Aave's struggles over the past few months have served as a wake-up call for the entire cryptocurrency space.

In the early days of the protocol, many issues could often be temporarily set aside. With a relatively limited user base and funding, everyone's thoughts were somewhat aligned: let's get things up and running first. Once a protocol becomes "overweight," the places most likely to bury hidden problems have long since moved beyond the realm of business growth. A brief overview of the recent turmoil with Aave: Aave DAO controls the core smart contracts and treasury, while Aave Labs, a company controlled by founder Stani, manages the front-end website and brand trademarks. When the protocol is earning tens of millions of dollars a year, conflicts become impossible to suppress. Aave Labs wants to take a share of the income, and the community immediately objects, considering it looting the treasury. Both sides have been fiercely arguing on on-chain governance and social platforms.

This is almost a situation that established projects inevitably face once they grow larger. Once a protocol scales up, the troubles go beyond just surface issues; the real challenges often lie in things that were not clarified before but cannot be avoided now.

As a veteran public chain that has been waving its flag since 2014, Neo is publicly at odds with its founders. The disputes over financial transparency have been ongoing, and issues surrounding the control of foundation assets and mainnet governance rights have also surfaced. While it looks like a personal falling out, it's not that simple; it feels more like problems that have been unresolved for many years are being detonated all at once.

Because of this, with the controversy still fresh, a proposal for restructuring the foundation has already been put forward.

The restructuring proposal was presented by Neo founder Da Hongfei (also CEO of NGD) and is very straightforward: the two founders have diverged in vision and priorities, resulting in a governance stalemate where many key decisions cannot be made. At the same time, governance on-chain has been long dominated by tokens controlled by the foundation, leaving broader token holders with almost no sense of participation. The proposal specifically states that these are not minor, temporary issues; they are structural failures, and delaying further will only make things worse.

Many early projects are now facing similar legacy issues as they evolve. However, just when the market expected Neo to fall into endless internal conflicts, this sharp and decisive proposal for restructuring the foundation was delivered to the table. Notably, as the initiator of the proposal, Da Hongfei's managed NGD assets will also be fully transferred to the new foundation. Through this "self-revolution," we can see that Da Hongfei genuinely intends to rebuild a new governance framework for Neo.

Completely Restructuring the Neo Foundation

The core objectives of the restructuring proposal are fourfold. The first is to establish a unified on-chain and off-chain governance framework to truly empower Neo token holders to take charge; the second is to introduce a staking voting mechanism to directly eliminate speculative users who only wish to take advantage; the third, and the most ambitious, is to completely sever the ecosystem's dependency on the founders, forcibly reclaiming all core assets and control rights for the foundation, firmly avoiding scenarios where a few prominent figures can jeopardize the entire network; the final point is to relentlessly pursue high efficiency and absolute transparency under the new system.

From the roadmap perspective, this is not simply a proposal that exists at the level of slogans; it is a systematic approach broken down into clear phases.

In the first 1-3 months, the emphasis will be on the reconstruction of governance and legal structures, including the foundation's relocation to the Cayman Islands, as well as the establishment of an initial board of directors.

In the second to fifth months, the focus will shift to adjusting the token and protocol level: beginning to transfer tokens into the Giveback II lock-up address while preparing for network upgrades.

Subsequently, key restructurings such as the staking voting mechanism, split-able NEO, token redistribution, and asset integration will gradually be implemented. The overall timeline is extended to approximately one year to ensure the complete execution of the plan.

To achieve fairness and allow holders to have real power, the proposal has thoroughly restructured the personnel system of the Neo Foundation.

The proposal has firmly designed a dual balance with a five-member board of directors and an independent overseer. It clearly states that the founders cannot touch these core governance positions for the first two years. The rights of token holders have also been significantly elevated. As long as they meet the staking threshold, they can nominate candidates for the board; they can even initiate votes to remove directors who occupy positions without fulfilling their duties.

Specifically, the initial board will consist of 2 founders nominating 4 people, from which independent community leaders and core developers will select 5 members from the 8 candidate pool to form the board. In this way, not only can the founders not intervene in the board, but the proposal also provides for an independent oversight agency outside the board to supervise and balance the board's series of management and budget actions, achieving fairness and justice in internal operations.

As for the rights of token holders, those who meet the minimum staking voting threshold can nominate candidates for board positions; furthermore, token holders can initiate votes for the removal of board members or overseers. From the selection of individuals to their removal, token holders have become true stakeholders.

With the personnel system reformed, the legal framework also needs to adapt. The proposal is quite direct about the current Singapore CLG. It believes that this shell is not suited for today's Neo. It appears that there is a foundation, but when significant issues arise, the member structure can easily fall into a stalemate. Therefore, the first step is clear: replace it with a Cayman foundation company without a member structure. The meaning is not difficult to understand—do not let the foundation be continuously bogged down between a few individuals in the future.

