Around May 23, 2026, the tone in Tehran changed quietly. Mediators began to signal externally: The United States and Iran are close to agreeing to extend the existing ceasefire by another 60 days, and a memorandum of understanding containing 14 points is being revised repeatedly on the table. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Baghaei deliberately shifted the focus away from the nuclear issue in an interview with IRIB, repeatedly emphasizing that the current negotiation focus is to end what Iran calls this "imposed war." In other words, Tehran is currently engaging in a typical "ceasefire for space" deal: temporarily setting aside sensitive nuclear topics and concentrating limited leverage on halting hostilities and lifting sanctions. The proposed memorandum clearly outlines these levers—the gradual reopening of the previously war-closed Strait of Hormuz, easing the blockade on Iranian ports, providing partial sanctions waivers, and phasing the unfreezing of overseas assets, creating space for economic respite; at the same time, it includes a cap on nuclear activities for the next ten years: keeping uranium enrichment levels below 3.6%, processing stocks over 20% enrichment either by dilution or transfer, while reiterating the commitment not to develop nuclear weapons, insisting on retaining limited rights to enrich uranium. This round of tug-of-war over a 60-day ceasefire and the 14-point memorandum is viewed by all parties as a tentative step to build a framework for the more difficult future nuclear negotiations. Whether Iran can use this "stop the war first, then discuss nuclear" arrangement to create genuine strategic maneuvering space becomes the most critical uncertainty over the next 60 days.

Ceasefire Extended by 60 Days: From Battlefield Pressure to Negotiating Table

To gain a cushion for the idea of "stop the war first, then discuss nuclear issues," mediators publicly stated: The United States and Iran are close to agreeing to extend the existing ceasefire by 60 days. Everyone knows this is not a definitive arrangement but a deliberately prolonged transitional period—pulling the frontline back a bit, allowing time for the nuanced discussions around the 14-point memorandum, technical details, and internal persuasion to be completed within a relatively quiet window. The political significance of extending the ceasefire far exceeds its battlefield significance; it is more like a safety rope hanging in the air, preventing the situation from slipping out of control immediately while also reserving maneuvering room for the final exchange of chips at the negotiation table.

In Tehran's narrative, this confrontation has always been defined as an "imposed war." In the time around May 2026, the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman publicly emphasized that the current negotiations are focused on ending this "imposed war," not immediately putting the nuclear issue on the table. For Iran, the ceasefire primarily alleviates security pressure—allowing the Strait of Hormuz to be given an opportunity to be "gradually reopened," letting blocked ports and severed trade channels see gaps; secondly, it seeks a path out of difficulty for people's livelihoods. With the flames of war in the Middle East still not extinguished and shipping in the Strait of Hormuz disrupted, all parties are aware that continuing to clash will only raise costs: risks at sea, regional uncertainties, and economic pressures, in turn forcing all participants to advance negotiations under lowered battlefield temperatures. Iranian President Pezehqiiyan, when meeting the Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan, mentioned that historical experiences of dealing with the U.S. forced Iran to maintain a high level of caution and prudence in this round of negotiations, which also means that even if the ceasefire is extended by 60 days, Tehran will not easily convert all its battlefield leverage into paper commitments.

Nuclear Issue Temporarily Set Aside: First, Exchange for Ceasefire and Lifting Sanctions

In this round of discussions regarding the ceasefire and the 14-point memorandum, the most sensitive nuclear topics have been deliberately pushed to the back. On May 23, 2026, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Baghaei clearly delineated in an interview with IRIB: The focus of current negotiations is on ending this "imposed war," not on deeply discussing nuclear issues. The structural framework of the text has also been cut accordingly—first discussing the ceasefire, passage, and economic terms that can cool things down immediately, while leaving technical details regarding uranium enrichment levels and stock disposal to be handled in a more professional, closed manner in the future.

Thus, the memorandum focuses on "halt hostilities + lifting sanctions": on one hand, the draft includes steps to relax the blockade on Iranian ports and implement partial sanctions waivers; on the other hand, it seeks to phase the unfreezing of frozen overseas assets, linking it to the gradual reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, attempting to create a feasible path for Iran to restore foreign trade and energy exports during the 60-day ceasefire extension. For Tehran, these are benefits that can be immediately calculated on paper, rather than abstract security commitments, and they align more with what Pezehqiiyan repeatedly emphasizes publicly: Iran is practically adhering to the framework of international law, merely seeking to reclaim the legitimate and rightful rights that belong to the nation and its people. As for the postponed nuclear issue, it is deliberately framed as "a problem for the next stage," with whether or not they can reach that step depending on whether this short-term deal, collateralized by a ceasefire and lifting sanctions, can withstand the current political and battlefield tests, ultimately determining whether the ceasefire can transform from a piece of paper into a genuine starting point for changing the regional situation.

