Quantum security has become part of the national agenda of the United States, and Bitcoin's quantum-resistant upgrade should accelerate.

To begin with, this tweet will be quite obscure and not suitable for reading. The main aim is to sort out the quantum risks that Bitcoin may face due to the executive orders related to quantum computing and post-quantum cryptography signed by Trump, and how these policies will promote the long-term security upgrade of Bitcoin.

Just early this morning, Trump signed two executive orders regarding quantum technology at the White House:

The first initiates a national-level quantum project, planning to produce a quantum computer capable of performing significant scientific calculations within the next five years, while also promoting quantum-enhanced sensors and quantum networks.

The second requires federal agencies to gradually migrate their computer systems to post-quantum cryptography systems by 2031, and to lead broader adoption through government procurement, security certification, and technical standards.

In terms of timing, five years and 2031 seem more like two policy and engineering milestones. The migration of government systems to new cryptographic standards often requires years of preparation, involving algorithm standards, software and hardware updates, key management, supply chain security, procurement processes, and interdepartmental coordination.

This process will allow post-quantum cryptography to transition from laboratory research to large-scale deployment, while also providing Bitcoin's quantum resistance preparations with a more mature technical foundation.

Once the U.S. federal system enters the post-quantum migration phase, relevant algorithm libraries, cryptographic chips, hardware security modules, key management systems, testing frameworks, and auditing standards will develop more rapidly. Although these infrastructures mainly serve the government, financial institutions, and large enterprises, they can also be adopted by bitcoin:native wallets, exchanges, custodial entities, and hardware devices in the future.

For Bitcoin, this means that the external industry is preemptively completing a portion of the research, testing, and standardization work. When the community needs to formally choose a quantum-resistant solution, the available algorithm implementations, hardware support, and security tools will be more mature, and the actual deployment costs will be lower.

The quantum risks for Bitcoin mainly involve two aspects: hashes and digital signatures.

The SHA-256 used in mining may be affected by Grover's algorithm in a quantum environment, which can increase search efficiency but yields a quadratic speedup, thus SHA-256 still retains a high security margin.

The signing layer becomes even more crucial; the ECDSA currently used by Bitcoin, as well as the Schnorr signatures used in Taproot, are built on the secp256k1 elliptic curve. Theoretically, when a quantum computer possesses a sufficient number of logical qubits, stable error correction capabilities, high logical gate fidelity, and adequate continuous running time, Shor’s algorithm can deduce the private key from the public key.

Current quantum computers are still a long way from achieving this large-scale, fault-tolerant operating capacity.

Whether a public key has already been published will affect the migration order of different UTXOs. Early P2PK outputs would directly write the public key on-chain, and Taproot outputs also contain publicly available x-only public keys. For P2PKH and P2WPKH addresses, when they have not yet been spent, they typically only show the public key hash on-chain, and the public key is made public only after the first expenditure. When addresses are reused, already disclosed public keys will continue to correspond to the remaining balance, thus they need to be prioritized during future upgrades.

Next, Bitcoin's quantum-resistant development will likely advance along four lines.

The first is to research post-quantum signature or hybrid signature output types, allowing users to gradually migrate assets to a new address format.

Hybrid signatures can simultaneously use traditional algorithms and post-quantum algorithms during the transition phase, preserving more security redundancy for the new solution. Here, it is necessary to balance signature size, verification speed, block space, node burden, hardware support, and long-term security, as many post-quantum signatures are notably larger than ECDSA and Schnorr.

The second line is to push wallets, exchanges, mining pools, custodial entities, and ETF custodians to complete key audits, address rotations, and UTXO migrations.

Protocol support for new addresses is just the first step; subsequent updates also involve hardware wallet firmware, cold wallet processes, hardware security modules, deposit addresses, signing devices, and overall auditing systems.

The third line is to research handling strategies for long-dormant coins, lost coins, and un-migrated assets.

There are a large number of UTXOs on-chain that have not moved for years; some of these public keys have been published, while others may have lost their private keys. In the future, the community needs to form a clearer consensus around the compatibility period for old signature types, migration rules, and asset identification.

The fourth line is to establish standards for monitoring quantum threats.

Industry focus will gradually shift from the number of physical qubits to logical qubits, error correction overhead, logical gate fidelity, quantum circuit depth, continuous running time, and the real computational resources required to run Shor's algorithm. Only when these indicators make concurrent progress will quantum computing progressively approach actual application at the cryptographic level.

Institutional demands will also rise in tandem.

Future custody, insurance, ETF audits, and asset allocation models are very likely to incorporate indicators such as public key exposure degree, address reuse status, wallet upgrade capabilities, quantum emergency plans, and protocol migration roadmaps.

Institutions will pay greater attention to what address types are used for custodial assets, which UTXOs have publicly exposed keys, whether hardware security modules can support post-quantum algorithms, and how long the entire custody system will take to complete the migration.

Some may be concerned about the possibility of Bitcoin being compromised, but believe me, the custodians and ETF issuers, including Coinbase and BlackRock, as well as exchanges like Binance and OKX, are likely to be 100 times more nervous than us.

So there is currently nothing to worry about; it is just that Trump is demanding that the U.S. move towards quantum computing, which, although it appears to sound an alarm for Bitcoin, will actually help BTC better navigate the quantum crisis.

#Bitget has arrived as VIP! Crypto, US stocks, CFDs, a global one-stop layout for opportunities.

免责声明：本文章仅代表作者个人观点，不代表本平台的立场和观点。本文章仅供信息分享，不构成对任何人的任何投资建议。用户与作者之间的任何争议，与本平台无关。如网页中刊载的文章或图片涉及侵权，请提供相关的权利证明和身份证明发送邮件到support@aicoin.com，本平台相关工作人员将会进行核查。