To prevent speculators from causing disruptions, Neo has also introduced a 180-day staking voting mechanism. Previously, voting incurred no cost at all; now, those who want to sit at the governance table must lock up real capital and bear risks. Meanwhile, the NEO token has finally adopted a decimal point and can be infinitely subdivided. This means that retail investors can also participate in voting rather than only large holders qualifying to sit at the table.

The previous voting method resembled a passerby casually liking something. Now, Neo wants to change that, turning a like into a bet. If you want to have a say at this table, you need to stake your time and opportunity costs.

Giving Back to the Community, Redistributing Foundation Tokens

Giveback II is the most impactful move within this proposal. The reason has been directly pointed out in the proposal: NF and NGD together hold 41 million NEO and 40 million GAS, with a significant portion still under single-signature control. The proposal also specifically compared the voting power supporting seven consensus nodes, revealing a stark disparity. The meaning is quite clear: for a mainnet that has been running for almost ten years, the concentration of assets and voting rights like this will naturally harm its credibility.

As early as 2017, Neo conducted a round of Giveback activities, refunding all funds to those who participated in the ICO while retaining their Neo tokens. This round of Giveback II aims to once again reward all members of the Neo community, with the intention to redistribute the majority of tokens back to the community while keeping a limited strategic reserve, allowing the foundation to support itself gradually with the GAS produced from staking. Community organizations will also receive a portion of NEO, which will need to continue being staked in the coming years to maintain operations using GAS. The largest portion (about 26 million NEO and 40 million GAS) will be returned to token holders through an on-chain rebasing method.

The subsequent asset integration is also straightforward. The proposal aims to first consolidate cash, stablecoins, and liquid holdings—assets that can be directly transferred—under the foundation. Investments and receivables that cannot be directly moved temporarily will also need to come under the foundation's effective control. Further down the line, even non-financial assets such as domain names, trademarks, IP, and codebases will need to be included as well. The ultimate goal is to create a truly proper treasury, rather than having several related structures each holding portions.

For Neo, what is currently lacking is not new stories, but rather regaining trust.

This is often not apparent, but when it explodes, it becomes extremely fatal. People in the circle are watching closely. Developers might wonder if this chain will be embroiled in internal conflicts daily. Partners are calculating whether the foundation's money and power are truly understood. Community retail investors are also observing, wanting to know if they can play a role or just remain sidelined cheering. In fact, this proposal has clarified the situation. The restructuring of the foundation, breaking the deadlock, and distributing the overly concentrated voting power are effectively aimed at rebuilding a reliable, robust foundation for Neo in its next phase.

Let’s broaden the perspective a bit; this is not merely a mess that only Neo is encountering. Aave has been arguing over income distribution and brand management incessantly for months. In simple terms, it’s redefining the boundaries between the protocol and the development team. Lido’s implementation of a dual governance mechanism that allows stETH holders to hit the brakes at any time indicates that merely issuing a governance token to appease the situation is long outdated. Then there’s Arbitrum, which got into significant trouble over the AIP-1 proposal and was subsequently forced to gradually establish budget transparency and secure committee mechanisms. They are also diligently addressing this necessary lesson. Neo is ensuring that its calculations are made now rather than after it has collapsed completely, which is certainly preferable.

Founders Leaving the Power Center: Can the Chain Run Better?

This is a huge, pragmatic question.

However, it is clear that leaving the power center does not mean that the founders will completely depart from Neo; rather, it allows them to better serve the entire Neo community under a system of management. Da Hongfei stated to Rhythm BlockBeats, "As one of the oldest public chains in the industry, most projects from the same period are now either firmly held by the founders, caught in governance stalemates, or quietly declining. There are almost no projects that have genuinely attempted to undergo a complete institutional reconstruction while still being viable."

Today's Neo is very much like a person that has reached maturity. In the past, many things could be handled by merely pushing ahead, aided by the thriving industry; divergences could be temporarily set aside. Yet there is always an end to that kind of existence. Once people truly clash, the protocol must learn to stand on its own. This process will certainly not be easy; it may not look pretty either. Writing the rules down is only the first step. The proposal extending the timeline to monthly progress indicates that it is not simply a matter of changing names or swapping shells. Many matters need careful fine-tuning.

Looking at it from another angle, Neo currently has no easy paths to choose from. If the existing models are continued to be applied, problems will only magnify over time. The proposal has provided a clear judgment: these are not cyclical fluctuations but rather deeper structural issues. Hence, "institutional drive" is no longer an ideal narrative, but a transformation that must be directly confronted.

As Da Hongfei stated, if the reforms succeed, it will be significant for the entire industry. He further explained that he hopes the restructured Neo Foundation will set an example for a mature crypto project that can hand over its management to a truly accountable institution; can return tokens held in its name to the community; can achieve high levels of transparency in finances and operations; and can allow founders to withdraw from positional power structures while continuing to participate in ecological building as contributors. If Neo can accomplish this, it will serve as a template that other projects can learn from.

Farewelling the era of founders is neither romantic nor easy for Neo. If this "surgery" is successful, Neo will have a chance to gradually emerge from past disputes and transform into a chain that can continue to develop and iterate even if the founders fall out, moving towards sustainability and setting an example for the entire industry.

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