Uranium Enrichment Cap at 3.6%: The Red Line Drawn by Iran

Although Baghaei repeatedly emphasized that this round of negotiations "is not about discussing nuclear issues," the technical terms in that 14-point memorandum have quietly begun to take shape: Iran proposes to keep domestic uranium enrichment levels below 3.6% for the next ten years, while proactively processing its stocks over 20% enrichment, "downgrading" this most sensitive leverage through dilution or transfer. In the same text, Tehran reiterates its commitment not to develop nuclear weapons, but adds a similarly crucial qualification—Iran must retain limited rights to enrich uranium. Externally, this is a commitment to a "nuclear-free Iran"; internally, it is packaged as a symbol of sovereignty, a bottom line that cannot be easily conceded in the cracks of war and sanctions.

For this reason, these seemingly cold technical arrangements have not been pushed to the forefront of current ceasefire negotiations but are carefully locked in the latter part of the memorandum, defined as "starting terms" reserved for more complex nuclear negotiations after the 60-day ceasefire extension. The U.S. may view the 3.6% cap and handling of the high-enrichment stock as baseline pressure points for the future, while Iran sees the "10-year commitment" and "limited enrichment rights" as negotiable chips: the more signs there are of a detente, the further sanctions waivers and asset unfreezing move, the more likely technical details could transition from the draft to the official text; once the ceasefire itself breaks down, these percentages and timelines inscribed in the memorandum can instantaneously transform from starting negotiation points to evidence of each party accusing the other of "who tore up the red line" during the next round of confrontation.

Israel's Reverse Bet: Who Fears a Successful Ceasefire?

At the moment the technical parameters were written into the draft memorandum, political fissures suddenly became evident. Pezehqiiyan, while meeting the visiting Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan, Asim Munir, explicitly accused Israel of being "the only force trying to profit from provoking war" in the current situation, immediately followed by a reiteration that Iran is complying with the framework of international law and simply seeks to restore its legitimate and rightful rights for its nation and people. This type of statement serves two purposes: on one hand, it is seeking moral support for the U.S.-Iran ceasefire and memorandum, while on the other hand, it preemptively locks in a "spoiler": if the 60-day ceasefire and the 14-point proposal face obstacles, Iran has pointed the answer to "who does not want the fire to be extinguished" at a specific target.

The problem is that once the ceasefire extension and sanction relief genuinely take effect, the gradual reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the relaxing of port blockades, and partial asset unfreezing will indeed improve Iran's strategic environment, which could easily be interpreted by Israel as tipping the deterrence balance quietly toward the adversary. What Iran gains is breathing space and legitimacy, while Israel fears losing its security boundaries and psychological advantages: the former views the memorandum as an exit from the "imposed war," while the latter might interpret the same document as a starting point for their adversary to accumulate leverage. In contrast to this anxiety, senior Pakistani military leaders appearing in Tehran at this time—Munir communicating with the Iranian president about regional situations—is itself a signal: even in a military role, more regional powers tend toward de-escalation through contacts and dialogue. In this misalignment, whether the ceasefire can truly "succeed" largely depends on whether Israel ultimately accepts a new order of balance after de-escalation or continues to bet on high-intensity confrontation, a familiar path but with increasingly high costs.

After the 60-Day Window: Is the Ceasefire a Turning Point or an Interlude?

If this round of maneuvering can be summarized in one sentence, Iran's choice is "first lower the gun, then discuss centrifuges": under the mediation of envoys, by accepting a framework of a 14-point memorandum focused on the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, unblocking ports, partial sanctions waivers, and phased asset unfreezing, pushing the sharpest nuclear disputes to be actively postponed, merely throwing out technical concessions like "maintaining below 3.6% for 10 years, processing high-enrichment stock, not developing nuclear weapons but retaining limited enrichment rights" at the textual level, in exchange for a limited but valuable ceasefire and economic respite. By May 23, 2026, the 60-day ceasefire extension and memorandum remain at the proposal and negotiation stage. Pezehqiiyan, while meeting Munir, loudly accused Israel of "trying to profit by provoking war," while repeatedly emphasizing adherence to international law and the pursuit of "legitimate rights," attempting to portray Iran as a responsible negotiating party. However, how far this seemingly carefully designed "ceasefire for space" strategy can go depends not only on whether Israel accepts a new balance after de-escalation or continues to bet on high-intensity confrontation, but also on whether the U.S. can bear the political costs of easing tensions with Iran domestically, and whether the implementation of the ceasefire will continuously "accidentally probe" each other's bottom lines through frontline friction and maritime incidents. Sixty days later, the most optimistic path is that the ceasefire is solidified and naturally extended, with technical negotiations further advancing toward more systematic nuclear arrangements; the pessimistic scenario is that a rapid escalation of conflict tears the ceasefire apart, with both sides returning to familiar confrontation tracks; more likely is a grey area between the two—ceasefires repeatedly extended and violated, small-scale friction and limited cooling existing side by side, until some key variable genuinely changes the way all parties calculate costs and benefits.

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