Original Title: What on earth just happened? Trump, Iran, and the unlikely ceasefire
Original Author: Trita Parsi
Translation: Peggy, BlockBeats
Editor's note: From the escalation of threats to a swift ceasefire, and then to ongoing conflicts post-ceasefire, the situation surrounding Iran appears to have cooled, but in reality, it has not ended; instead, it has entered a more complex phase: coexistence of ceasefire and maneuvering.
This article revolves around a key change—the negotiation structure is undergoing a reversal. As pointed out by the author Trita Parsi, military actions have not forced Iran to make concessions; rather, they have passively led the United States to enter into a negotiation framework based on its "ten-point plan." Although Washington has not formally accepted all terms, the practical concessions on the issue of Hormuz constitute a significant strategic retreat, allowing Tehran to regain diplomatic and economic leverage.
As a result, the outcome of the war presents an unintuitive turn: it has not weakened Iran but has somewhat restored its deterrence capability. At the same time, American military measures have failed to change the outcome of the game; instead, they have weakened the credibility of its threats, necessitating that subsequent negotiations be based on real compromises.
However, the ceasefire itself is extremely fragile. Local conflicts continue, and Israel's actions further increase uncertainty, keeping the entire situation on the verge of potential escalation, with its stability heavily reliant on external variables.
A deeper impact is that this conflict, originally intended to exert pressure or even prompt regime change, may actually consolidate Iran's internal ruling structure. The U.S. has shifted from a leading party to a negotiating party, while Iran has transitioned from a pressured party to a player, thus entering the conflict into a longer-term, more complex phase.
The following is the original text:
Yesterday began with Donald Trump issuing a genocidal-sounding threat to Iran on social media; just ten hours later, however, the situation took a dramatic turn—announcing a ceasefire agreement lasting 14 days and based on Iranian conditions.
Even considering the extreme volatility characteristic of Trump's presidency, this reversal seems particularly intense. So what consensus did the two parties actually reach? What does it mean?
In a subsequent post, Trump stated that Iran had agreed to keep the Strait of Hormuz open during the two-week ceasefire. He also indicated that negotiations would take place during this period and would advance based on Iran's proposed "ten-point plan," calling it a "viable" negotiation framework.
The ten points include:
1. The United States must fundamentally commit not to take aggressive action against Iran.
2. Continue to recognize Iran's control over the Strait of Hormuz.
3. Accept Iran's uranium enrichment for its nuclear program.
4. Lift all primary sanctions against Iran.
5. Lift all secondary sanctions against foreign entities doing business with Iranian institutions.
6. Terminate all United Nations Security Council resolutions against Iran.
7. Terminate all International Atomic Energy Agency resolutions related to Iran's nuclear program.
8. Compensate Iran for the losses from the war.
9. Withdraw U.S. combat forces from the region.
10. Achieve a ceasefire on all fronts, including conflicts between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah.
Of course, the United States has not agreed to all of these points. However, simply using the framework proposed by Iran as a basis for negotiations already constitutes a significant diplomatic victory for Tehran. Moreover, it is noteworthy that, according to the Associated Press, during the ceasefire, Iran will continue to control the Strait of Hormuz and, along with Oman, levy fees on passing vessels.
In other words, Washington has effectively acknowledged that to reopen this critical waterway, it must, to some extent, recognize Iran's actual control over it.
The geopolitical implications could be profound. As pointed out by Mohammad Eslami and Zeynab Malakouti in Responsible Statecraft, Tehran is likely to seize this opportunity to rebuild economic ties with partners in Asia and Europe—countries that once had close trade relationships with Iran but were forced out of its markets due to U.S. sanctions over the past 15 years.
Iran's strategic considerations are not solely driven by support for Palestinians and Lebanese but are rooted in clear practical motives. Israel's ongoing military strikes pose a risk of rekindling a direct conflict between Israel and Iran—this confrontation has already erupted twice since October 7. From Tehran's perspective, achieving a long-term de-escalation of conflict with Israel requires simultaneously ending Israel's wars in Gaza and Lebanon. This is not a supplemental political demand but a prerequisite.
The upcoming talks between Washington and Tehran in Islamabad could still end without a resolution. However, the fundamental dynamics have changed. Trump's use of force has not achieved its goals, weakening the credibility of U.S. military deterrence, and introducing a new variable into U.S.-Iran diplomacy.
Washington can still bluff and wield military threats, but after a war that failed to achieve results, such threats are becoming difficult to believe. The U.S. is no longer in a position to unilaterally set terms; any agreement must be based on genuine mutual concessions. This means that real diplomacy is required—patience, restraint, and tolerance for uncertainty—qualities that are not often associated with Donald Trump. Meanwhile, this process may also require the involvement of other major powers, especially China, to help stabilize the situation and reduce the risk of escalating conflicts.
Most critically, whether this ceasefire can be sustained largely depends on whether Trump can restrain Israel and prevent it from undermining the diplomatic process. There should be no illusions about this. Israeli senior officials have already denounced the agreement as "the biggest political disaster in the history of the state," indicating that this fragile moment could break at any time.
Even if negotiations ultimately collapse, or if Israel resumes its strikes against Iran, it does not necessarily mean that the U.S. will re-enter the conflict. There is no solid reason to believe that a second round of conflict would yield different results or would not again enable Iran to possess the capability to "hold the global economy hostage." In this sense, Tehran has at least restored a degree of deterrent power for the moment.
One last point deserves emphasis: this "intentional choice" of war is not merely a strategic miscalculation. It has not only failed to bring about regime change but may actually prolong the life of Iran's theocratic system—just as Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran in 1980 helped consolidate Ayatollah Khomeini's power domestically.
The profound extent of this miscalculation may haunt historians for decades to come.
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