In the first quarter of 2026, during the earnings report season, Bitcoin began to be pressed back from being a "sacred, untouchable asset" on corporate balance sheets. Almost at the same time, a French chip manufacturer, Sequans, cut its positions in half, while on the other end, Michael Saylor, who has long been shouting "buy and never sell," eased up: he did not rule out selling part of their Bitcoin in the future to return cash to shareholders in the form of dividends. In the face of operational pressures, stock price performance, and shareholder expectations, Bitcoin was publicly treated by these companies for the first time as a usable resource, rather than just a footnote of belief written on their balance sheets.

Sequans' actions were the most direct. By the end of 2025, the company had amassed approximately 2,139 Bitcoins on its books, but by the first quarter of 2026 and the end of April, its holdings had dropped to about 1,114, selling around 1,025 during that period. In the same quarter, it recorded about $54.3 million in net losses and approximately $50.5 million in operating losses, significantly higher than the previous year's figures, which naturally led the media to link the reduction in holdings with declining revenues and debt pressures. In contrast to this passive reduction was MicroStrategy: as one of the largest corporate Bitcoin holders globally, Saylor asserted that the logic of holding long-term remained unchanged while starting to emphasize that it could also use part of its Bitcoin to pay dividends if it was advantageous to the company and added value to shareholders, thus proving that this asset strategy could not only withstand volatility but also satisfy shareholders. In a broader context, the trend of corporate Bitcoin sell-offs was on the rise, with some mining companies also beginning to shrink their exposure, and corporate Bitcoin strategies shifting from the one-dimensional "buy and never sell" to dynamic management surrounding financial health and shareholder returns, becoming a truly significant variable worth tracking in this turning point.

Sequans couldn't hold up: halving Bitcoin holdings for self-rescue

If Saylor was actively rewriting the script, Sequans was being pushed down by performance to change its lines. As a French chip manufacturer, Sequans took a more "hardcore" route in 2025: significantly increasing its Bitcoin holdings and officially moving this type of asset onto the balance sheet. By the end of 2025, the company had about 2,139 Bitcoins on its books, which within the narrative framework at the time was more like a "bottom card" against future uncertainties—management did not have to explicitly say "never sell," and the market also assumed this batch of positions would be locked away in the treasury long-term, becoming part of the company's growth story.

The turning point emerged in the first quarter of 2026. Business deterioration forced this "bottom card" to become a bargaining chip: Sequans recorded a net loss of about $54.3 million and an operating loss of about $50.5 million in a single quarter, while the operating loss in the same period last year was only about $7.3 million, marking an increase in losses by almost an order of magnitude within a year. Losses escalated debt pressure, and the media began to connect Sequans' financial holes and revenue decline with its Bitcoin sell-offs. From the first quarter of 2026 to the end of April, Sequans sold about 1,025 Bitcoins, reducing its holdings from about 2,139 to about 1,114, effectively halving its positions, as Bitcoin was directly mobilized from a "hidden asset" to a source of cash to alleviate operational pressures.

The symbolic significance of this reduction far exceeded the 1,000 or so Bitcoins that were sold off. Sequans did not hold a grand narrative press conference but provided cold numbers in its earnings report and disclosures, actually operating to tell the market: the myth of "corporate treasury Bitcoin being absolutely untouchable" cannot withstand a quarter of significant losses and impending debt repayments. The company must ensure it survives first before it can talk about belief. Sequans' forced reduction put an end to the story of corporate treasury Bitcoin being "in but not out."

From never selling coins to selling coins for dividends: Saylor bends

If Sequans was pushed to reduce its holdings under pressure, another key character in the Bitcoin narrative had always regarded "never sell Bitcoin" as a banner. As one of the world's largest corporate Bitcoin holders, MicroStrategy and its founder Michael Saylor have, for years, almost treated "holding Bitcoin as a long-term reserve asset" as part of the company's brand. In earnings calls and public interviews, he repeatedly emphasized that Bitcoin is not a short-term trading chip but a strategic asset that will never be used, quietly resting on the balance sheet to combat long-term currency devaluation, forming a kind of belief-colored "digital treasury."

