Everyone hopes the Middle East war will end as soon as possible.

Trump's statement of "withdrawing troops within three weeks," the confirmed date of his visit to China in May, the release of 10 oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, the removal of the Iranian Foreign Minister and Speaker from the sanction list, the rumors of secret contacts between the US and Iran... all these signals point to the significant possibility of a short-term end to the Middle East war.

The best time to end the war was yesterday, and the next best time is now. For the Trump administration, the continued delay of the conflict has no benefits. What lies ahead is not a choice between "good and bad," but between "worse and worst." Only by resolving the issue as quickly as possible can they avoid the spillover of the conflict, which could affect the midterm elections in November this year and even further impact the 2028 presidential election.

The Strait of Hormuz and the Energy Game

If the war truly approaches its end, what will become of the Strait of Hormuz? Will it be long-term blocked?

From a realistic perspective, the chances of this happening are actually low. Even if the Iranian regime does not undergo a change, after experiencing a round of military strikes, its overall strength will be significantly weakened, making it difficult to rely on a single strait to confront the world for an extended period.

More critically, this is not just a European problem. The first to face pressure may be one of Iran's most important buyers, China.

Europe can still reallocate energy from other regions, but China is more reliant on the Strait of Hormuz. Once the shipping lanes are obstructed for an extended period, the pressure faced by China will become more direct. Therefore, one core variable in this issue is actually China's attitude, especially how China and the US communicate and coordinate; this is likely to become a key factor influencing the subsequent situation.

Meanwhile, the US has a significantly stronger capacity to bear pressure on this issue. Over the past few years, the US has greatly increased domestic energy production and is no longer as dependent on Middle Eastern crude oil as before. From a supply-side perspective, even if problems occur in the Strait of Hormuz, the direct impact on the US domestically is relatively limited; the countries that are truly affected are mainly in Europe and Asia.

Of course, there is also a grayer but equally realistic scenario: Iran may not have the ability to completely block the strait, but could shift to a "toll pass" system, extorting ships passing through. This method would also lead to continuous disturbances.

The US has clearly stated that it should not accept such behavior, but "whether to accept" and "whether it can be prevented" are two different things.

In this case, responses among different countries may diverge; for example, if Iran, for survival, allows "some leniency for China" to permit its shipping, then trade routes and directions may be reshaped, with intermediary processes such as transshipment, resale, and arbitrage potentially emerging. However, this might lead to Chinese traders smuggling low-priced oil to Europe for profit, complicating the issue further.

The Chaotic Iranian Regime

The New York Times recently conducted a series of reports on Iran, including contributions from several journalists who have studied authoritarian regimes for a long time. They raised a key judgment: Iran is currently in a state of high internal division, with a blurred power structure and a situation where, to some extent, "no one is actually in charge."

Reports indicate that during the large-scale protests in Iran in 2019, the Iranian regime was actually close to the brink of collapse, with a very fragile internal state that was unknown to the outside world. However, on the surface, Khamenei managed to stabilize the situation through various means, making the regime appear to regain stability and successfully navigating that crisis.

The question arises whether Khamenei's son Mojtaba can truly inherit this mess after Khamenei's death two months ago in the US-Israeli joint operations; this remains a question no one can answer definitively.

In this context, Trump's strategy becomes apparent: he is not merely negotiating with a stable government but is attempting to identify or even sift through the more "pro-American" or cooperative factions within Iran.

Once negotiations are reached, the US might support this faction's rise to power through external means.

The most prominent "supportable figure" currently is Reza Pahlavi.

The Exiled Little Prince Pahlavi

In 1978, at the age of 17, Pahlavi went to the US for pilot training. A year later, in 1979, the Islamic Revolution broke out, marking the end of the "Pahlavi Dynasty" and the "Iranian Empire," with the monarchy abolished. After that, the regime changed, and the country was renamed the "Islamic Republic of Iran." He has never been able to return and settled in the US.

Over the following forty years, as an exiled crown prince, he has navigated between Western think tanks and media, never leaving the political spotlight of Iran.

