By late March 2026, Eastern Eight Time, negotiations and battlefield escalations between the U.S. and Iran surrounding the Middle East conflict are advancing simultaneously: after the talks broke down in February, military strikes continued to escalate in March, creating a rare parallel scenario of diplomacy and airstrikes. In this complex game, Iran explicitly refuses to engage with Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner's team any further, explicitly insisting that U.S. Vice President JD Vance lead the negotiations, marking a clear shift in the power structure and discourse representation of the U.S. Meanwhile, Tehran repeatedly accuses the U.S. of launching strikes "immediately" after the February talks (according to sources A/C), labeling existing dialogue channels as "betrayal," and pushing the trust deficit to the forefront. In the context of sustained military pressure and fragmented communication, whether this round of negotiations marks the beginning of a ceasefire exit or is merely a tactical delay for various parties to buy time and adjust their stakes has become the biggest suspense surrounding the Middle East situation in late March.

Firing Immediately After the Meeting: Iran Accuses the U.S. of Betrayal

In terms of timeline, following the breakdown of U.S.-Iran talks in February, the battlefield did not enter a cooling phase but rather saw significant escalation in March. According to sources A and C, the core narrative of Iran's external story points to the accusation that the U.S. participated in or tacitly approved strikes against its regional targets shortly after the end of February's contact, shaping the "fire immediately after the meeting" into a model rather than an isolated incident. In the context of Tehran, this rhythm of talking followed by attacks is used to prove that Washington views negotiations as tools for intelligence gathering and public opinion masking, rather than serious conflict management mechanisms.

Under this narrative framework, Iran's choice to refuse continued engagement with Witkoff and Kushner's team is not merely a rejection of individual U.S. intermediaries but sees them as symbols of the "talk then get hit" old track. Both sources A and C indicate that Iranian officials and pro-government media depict this group of American negotiators as continuators of the logic from the previous round of negotiations, closely tying them to the breakdown in February and subsequent strikes, thus seeking political and emotional legitimacy for "changing the dialogue window."

This "betrayed" rhetoric has been quickly amplified by hardliners within Iran. The hardline camp emphasizes "getting bombed immediately after discussions" and "the U.S. never intended to honor any commitments," to shape a structural distrust, pressuring moderates to raise the threshold for engagement with the U.S.: any new negotiations must occur at a higher political level, with clearer security guarantees, and under a more controllable rhythm; otherwise, it will be seen as once again being exploited by the U.S. As a result, in the short term, any form of ceasefire proposal is compressed in space by this trust crack—Tehran is unwilling to bear the political risk of being "bombed again after talks," while Washington also finds it difficult to provide credible assurances without changing its military practices.

In this context, the competition over the "personnel" for negotiations has been elevated to an initial point of contention. Iran labels the old team as "betrayers," laying the groundwork for later insisting on Vance: only representatives symbolizing a new track could potentially be framed domestically as attempts different from the old script of February, thus having an opportunity to gain limited operational space under the squeeze of hardline rhetoric.

Kushner Excluded: Iran's Personnel Game

In the latest round of contention, one of the clearest moves from the Iranian side is to refuse to allow Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to continue facilitating talks, instead explicitly calling for Vice President JD Vance to lead the negotiations. This personnel demand goes beyond traditional diplomatic customs, resembling an open personnel game: who sits across the table is not just about technical details but whether the negotiation framework can be viewed as a premise for "starting anew."

According to sources A and C, Trump later publicly confirmed that negotiations with Iran would be led by JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, endorsing this adjustment by stating, "Vance and Rubio's negotiations are strong; we are optimistic about its success." This statement sends two signals: first, the White House is willing to make concessions on representative choices to salvage dialogue, putting both the Vice President and the Secretary of State forward; second, by elevating Vance to a significant position, they attempt to meet Iran's demand for "higher political level and different symbolic significance."

For Iran, the problem with the Kushner system is not personal preference but rather its perception as a representative of "continuing old accounts." In Tehran's elite narrative, Kushner's close ties with the Israeli decision-making circle make him viewed as closer to Tel Aviv, rather than a mediator maintaining distance between the U.S. and Israel; at the same time, the timeline of the February breakdown and subsequent strikes has continuously been intertwined with the Kushner team in Iranian discourse, solidifying the impression that "the old team = getting hit after talks." By simultaneously releasing signals of "no Kushner, only Vance" through public and private channels, Iran attempts to reset the structural game through the personnel contention: shifting the dialogue from a track that appears to serve Israeli interests to one that, at least symbolically, interfaces with a more independent U.S. decision-making layer.

