On the morning of July 17, 2026, the opening ceremony of the Shanghai World Reception Hall was endowed with significance beyond the city itself - Chinese national leaders delivered keynote speeches here, officially announcing the emergence of the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization in Shanghai. During the subsequent signing ceremony, 29 countries, including China, jointly signed agreements, establishing the legal basis for this intergovernmental international organization aimed at promoting international cooperation in artificial intelligence, capacity building, and global governance. In the speech, the Chinese side clearly defined this organization as a significant initiative in response to the voices of the Global South, uniting the broader international community to actively participate in the development and governance of artificial intelligence, and claimed it would become an important milestone in the history of AI development. Since the proposal was first raised in 2025, to gathering participation from Russia, Brazil, Cuba, Serbia, as well as multiple African and Asian countries by 2026, this moment in Shanghai not only marked the grounding of the initiative but also signaled the formal beginning of a new narrative: beyond the established Western-dominated framework of AI governance, a multilateral mechanism led by China and predominantly consisting of developing countries began to take shape, with the global AI governance landscape shifting from a singular center towards complex competition and collaboration among multiple powers.

Shanghai: New Command Center for Global AI Governance

When the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization was announced to have "emerged in Shanghai," the location itself became part of the narrative. On the morning of July 17, 2026, the highest Chinese leaders attended the opening ceremony in the Shanghai World Reception Hall and delivered keynote speeches, intertwining the birth of this intergovernmental international organization with the coordinates of a city: from now on, international cooperation, capacity building, and global governance surrounding artificial intelligence would no longer be discussed solely in the existing rule-centered conference rooms but would reopen discussions along the Huangpu River. For the outside world, this marked China's spatial declaration of its transformation from a technological follower to an agenda setter - the new story of global AI governance would begin from the "Shanghai scene."

If the initiative in 2025 was merely a strategic exploration, then the sustained efforts over the following year truly brought this card to reality. China proposed the establishment of the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization and immediately gained support from the first batch of members from 2025 to the first half of 2026, roughly confirming the scope of founding members, ultimately signing an agreement on July 17, 2026, with 29 countries including China to officially position it as an intergovernmental international organization and chose to hold this ceremony in Shanghai. From a psychological perspective, a new multilateral technological governance platform led by developing countries with its headquarters in a Chinese city sends a message to the global technology and digital governance circle: to participate in the next phase of AI rule design, one must face a new coordinate system with Shanghai as a command center. Thus, Shanghai became not just a venue for a conference but the central position in the global AI power map, serving as a strategic starting point for observing how China leads the reshaping of global artificial intelligence order.

29 Countries Assembled: Voices of the Global South in AI Discourse

As Shanghai was positioned at the center of the global artificial intelligence power map, what emerged was a membership profile significantly tilted towards the "Global South." Among the 29 countries signing the agreement on the same day, founding members included China, Russia, Brazil, Cuba, Serbia, and the list continued to extend to Africa and Asia: 10 African countries and 12 Asian countries became the first entrants, with developing countries no longer being a minority in this new organization but rather a clear leading force. This composition itself is a political declaration - countries that have long acted as "recipients" in technical rules chose to collectively enter the negotiation table in this new round of global institutional reshaping around artificial intelligence.

From the perspective of the "Global South," the assembly of these 29 countries first rewrites their role positioning. They hope to have the right to participate in setting rules in discussions about algorithm standards, safety frameworks, and cross-border governance, rather than adjusting their national policies passively based on others' templates afterward; equally important is to gain systemic support in talents, tools, and governance experiences through an intergovernmental platform oriented towards "capacity building" and "international cooperation." China plays a dual role here: on one hand, as an advocate, it emphasizes "responding to the voices of the Global South," providing political language for the demands of developing countries; on the other hand, as the host and core member of the organization, it builds an institutional stage that embeds these demands into a set of AI governance frameworks designed by China for the Global South, deepening connections with developing countries along both technical and political lines.

Chinese Proposal Emerges: A Subtle Competition and Cooperation with Western Pathways

If the previous stage of preparation and lobbying was paving the way, then the announcement of the establishment of the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization in Shanghai is the institutional vehicle for the Chinese proposal to truly emerge. It is explicitly positioned as an intergovernmental international organization, jointly established through agreements signed by 29 countries, including China, with its mission focused on three points: promoting international cooperation in artificial intelligence, bringing more countries to the same table for technological and data dialogue; strengthening capacity building, viewing computing power, talent, infrastructure, and governance capacity as "public goods" that can be collectively enhanced; and participating in global governance, forming transnational coordination on principles, standards, and risk responses. These three dimensions combine to outline a Chinese version of the blueprint that, rather than merely controlling technology, seeks to reshape the distribution and discourse power structure of technology, especially under a member composition dominated by developing countries, this blueprint inherently carries a political color of "closing the gap."