Therefore, when shortly after the first quarter of 2026, Saylor mentioned publicly for the first time that "in the future, it may be possible to sell part of Bitcoin to pay dividends," what the market felt was not an ordinary piece of shareholder return news, but a crack in the narrative. According to him, the purpose of doing so is to prove to the market that MicroStrategy's Bitcoin asset strategy is feasible—not only can it accumulate assets on the balance sheet, but it can also tangibly support shareholder returns in the financial system of the company, allowing the Bitcoins on the books to truly become a part of distributable corporate value rather than just a "sacred object" to be viewed from afar.

The issue is that this statement inherently creates tension with his past high-profile claims of "long-term holding and not easily selling Bitcoin." Some commentators quickly pointed out that the shift from the absolute commitment of "never selling Bitcoin" to the flexible idea of "selling a portion when it is beneficial to the company and has a value-add effect for shareholders" redefines the role of corporate Bitcoin as no longer being placed on a shrine above operational goals but being pulled back into the real world of cash flow, dividends, and capital market expectations. In this realistic logic, Bitcoin must first serve financial health and shareholder value, rather than being used as a prop to tell eternal stories.

Shift in corporate treasury: the myth of only buying and not selling is receding

Sequans provided an extreme but typical example of this shift. In 2025, this French chip manufacturer publicly moved Bitcoin onto its balance sheet, with about 2,139 coins by the end of the year, which the outside world preferred to interpret as a story of "tech companies betting on the future." However, by the first quarter of 2026, the focus of the story quickly shifted: an approximate $54.3 million net loss and around $50.5 million in operating losses combined with debt pressure (according to a single source) forced this "visionary asset" back into the calculations of short-term cash flow. From the end of 2025 to the end of April 2026, Sequans sold about 1,025 Bitcoins, halving its holdings to about 1,114, and the media linked this reduction to declining revenues and repayment pressures (according to a single source). Bitcoin was no longer the shiny chip in announcements but was treated as inventory that could be cashed out to fix balance sheets.

Unlike Sequans' "forced use of treasury coins," MicroStrategy and Saylor took another path: not because cash was running out but proactively including "selling coins" in the options list. Saylor openly stated that the company might sell part of its Bitcoin in the future on the premise of "beneficial to the company and adding value for shareholders" to pay dividends. This created a clear narrative contrast with his past almost religious assertion of "never selling Bitcoin." In this new narrative, Bitcoin treasury is no longer set as an untouchable "cold palace asset" but is designed to be a financial tool that can timely realize cash and return to shareholders—Sequans treats Bitcoin as a firewall, while Saylor sees it as a reservoir for shareholder returns. Both paths point to a common conclusion: companies can and should utilize these coins when necessary.

Stepping back, Sequans' reductions and MicroStrategy's conditional selling announcement are merely part of the growing backdrop of corporate pressure to sell. Briefings show that in the first quarter of 2026, the overall trend of Bitcoin sell-offs at the corporate level is rising, with some holders, including some mining companies, beginning to reduce their exposure and reset the previously hoarded chips back into the market. This means the past myth of "companies will only buy continuously and never sell" is receding, and the role of Bitcoin on corporate balance sheets is transitioning from a one-way accumulation good to a financial asset that dynamically adjusts according to operational cycles, debt cycles, and shareholder demands, subtly rewriting the market's expectations of buying and selling pressures represented by corporate holdings.

The tug-of-war among shareholders, creditors, and coin-oriented beliefs

When Bitcoin is written onto the balance sheet, it is not just a line item but pulls three forces within the company to the same table: the management believing in "coin standard," who see Bitcoin as a long-term hedge against fiat currency inflation; the shareholders, watching stock price curves and dividend discount models, who only care whether this pile of assets can transform into earnings per share and valuation premiums; and the banks and bond investors holding debt contracts, who only care about solvency and default probabilities. In a bull market, these three can temporarily align—rising prices benefit both believers and shareholders, also beautifying the balance sheet; but once operations deteriorate and cash flow tightens, the priority order is immediately exposed: surviving first or upholding belief.

