Author: Climber, CryptoPulse Labs

On April 24, Aave, along with several institutions, launched a rescue program called "DeFi United," primarily to address the approximately 292 million dollar loss caused by the KelpDAO vulnerability attack, to prevent bad debts from continuing to spread.

This attack originated mainly from a vulnerability that occurred due to the integration of KelpDAO with LayerZero. The hacker forged uncollateralized rsETH and borrowed approximately 190 million dollars' worth of assets on Aave. This caused collateral distortion and triggered a bank run, with the platform's TVL evaporating by about 10 billion dollars at one point.

Currently, Lido Finance, EtherFi, and founder Stani Kulechov have proposed funding plans, with Aave having already secured potential support of 43,500 ETH to help stabilize the DeFi lending system, but there is still a shortfall of about 68,900 ETH.

This situation was originally a security incident on a technical level, but it is rapidly evolving into an industry test of trust. When there are no central banks, no enforcement mechanisms, and no lenders of last resort, can this system really fix itself?

1. The vulnerability is not the focus; the real issue is: there really isn't enough money

The cause of the problem is actually very clear.

The security incident surrounding rsETH has caused a significant imbalance in Aave's asset structure. The hacker took out 99,600 ETH through the lending mechanism, which is equivalent to directly removing a core liquidity block from the system.

The danger of this kind of operation is that it's not a theft of assets in the traditional sense, but rather a use of the rules to borrow money. From the perspective of the protocol, this asset was indeed borrowed legally, but from the overall system's viewpoint, it is no longer within the usable range.

Fortunately, a key "stanching" event occurred on-chain shortly afterward.

On Arbitrum, approximately 30,700 ETH was successfully frozen. This, to some extent, prevented further losses from expanding and bought time for subsequent handling. However, even so, there still remains an undeniable number on the books, around 68,900 ETH of actual shortfall.

The significance of this number lies in its certainty; it is neither expected losses nor unrealized losses but a clearly existing funding gap. In other words, if external supplements are not provided, this gap will not disappear on its own.

More critically, this kind of gap will quickly transmit into a trust issue. Users will not analyze complex technical details nor dissect lending models. They will only ask one simple question: Is my money still safe now that I’ve deposited it?

Once this question starts to be raised repeatedly, the risk has already begun to spread.

The operation of lending protocols essentially relies on the confidence that funds can be withdrawn at any time. As long as users believe they can take out their funds, the system can operate stably.

But once that confidence wavers, it will enter a familiar path. First, a small amount of funds will withdraw, then outflows accelerate, and finally evolve into structural pressure.

Now, the market's reaction has started to show.

Aave's total deposit scale has noticeably declined after the incident, and liquidity has tightened marginally. This change is not a momentary collapse but a typical chronic death. Every withdrawal amplifies the system's instability.

This is why the core of this event is not about how much was hacked. Instead, it revolves around a more fundamental question: When DeFi protocols encounter a real funding gap, does this system have the ability to self-repair?

2. "DeFi United": A rescue experiment without a central bank

Faced with the gap, Aave did not choose to wait for the market to repair itself.

On the contrary, it proactively initiated a symbolic action to establish a joint rescue mechanism called "DeFi United."

This step is essentially doing something very common in traditional finance, but hardly seen on-chain: introducing external liquidity support.

In traditional systems, this role is usually played by central banks.

When financial institutions experience liquidity issues, there is a clear fallback mechanism in place. But in the world of DeFi, there is no such role.

Thus, this attempt has turned into an alternative solution. That is, the leading protocols within the industry share the responsibilities of a lender of last resort.

As a result, an uncommon scene emerged. Protocols that originally competed in different tracks began to rally support:

Lido Finance offers 2,500 stETH (in proposal stage)

EtherFi Foundation offers 5,000 ETH (in proposal)

Stani Kulechov personally contributes 5,000 ETH

Golem Foundation offers 1,000 ETH

Mantle intends to provide 30,000 ETH (currently the largest amount)

Additionally, projects like Ethena, LayerZero, Ink Foundation, Tydra, etc., have also made public statements in support.

