This week, according to the time of the East Eight Zone, the China National Computer Virus Emergency Response Center and other national-level technical institutions jointly released a report titled "The 'Number One Player' – A Deep Analysis of the Global Virtual Currency Asset Harvesting Actions Under U.S. Technological Hegemony," naming the United States as the "Number One Player" and "Dealer" at the cryptocurrency table. The most striking figure in the report indicates that during the period from 2022 to 2025, the United States is set to seize global related assets worth over 30 billion U.S. dollars, with this data derived from a single source. In the narrative of the report, on-chain surveillance, technical standards, the long arm of the law, and the sanction system are packaged as a set of combined strikes, becoming new tools for the United States to reshape, and even partially rewrite, the global ownership structure of cryptocurrency assets. This raises a sharp question: who truly controls the chips and rules beneath the banner of "freedom and decentralization" in the cryptocurrency world?
From Freedom Narrative to Dealer Reality: The Reversal of the U.S. Role
● The starting point of the freedom narrative: At the beginning of the cryptocurrency's emergence, it was shaped as a decentralized, censorship-resistant financial experiment, repeatedly emphasizing in mainstream discourse the open narrative of "borderless," "not relying on a single sovereignty," and "everyone can participate." Wall Street institutions, Silicon Valley tech companies, and U.S. regulatory agencies once jointly constructed the image of "innovation + regulatory sandbox," making the U.S. leadership position in the global cryptocurrency ecosystem seen as the result of natural technological and market evolution, rather than a deliberately designed power project.
● The Dealer Portrayal in the Report: This report, spearheaded by China's national-level cybersecurity agency, directly depicts the U.S. role using terms like "gamble," "number one player," and "dealer," suggesting that it is not an ordinary participant but the dominant party controlling the flow of chips and the rules of the game. The report accuses the United States of simultaneously holding the flag of innovation, compliance, and investor protection while expanding its control over global cryptocurrency assets through regulatory enforcement, judicial confiscation, and technical monitoring in the shadows, attempting to reposition the U.S. from "institutional advocate" to "asset harvester."
● Rule dividends and table advantages: Over the past decade, the United States has continuously accumulated discourse power in areas such as cryptocurrency regulatory frameworks, qualitative definitions of securities and commodity attributes, tax compliance requirements, and exchange licensing systems. Additionally, with the U.S. dollar payment system, SWIFT settlement network, and large compliant trading platforms highly concentrated within the U.S. dollar ecosystem, the U.S. possesses an almost inherent "dealer perspective" in regulatory precedents, compliance thresholds, and infrastructure standards, allowing it to play the roles of both referee and an important participant in rule-making and interpretation.
● The mirror conflict of narratives between China and the U.S.: In mainstream U.S. discourse, regulation is packaged as "drawing red lines for innovation," seeking to bring cryptocurrency assets into existing financial and securities orders. In contrast, the narrative in this report from an official Chinese background interprets similar measures as extensions of technological hegemony, financial hegemony, and judicial hegemony, essentially representing a filtering, siphoning, and redistribution of global cryptocurrency assets. Innovation and compliance stand opposed to technological hegemony and asset harvesting within two contrasting political narratives, adding a layer of geopolitical filter to the cryptocurrency world.
From On-chain Monitoring to Judicial Intervention: The Convergence of Technology and Long Arm Jurisdiction
● The pivotal position of on-chain analysis companies: The report specifically names U.S. control over Chainalysis, Elliptic, and other on-chain analysis companies, emphasizing these firms' hub status in monitoring and tracing the flow of funds. On-chain analysis not only identifies address ownership and constructs funding flow maps but also connects with compliance systems and law enforcement databases, providing technical support for various investigations and sanctions. When this basic analytical capability is primarily held by U.S. enterprises and institutions, it means that global cryptocurrency trading activities are largely exposed to the same set of monitoring frameworks at a technical level.
● Technological monitoring overlaying long-arm jurisdiction: The United States already possesses a mature sanctions and long-arm jurisdiction system, extending the dollar system globally through financial institutions' "Know Your Customer" (KYC) and anti-money laundering (AML) rules. The addition of on-chain analysis technology enables this power to transition from traditional banks to the cryptocurrency sector: once an address or transaction path is linked to a sanctions list or criminal activities, law enforcement can invoke existing laws to implement freezing, confiscation, or criminal accountability, seamlessly connecting technical monitoring with judicial tools, thereby amplifying control over cross-border assets.
● Information asymmetry and passive rules: When key on-chain data, address profiling algorithms, and risk rating models are concentrated in the hands of a few U.S. companies and partner institutions, other countries' regulatory agencies, trading platforms, and even ordinary users often have to passively accept their classifications and risk labels. This technical and informational asymmetry makes it difficult for non-U.S. entities to escape reliance on U.S. data and standards in compliance judgments and risk control decisions — whether their assets are "safe" or "compliant" is to a large extent outsourced to third-party technologies and U.S. judicial interpretations.
● Evidence constraints of accusation details: It is important to emphasize that many statements in the report regarding how the U.S. links technical monitoring with judicial actions in specific cases are still largely macro descriptions, with some details relying on a single source and not fully disclosed. Researchers need to cross-verify with publicly available judicial cases, sanctions lists, and regulatory documents when quoting to avoid misreading analytical statements as court-verified facts, especially when involving specific operational processes and technical usage details, thus avoiding excessive speculation and conspiracy theorizing.