Sequans' turnaround is a sample of this priority being restructured in reality. By the end of 2025, this French chip manufacturer still had amassed about 2,139 Bitcoins on its books, betting on "long-term holding." However, by the first quarter of 2026, the company recorded a net loss of about $54.3 million and an operating loss of about $50.5 million, notably higher than the previous year's level of about $7.3 million, amplified pressures from continued operations and liabilities. At this point, between the first quarter of 2026 and the end of April, it sold about 1,025 Bitcoins, nearly halving its holdings, and the media quickly connected this selling action to revenue decline and debt pressures. Regardless of how idealized the management's narrative was about Bitcoin as a "treasury asset," faced with tens of millions of dollars in losses and creditors' real concerns about solvency, the slogan of "never selling" became an assumption that could be revised, with faith yielding to the necessity of survival.

Unlike Sequans' passive reduction, MicroStrategy founder Michael Saylor's change in attitude seems more like an active rewriting of the script. He has long played the role of a standard-bearer for corporate Bitcoin narratives, and now, when discussing possible future coin sales, he adds preconditions: it must be "beneficial to the company" and "have value-added effects for shareholders," explicitly pointing the potential uses of selling coins towards paying dividends. He attempts to prove to the market that the Bitcoin treasury strategy is not a one-way accumulation gamble but a financial tool that can reinvest in shareholder returns at critical moments. Some commentators keenly observe the narrative tension between his past interpretation as close to "never sell Bitcoin" and the current idea of "selling when necessary"—on one side is the ultimate belief represented by personal branding, and on the other is the financial responsibility that the leader of a publicly traded company must assume. How to draw a line that both shareholders and creditors can accept will determine the fate of Bitcoin at the corporate level—whether it continues to be mythologized as an untouchable "strategic reserve" or returns to being a liquid asset that can be calculated, discounted, and traded.

How will corporate Bitcoin narratives be rewritten before the next bull market?

From Sequans' passive reduction and making up gaps by selling coins to MicroStrategy's first public commitment to "sell coins for dividends," after the first quarter of 2026, the story of holding Bitcoin at the corporate level can hardly be told as a linear narrative of "hoarding until the end of the world." Bitcoin, as a number on a balance sheet, has started to be more directly tied to two practical objectives: one end being the Sequans-like financial cushion—when faced with net losses, operating losses, and debt pressures, positions can be sliced into cash flows; the other end is the shareholder return medium mentioned by Saylor—when conditions allow, to sell a portion and use real dividends to prove that this "long-term holding experiment" is not just a balance sheet game. Hoarding Bitcoin is no longer the end goal but rather a means to serve capital structure and shareholder rights.

For investors, the signals to watch in the next cycle have also changed. First, monitor how companies describe their treasury strategies in earnings reports and conference calls: do they continue to emphasize "long-term strategic reserves," or do they start giving clear thresholds and rules for reductions? Next, see whether dividend and buyback policies are tied to Bitcoin—if Saylor's "selling coins for dividends" is imitated by more companies, it means Bitcoin will be incorporated into the regular capital return toolbox. Lastly, watch the pace and frequency of sell-offs by mining companies and highly elastic firms; briefings have already observed an upward trend in sell-offs on this front, which will amplify or dampen the market's pro-cyclical sentiment during each price fluctuation.

Given the high volatility overlaying a regulatory and accounting environment that is still evolving, there are several potential scripts for the path of corporate Bitcoin treasuries: one is that Bitcoin becomes thoroughly institutionalized, quantified, and discounted as an alternative treasury asset, with reduction rules written into company bylaws, transforming from "belief assets" to "model assets"; another is that companies create a barbell layout between "core long-term holdings" and "tactical maneuvering holdings," using part of the holdings to hedge operational risks while seeking valuation premiums with another part; and yet another is that as regulations and accounting costs continue to rise and traditional shareholders become increasingly impatient with volatility, most companies may choose to minimize Bitcoin exposure, leaving the games to a few players who are more specialized and able to bear the volatility. For investors, what truly matters is not whether companies hold Bitcoin but whether they learn to incorporate this asset into a capital allocation framework that can be scrutinized and constrained.

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