Without proper legitimacy, one cannot succeed; without success, one cannot accomplish anything. When an old regime collapses and various factions emerge, possessing the bloodline of the original dynasty is a significant political asset.

Today, Pahlavi is enjoying the most representative "highlight moment" of his exile career. Following Khamenei's death in the US-Israeli joint operation at the end of February this year, Pahlavi engaged in intensive political mobilization in March.

He has repeatedly stated that his goal is not necessarily to restore the monarchy but to allow the Iranian people the freedom to choose their governmental system. If the people choose a republic, he has stated he would accept it. He frequently appears in Western media and think tank events, urging Western countries to pressure the Iranian government and support human rights movements within Iran, such as the recent "Women, Life, Freedom" protests.

The core event was his speech at the CPAC (Conservative Political Action Conference) held in Texas on March 28, 2026, and a supporting rally initiated in Washington that same month.

At CPAC, Pahlavi's speech was highly compelling, centering on binding Iran's future deeply to American values. He told the audience that a free Iran would no longer be a nuclear threat, would no longer support terrorism, and would no longer block the Strait of Hormuz. Moreover, Iran would establish a strategic partnership with the US and Israel, potentially yielding over $1 trillion in benefits for the American economy.

At the end of his speech, he even echoed Trump’s slogan, throwing out a line that electrified the crowd: "President Trump is making America great again, and I intend to make Iran great again. MIGA."

He also deliberately addressed the biggest concern from the outside. He stated that Iran is not Iraq, and he would not repeat the past mistake of "de-Baathification," allowing a power vacuum to descend into anarchy. He promised to retain existing bureaucracies and some military facilities, only eliminating top-level theocratic oppression.

The Western media's characterization has also quietly shifted this month. Fox News and the Jerusalem Post no longer refer to him as "the former crown prince," but as "the leader of the Iranian opposition."

Some Iranian-Americans rally in Copley Square, calling for the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Iran

"Cutting across cities, generations, and social classes, Pahlavi has become the only widely recognized and genuinely legitimate opposition figure, with his name being chanted nationwide," an article from the Jerusalem Post pointed out: "For many Iranians, he is not merely one of many political options. He represents a clear break from the Islamic Republic and the continuity of the Iranian nation beyond it."

Pahlavi is not just a symbolic figure; he has been making substantial preparations over the past two years.

In April 2025, he officially launched the "Iran Prosperity Project," a 170-page manual for regime transition compiled over years by more than 100 experts. Its core logic is to shift the focus from "how to overthrow" to "what to do from Day 1 to Day 180 after the overthrow," including lifting sanctions, recovering $120 to $150 billion in overseas frozen assets, rebuilding energy supplies, integrating the military, and holding a national referendum.

His focus is to prevent Iran from falling into an anarchic state similar to that of Iraq or Libya after regime collapse.

In October 2025, he released a digital mobilization platform called "We Take Back Iran." According to his team, by early 2026, tens of thousands of current Iranian security personnel, police, and government workers had registered through this platform, expressing willingness to switch sides during a regime change.

The central political gamble in Pahlavi's "We Take Back Iran" plan is to call for the Iranian regular army (Artesh) to defect. This armed force, with approximately 350,000 personnel, exists parallel to the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) but has long been marginalized.

The Long-standing Contradiction Between Iran's Military Forces

The long-standing contradiction between Iran's two military forces is also another entry point for regime change in Iran.

Within Iran's highly militarized theocratic state, the opposition between the regular army (Artesh) and the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) is not a recent issue; it is a structural tumor that has been present since the establishment of the regime in 1979, with these two armed forces fundamentally different in lineage and ethos.

The Artesh is Iran's long-established regular army, and its professional traditions, military regulations, and many senior generals' familial memories can be traced back to the more secular and nationalistic era of the Pahlavi dynasty. For them, they defend "the land of Darius and Cyrus."

In contrast, the Revolutionary Guard was established by Khamenei and his predecessor to secure their power as a "private army." Thus, the Revolutionary Guard controls not only Iran's most elite missile forces and the wealthiest overseas secret accounts but also monopolizes the country's construction, telecommunications, and energy industries through its vast commercial empire.