In terms of scale, this is not a small "blood transfusion operation." The current potential support scale is approximately 43,500 ETH. If fully realized, it could cover most of the gap.

But the problem is equally clear; it still cannot completely fill the 68,900 ETH shortfall.

More importantly, the status of these funds is not entirely consistent.

Some are already explicitly committed contributions, while others are still at the governance proposal stage and need community votes to pass. Still others are merely expressing support without providing specific amounts.

This creates a kind of semi-certainty for the entire rescue mechanism. It is established conceptually but remains uncertain in execution.

However, even so, this mechanism itself is important. Because it clearly showcases a possibility for the first time: DeFi can attempt to respond to systemic risks through project collaboration across the board.

Why are these protocols willing to step in? The reason is not complicated.

Aave is not an isolated protocol; it is one of the core nodes in the entire DeFi liquidity network. If it encounters problems, the impact will spread outward. For example, the value of staked assets may be pressured, the re-staking structure may be impacted, and the stablecoin collateral system may also experience fluctuations, etc.

In other words, this is no longer just a project issue but a risk source that could affect the entire ecosystem.

Therefore, the essence of this joint rescue is not just to help Aave weather the storm. Instead, it is to prevent the entire DeFi credit system from developing cracks.

3. The real test: Can DeFi survive the "trust crisis"?

As the events unfolded, the issue began to shift from a funding level to a structural level. This crisis is becoming a critical test for DeFi.

Returning to the most crucial question: Can this funding gap be fully filled?

If so, Aave's asset-liability relationship will rebalance. Market confidence will gradually recover, and fund flows will stabilize.

But if not, even if it is just a partial shortfall, it will leave hidden dangers.

The market will not feel reassured simply because a large portion has been covered; it will focus on one outcome: whether the risk has been completely eliminated.

Next is the test of the mechanism itself. Can "DeFi United" become a long-term solution?

At least for now, it still faces several structural issues.

For example, there is a lack of enforceability. All contributions from participating parties are based on voluntariness. Once the market environment changes, whether commitments are fulfilled remains uncertain.

Moreover, there is a lack of standardized rules. There are no clear contribution ratios, triggering conditions, or reward mechanisms. Every rescue requires re-coordination, which means that both efficiency and stability are limited.

Additionally, there is the issue of scale limits. This shortfall is approximately 68,900 ETH. But if greater risks arise in the future, whether this mechanism can still cover them remains unknown.

These issues also determine one thing: this mechanism currently resembles a temporary solution rather than a mature industry rescue system.

Yet, even so, it remains significant. Because it provides a direction for whether DeFi can spontaneously form a risk-sharing mechanism without centralized backing.

Thus, this event can be viewed as an on-chain pressure test. It will not directly determine the industry's success or failure, but it will impact market perceptions.

If this rescue is successful, several changes may arise. For instance, DeFi may first establish a cross-protocol collaborative risk response mechanism, the credit of leading protocols may be restored or even strengthened, and the market’s trust in on-chain finance may be expanded once again.

However, if it fails, the consequences will also be clear. Users' trust in lending protocols may decline, funds may further withdraw from high-risk structures, and the risk premium for the entire DeFi system may increase.

And at a deeper level, the influence could lead users to reassess a question: Is DeFi really a system that can sustainably hold large-scale assets in the long term?

Conclusion

On the surface, this is a shortfall of 68,900 ETH. But at a deeper level, this is a major test of how trust can be rebuilt.

In an environment without central banks and regulatory backstops, the leading projects in DeFi are answering one core question in the most primitive way: When risk truly occurs, can this system save itself?

The answer is not yet fully revealed, but it is certain that this attempt, whether successful or not, will require a longer time and greater effort to repair and rebuild.

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