Thus, choosing Vance is far from a simple technical change for Iran; rather, it is a strategic move aimed at attempting to change the rules of the game. By explicitly excluding the Kushner system, Tehran factually distances itself from the Israeli decision-making circle, locking in its negotiating counterpart within the symbolic space of U.S.-Iran bilateral relations; at the same time, it also conveys information to domestic audiences: if negotiations under high pressure are to occur, it must involve a new batch of "Americans who did not sell us out in the last round" at the table, thus providing justification for retesting U.S. sincerity.

From the Iraqi Battlefield to the Negotiation Table: Vance's Anti-War Label

One key reason JD Vance has become an "unexpected protagonist" in this round of U.S.-Iran contention is his personal experience and image, which are markedly different from traditional American hawks on Middle Eastern issues. According to background information from sources A and C, Vance served in Iraq, and this military experience leads outsiders to view him as someone with firsthand understanding of the costs of Middle Eastern wars, categorizing him as part of a relatively restrained wing on foreign military actions. Unlike many who discuss the Middle East only in Washington conference rooms, Vance's identity as a "politician who returned from the front lines" provides him with a unique stance in narratives of conflict.

Within Iranian elite circles, such experiences are interpreted as a dialogue partner who "understands the costs of war." From Tehran's perspective, a U.S. Vice President who has personally experienced the Iraqi battlefield is, at least in terms of emotional and risk judgment, more likely to comprehend the tearing effects of sustained airstrikes and sanctions on regional social structures, thus holding a potentially more open attitude towards "sustainable proposals to end conflict." This does not mean Iran has a delusional trust in Vance; rather, they relatively believe he does not treat the Middle Eastern wars as an abstract game of chips, unlike some traditional security bureaucrats.

In contrast, Secretary of State Rubio has a long-standing hawk label on security issues. Rubio consistently advocates for a hardline foreign policy in U.S. domestic politics, emphasizing the primacy of deterrence and pressure tools on issues such as Iran, making him closer to a symbol of "institutional hostility" in Tehran's eyes. Therefore, when Trump announces that Vance and Rubio will jointly lead the negotiations, Iranian internal discourse consciously highlights Vance while downplaying Rubio, presenting the former as "someone who might be receptive to proposals for ending conflict" and viewing the latter as a predictable background of hardline voices.

This distinction brings about a complex mindset: on one hand, some factions within Iran view Vance as a potential channel for "sustainable proposals to end conflict," believing that establishing a working relationship with him could help navigate from "tactical ceasefire" to more structural downgrading arrangements; on the other hand, hardliners maintain high vigilance against such hopes, emphasizing that Vance is ultimately the U.S. Vice President who must serve Washington's overall strategy, and cannot deviate from established routes on fundamental issues. Thus, around Vance's "anti-war credibility," Tehran treats it as both a potential breakthrough point to be tested and a risk that must be guarded against.

Israel Throws Cold Water: Short-Term Agreement Seen as "Unrealistic"

While the U.S. and Iran attempt to rekindle communication, Israel publicly throws cold water on the prospects of reaching a short-term agreement. According to source A, Israeli officials explicitly state that reaching a short-term agreement "does not seem realistic," which reflects not only reservations about the technical details of negotiations but also judgments about the overall political climate and military objectives. For Tel Aviv's security elite, rushing into a ceasefire while battlefield advantages are not fully solidified means prematurely closing the window to reshape regional balances through military pressure.

The current scenario is that while the U.S. and Israel maintain or escalate actions on the battlefield, they also allow, or even participate in, some form of communication attempts, creating a typical high-pressure parallel situation of "fighting while talking." For Iran, this means that any proposed ceasefire or easing plan must be evaluated against the backdrop of actual shelling and airstrike sounds; its domestic public opinion may easily view it as tactical deception from the U.S. and Israel; for the U.S., maintaining commitments to Israeli security while probing with Iran continuously constrains its negotiating space at the table due to its allies' red lines.

The core concern for Israeli security elites is that a hasty ceasefire could weaken deterrence against Iran and its regional networks, solidifying the latter's accumulated influence across multiple fronts. In their strategic vision, extending the window of military pressure can create more opportunities to undermine Iran's deployments in the vicinity and weaken its proxy networks, while simultaneously demonstrating resolve to other regional actors. Thus, even if the U.S. and Iran technically find some language to "reduce direct conflict," Israel tends to maintain the rhythm of strikes on key targets, viewing negotiations as a tactical subplot rather than a strategic mainline.