In Tehran, it is possible for a mid-level Revolutionary Guard officer to own a mansion in the northern city, while a colonel from the regular Artesh might still worry about his family's basic medical insurance. The contradictions between the two have escalated to a critical point in the war of 2026.

According to battlefield reports from mid-March 2026, the Artesh undertook many frontline air defense and territorial defense tasks in response to external airstrikes but was critically short on supplies. There were reports suggesting that the Revolutionary Guard, controlling the logistics lifeline, refused to provide medical transfers for injured Artesh soldiers and even intercepted ammunition, which sparked immense anger within the Artesh.

There are already signs that the US military is maintaining informal communication with high-ranking Artesh officials through Qatar.

These analyses ultimately point toward the now "fragmented" Iran, where the US military is identifying, waiting for, and helping the most suitable "local authorities" to retake power in Iran.

The Realistic Pressure of the US Midterm Elections

The echoes of war will ultimately resonate in the most tangible place: gas stations.

As the midterm elections draw near, the negative feedback effects of the war in Iran on domestic US politics are becoming apparent.

A key variable is that support for the war in Iran is already low among the American public. This is one of the critical points many analysts have criticized Trump for—this war has essentially failed in public relations, and one might say that an effective narrative has not been established from the outset. Ordinary Americans might not care much about the complex logic of geopolitics, but they are very concerned about the costs of living, such as gas prices.

Thus, there are layers of information. For some news-following individuals or those already supporting Trump, they may feel this war is "very important" on a macro level, relating to global situations, energy, and geopolitics. But for most ordinary Americans, their feelings are very concrete: spending an extra $100 a week on gas is more immediate than any grand narrative.

Currently, in many places, gas prices have risen to $3.8, and in many areas, it exceeds $4 per gallon. In this case, while Trump emphasizes “this is a short pain,” it logically makes sense, but it is challenging for voters to accept psychologically. Because for most people, "short pain" is precisely the clearest and most inescapable sensation of pain.

As for whether this will translate into votes, it is still too early to judge. But it can be confirmed that inflation is eroding trust in the government, and the "kitchen economy" is becoming a decisive factor again.

From the perspective of Congressional dynamics, the direct influence of the war itself is limited. Affected by economic factors such as rising oil prices, if voting were to happen now, the Republican Party might lose the House of Representatives. However, there are still 7 months until the midterm elections, the war has not yet ended, and the situation is still unclear.

Moreover, there is no overwhelming consensus of anti-war sentiment in the US; opposition has not resulted in strong mobilization, and non-opposition supporters are not particularly firm, making this "middle state" challenging to translate into dramatic shifts at the polls.

Meaningful analysis will likely need to wait until June or July, breaking down about 20 to 25 key battleground seats one by one to form a relatively reliable judgment.

Despite the Republican Party facing the risk of losing the House of Representatives, the Senate's dynamics are much more stable.

If the Democratic Party wants to change the situation, it needs to secure at least 4 additional seats on the basis of maintaining existing ones to have substantial advantages; gaining 3 seats is relatively insignificant because, in a 50:50 scenario, the Vice President's vote can break the tie.

Thus, looking at the current state structure, the difficulty for the Democratic Party to seize the Senate is high. For example, in Texas and Alaska, the Democratic Party has essentially no realistic chance of winning. Relatively promising opportunities lie in battleground states like New Hampshire, which presents certain variables; additionally, North Carolina may also become a focus for Democratic contention.

Overall, the theoretical "ceiling" for the Democrats is to secure four seats, but realistically, they are more likely to gain one to two seats, and we have not yet entered the most intense phase. In many states, even primary elections are still ongoing. In Texas, for instance, the candidates put forward by the Democratic Party lack sufficient vetting, and past statements are continually being scrutinized, all of which will weaken their competitiveness.

In the mid to late stages of the 2028 elections, a "divided Congress" scenario will be at play: the Republican Party controlling the Senate to secure personnel appointments and foreign policy powers, while even if the Democratic Party regains the House of Representatives, they will face a "policy vacuum period" due to legislative stagnation.

