseen models and plugins. In such an environment, security boundaries must expand from "is the code secure?" to "who writes my code, who has execution rights within my development environment": when selecting IDE extensions, one must confirm the source, the scope of permissions, and whether there are on-chain mutable configurations, similar to auditing dependency libraries; when introducing AI coding assistants, one must also assume that they could be driven by malicious commands or contaminated models, rather than assuming they will only output "best practices." What remains to be observed is whether governance discussions surrounding frontier AI will indeed materialize into development tool norms, whether on-chain security tools will catch up to recognize and intercept such attack patterns utilizing contracts as control planes, and whether designs similar to juannegro.solidity will be replicated by more attackers in new contract and IDE combinations.

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