The result is a noticeable dislocation: on one side, Trump releases a positive signal in sources A/C stating, "Vance and Rubio's negotiations are strong; we are optimistic about their success," combined with Iranian sources claiming "willingness to listen to sustainable proposals to end conflict"; on the other side, Israeli officials calmly assess that "short-term agreements are unrealistic." The motivation for the U.S. and Iran's "seeking an exit" collides with Israel's demand to "extend the pressure window," creating structural tension in the regional security architecture, directly compressing the feasibility of any rapid political resolution.

The Islamabad Proposal Under Fire and Strategic Ambiguity

In the context of the aforementioned multiple games, the possibility of the next round of negotiations being hosted in Islamabad has drawn external attention. However, according to existing information from sources A/C, this choice of location remains unconfirmed, as significant information gaps exist regarding both the specific timing and the levels of participation. Simply put, Islamabad is currently more of a "potential stage" frequently mentioned by various media, rather than a finalized coordinate.

Regarding whether Iranian Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf will personally participate in negotiations, there have also been contradictory reports. Some channels view him as one of Iran's key representatives, while others from source C state that Ghalibaf denies the related negotiations as "fake news." Since this denial currently appears only in a single source and lacks broader cross-verification, what can be confirmed is that information about who precisely will be at the table at the senior level in Tehran is clearly incomplete, as well as the identity under which they will participate.

These unverifiable and conflicting pieces of information represent a deliberately created "strategic ambiguity." For all parties, under conditions where the battlefield is unstable and domestic political costs remain sensitive, prematurely solidifying the negotiation location, timing, and personnel binds them to a commitment that can be easily magnified, making it difficult to adjust rhythms at will and amplifying any "failure" label when breakdowns occur. By keeping the Islamabad proposal in a state that is always "seemingly there but not there," the U.S., Iran, and other relevant parties can test each other's bottom lines while maintaining room for explanations in the public opinion arena.

In this information ecology, it is particularly necessary for external observers to remain cautious. The Islamabad negotiations can currently be viewed as an option "existing on the discussion level," rather than a nailed-down timetable; regarding whether Ghalibaf will attend, it can only be marked as "contentious" and pending verification rather than a fact to be extended in interpretation. Distinguishing between what is multi-sourced confirmed hard information and what is speculation based on a single channel is critical for resisting the erosion of procedural optimism or pessimism narratives—otherwise, whether it is the excessive expectation of "peace being imminent" or the a priori pessimism of "inevitable breakdown," both will over-lock cognition before facts have clarified.

Negotiations and Airstrikes in Parallel: The Real Variables for the Next Steps in the Middle East

Integrating signals currently from sources A and C, Trump emphasizes externally that "Vance and Rubio's negotiations are strong; we are optimistic about their success," trying to create a positive atmosphere for the U.S.-led political resolution process; on the other hand, Iranian sources also convey a willingness to listen to sustainable proposals to end conflict, indicating that Tehran has not completely shut the door on diplomacy. At least at the level of discourse, both sides are reserving windows for some form of political resolution, hoping to find space to maneuver on the edges of the battlefield and sanctions.

However, in stark contrast, Israeli officials judge that a short-term agreement is "unrealistic," along with the reality that no substantial de-escalation has yet occurred on the battlefield. Every move in U.S.-Iran negotiations must unfold under the shadow of Israeli security concerns and military rhythms; and Israel's preference for extending pressure intensity and duration continuously erodes any rapid ceasefire proposals' political space. The fundamental dislocation in goals among the three parties—the U.S. logic of conflict management, Iran's regime security demands, and Israel's prioritization of deterrence—forms the backdrop of the current regional game.

Given that the trust deficit has not been repaired, military pressure persists, and domestic political cycles among the three are interwoven, a more realistic baseline judgment is: U.S.-Iran negotiations are likely to present a back-and-forth situation over the next period, with occasional contacts but difficult to achieve quick breakthroughs. Each meeting or communication message may be partially offset by subsequent airstrikes or political statements; each potential ceasefire window must simultaneously pass through the political filters of Tehran, Washington, and Tel Aviv.

Looking ahead to the next few months, two key observation points are worth continuous tracking. First, whether Vance can, under domestic political constraints, transform his "anti-war credibility" into executable conflict de-escalation proposals: this tests not only his actual influence within the government but also whether he can persuade allies to accept some forms of moderation arrangements. Second, whether the battlefield situation will exhibit structural changes sufficient to support phased de-escalation: if military confrontations continue to operate at high intensity, no cleverly designed negotiation framework can escape the fate of being viewed as "tactical delay." What may truly determine the next steps in the Middle East are not the headlines of any meeting but whether battlefield and political realities provide enough space for "negotiations to be prioritized."

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