During this time, due to the difficulty of passing fiscal subsidies, large-scale domestic stimulus plans will be stillborn. This political deadlock may lower government efficiency, but from a macro analytical perspective, it could actually strengthen the coherence of U.S. policy in core areas like energy extraction and border security through unilateral executive orders.

Repricing in the Financial Market

In the current chaotic scenario in Iran, the valuation model for global macro assets is undergoing profound reconstruction.

The core variable of this repricing is that the US is utilizing its energy advantage to carry out a targeted harvest and redistribution of global wealth. The performance of the crude oil market shows an extreme asymmetry: in the short term, fears of supply disruptions support oil prices fluctuating at historical highs, but smart money has begun to price in a "supply glut" after the conflict.

With the limit release of domestic production in the US and the reactivation of development rights in Venezuela, a Western-led order for new energy supply is taking shape, meaning that the market's discourse power regarding Middle Eastern crude oil is facing permanent dilution.

In the currency market, the dollar's hegemonic status has not been weakened in the turbulence but rather has been strengthened in a reversal. In contrast, the euro is trapped in a long-term depreciation channel due to energy shortages and political divisions. The blame-shifting between France and Spain over military actions not only exposes the weakness of European defense but also severely undermines market confidence in the euro. Due to Europe's lack of a deep energy moat like that of the US, this absence of economic sovereignty is transforming into a disaster for the exchange rate. Under the potential influence of financial proposals like the "Save America Act," global capital may accelerate its return to the US, seeking a safe harbor amid the geopolitical storm.

The rise of gold in this narrative comes from three overlapping driving forces:

First is the geopolitical risk premium. Before Pahlavi truly establishes a foothold, there will inevitably be a vacuum period. No one knows what Iran will ultimately become, and until the situation is fully settled, the Revolutionary Guard has not been completely dismantled, residual forces remain, and regional proxies are still active, gold will remain elevated. This driving force will persist until the situation is truly clarified.

The second is the structural pressure on dollar credit. Even if the Pahlavi regime eventually establishes itself and the oil dollar expands, before that, the US has already gone through an extraordinarily costly war, a rebound in inflation, and renewed doubts about the sustainability of US finances. In this process, gold plays the role of a "fiat currency credit hedge," not just a safe haven against geopolitical risk.

The third is the structural trend of global central banks purchasing gold. This trend emerged after 2022, and the Middle East war will only accelerate it, not reverse it.

As for the impact on Bitcoin, it needs to be viewed from two dimensions.

The first dimension is liquidity.

Falling oil prices, retreating inflation, and the Federal Reserve opening up room for interest rate cuts—all contribute to a macro environment of renewed liquidity easing. Historically, every time the Federal Reserve shifts to easing, Bitcoin has been one of the biggest beneficiaries as its sensitivity to liquidity far exceeds any traditional asset. In this dimension, Bitcoin is a clear beneficiary.

Over the past few years, Bitcoin's correlation with the Nasdaq has been quite high. Each time global risk premiums soar—whether from the pandemic shock in March 2020, the rate hike cycle in 2022, or any significant geopolitical event—Bitcoin has not exhibited its theoretically expected "safe haven asset" properties; instead, it has fallen alongside risk assets, often losing even more ground.

The reason is straightforward: the marginal holders of Bitcoin are still risk-seeking institutional investors and retail traders, who prioritize selling the most volatile assets for cash during liquidity tightening. Bitcoin happens to be the most volatile asset in their holdings.

Therefore, in the first phase of war breakout, soaring oil prices, and collapsing global risk sentiment, Bitcoin is likely to decline alongside the Nasdaq, possibly even more sharply. This is not a logical contradiction but a result dictated by market structure.

The key variable for Bitcoin is not the war itself but rather the reaction path of the Federal Reserve. If soaring oil prices force the Federal Reserve to tighten liquidity again, Bitcoin will likely drop in the short term alongside risk assets, potentially experiencing significant declines. However, if the Federal Reserve is forced to compromise between inflation and recession, choosing to maintain easing or even restart quantitative easing, Bitcoin will be one of the most direct beneficiaries.

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