Compared to the AI governance principles and security initiatives proposed by Europe and the United States and related international institutions in recent years, the focus of this framework is not simple opposition, but rather differences in their arrangement order: Western dominant discourse often starts from "risk," emphasizing compliance, scrutiny, and restraints; the China-led cooperation organization emphasizes "cooperation" and "capacity" at the mission level, attempting to find new balance labels between security and development. While specific institutional details have not yet been made public, it is foreseeable that these two systems may have dialogue space on abstract principles such as security, responsibility, and transparency, but are also bound to experience a scenario of parallel understanding and competition in standard setting, technology exports, and evaluation methods. At present, both sides are still in the exploration stage of testing each other's boundaries through declarations and initiatives, and what will truly determine the relationship between the two will be whether this China-led framework can find practice paths willing to engage different governance cultures in balancing security and development in the future.

Capability Gaps and Technological Anxiety: The AI Window Period for Developing Countries

For many African and Asian members, artificial intelligence has always felt like a technology competition unfolding in the distance: talent outflow, weak infrastructure, insufficient data governance capacity, and the resources and discourse power to truly participate in rule-making are very limited. It is against this backdrop of real disparities and window period anxiety that the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization includes "capacity building" in its mission, concentrating 10 African countries and 12 Asian countries among its founding members, explicitly putting these demands front and center. Xi Jinping's speech in Shanghai positioned this organization as a measure to respond to the voices of the Global South and unite the international community to actively promote AI development and governance, effectively promising these countries that they no longer have to merely passively accept existing technologies and rules but can attempt to collectively enter the agenda setting of the AI era through an intergovernmental platform.

However, there remains a distance between commitment to capacity building and its implementation. Among the disclosed information so far, there are no details about specific training programs, computing power support plans, or funding arrangements; "capacity building" still remains at the level of initiative, meaning that the organization primarily provides a field for coordination and cooperation rather than an immediate solution to bridging the gaps in talent, infrastructure, and computing power. Within the framework led by China, developing countries have the opportunity to receive support in technology output, governance experiences, and institutional design, and will also be incorporated into a collective identity distinct from the Western system in discourse. However, it is equally important to recognize that an excessive reliance on a single technology provider and a single governance paradigm may inadvertently lock in future pathway choices, leading to "catching up" translating into long-term binding to specific standards and ecosystems. For those countries viewing this organization as an opportunity to seize the AI window, it serves as both a platform to strive for development initiative and a governance test that must constantly weigh dependency against autonomy.

Departure of a Multipolar AI Order: Parallel Cooperation and Competition

From the proposition of the initiative in 2025 to the signing of the agreement by 29 countries in Shanghai on July 17, 2026, an intergovernmental artificial intelligence cooperation organization dominated by developing countries was officially established along the Huangpu River, which Xi Jinping defined as "an important milestone in the history of AI development," effectively integrating this collective appearance into the future global narrative: the governance of world AI is no longer centered around a singular power, but has instead emerged a new pivot initiated jointly by China and the Global South. However, whether this pivot can leverage the restructuring of order is still enveloped by a multitude of unknowns - the governance structure, by-laws, and operational mechanisms of the organization have not been disclosed, and the complete list of 29 signatory countries and subsequent legal processes remains blank; thus, research briefs view the potential competition and coordination with the existing Western-led system as the main conflict storyline in the coming narrative. For China and the vast number of developing countries, the road ahead is likely not to be a linear progression but rather a simultaneous advancement on three tracks: on the cooperation track, striving for discourse space on technology, capacity building, and security rules through this intergovernmental platform; on the competition track, addressing discourse imbalances in the existing system with different value orientations and governance paradigms; and on the dialogue track, inevitably maintaining communication with the original framework to prevent normative fragmentation from backfiring on their own development. What will truly determine whether this milestone can rewrite the rules is whether China and the Global South can seize the initiative on cooperation, competition, and dialogue across these three tracks, rather than relying solely on proclamations made at a summit.

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