The $30 Billion Confiscation Storm: The Redistribution Logic Behind the Figure
● The $30 billion figure from a single source: One of the report's most impactful statements claims that between 2022 and 2025, the United States will seize more than $30 billion in global related assets. If this scale is accurate, it would signify that judicial confiscation in the cryptocurrency sector has reached a level rarely seen in traditional cross-border financial cases. However, the report simultaneously notes that this figure comes from a single source and does not provide data segmented by year, category, or case type, so external analysis must remain cautious when referencing it, avoiding treating it as officially verified global data from multiple sources.
● The macro background of rising confiscation intensity: Even setting aside specific statistical disputes, the trend of increased law enforcement intensity by the U.S. regarding cryptocurrency crime, sanction compliance, and financial security over the past few years has been publicly visible. Whether against hacker attacks, ransomware, dark web markets, or cryptocurrency payments related to terror financing and drug trafficking, U.S. law enforcement frequently reveals large asset seizures and confiscation cases through announcements, lawsuits, and sanction documents, reflecting its view of virtual currency as one of the core risk points for national security and financial system stability.
● The judicialization of wealth redistribution: Nominally, the U.S. confiscation actions target criminal gangs, sanctioned entities, and individuals or companies suspected of violating U.S. laws. However, viewed globally, the confiscated cryptocurrency assets often originally related to emerging markets, high-risk judicial jurisdictions, or overseas elite capital, only to eventually be transferred, disposed of, or partially integrated into the U.S. financial system under the judgment or settlement framework of U.S. courts. For the relevant source countries or asset owners, this signifies a process of cross-border wealth redistribution carried out in the name of judicial and compliance measures.
● The market-level chain reaction: The signals released by large-scale asset confiscations in the market not only represent the official narrative of "cracking down on crime," but also include the realities of increased compliance pressure, rising counterparty risks, and considerations for cross-border capital migration. On one hand, institutions facing heavier regulatory constraints may accelerate the concentration of funds along compliant paths; on the other hand, some funds choose to distance themselves from U.S. judicially accessible infrastructure, turning to less regulated or more concealed scenarios. This differentiation amplifies fear while also raising the focus on asset sovereignty and custody security.
Chen Zhi's Bitcoin Confiscation: How a Case Is Amplified into a Symbol
● The official source of the case background: The research brief cites the report stating that the U.S. has initiated criminal charges against Chen Zhi, the founder of the Cambodian Prince Group, and confiscated large amounts of Bitcoin assets under his name, and this information also primarily comes from a single source. The report places this case within the narrative of "technological hegemony and judicial harvesting," demonstrating how the U.S. utilizes its judicial system and on-chain tracking capabilities to bring foreign elites and emerging market capital under its controllable scope, providing concrete case support for macro accusations.
● The verifiable nature of key details: Regarding the specific time points, operational processes, and approximately 127,000 Bitcoin confiscated in the Chen Zhi case, the research brief clearly marks this as information pending verification, currently lacking sufficient publicly available authoritative judicial documents or multiple independent reports to substantiate it. This means that the related figures and details cannot be cited as established facts and must not form the basis for detailed deductions, to avoid solidifying unverified fragments into public consensus.
● The "template case" in Chinese public discourse: Nonetheless, in the secondary interpretations on Chinese social media and some self-media platforms, this case has been widely shaped into a typical model of the U.S. using judicial power to "capture" foreign tycoons and emerging market capital. The large-scale confiscation of Bitcoin is used to symbolize that once the assets intersect with the U.S. dollar system or legal jurisdictions, even vast on-chain wealth may instantaneously change hands under legal pretenses; this symbolism far exceeds the factual boundaries of the case itself, serving as an emotional outlet for anxieties regarding technological hegemony and financial sovereignty.
● The sovereignty paradox reflected by the case: Regardless of how the specifics of the Chen Zhi case ultimately settle, its amplification effect in public discourse exposes a deeper reality: a significant portion of on-chain assets that profess to be decentralized becomes fragile whenever required to flow through the U.S. dollar clearing system, American servers, or platforms governed by U.S. law. In a scenario of highly centralized technology and judiciary, individuals' and enterprises' cryptocurrency assets do not equate to sovereign assets solely regulated by their domestic laws, bringing new geopolitical variables to global capital allocation.
The Report Viewed as an Official Statement: Institutional Confrontation in Cryptocurrency Narratives
● The "unified signal" interpretation in social media: Following the report's release, a surge of discussions arose on Chinese social media regarding "the official characterization of the U.S. as a dealer in virtual currencies," with many opinions interpreting it as a concentrated expression of China's unified political and security stance on U.S. and cryptocurrency issues. For many market participants, this is no longer a mere technical analysis or intelligence summary but a policy signal linked to national strategy, digital security, and financial sovereignty.
● The bundling of technical safety and financial security: The report closely ties technical safety, network sovereignty, and financial security within the same accusation framework, stressing that the U.S. exerts systematic influence on global cryptocurrency assets through tech companies, standard-setting, and judicial means. This narrative elevates the issue of virtual currency from a traditional topic of "financial innovation and regulation" to a component of national security and institutional competition, positioning the U.S. as a central actor in intervening in the financial spaces of other nations through technological hegemony.
● Symbolic significance outweighs information disclosure: From the text structure and market reactions, the symbolic significance of this report may far exceed its informational value as an intelligence report. It serves both as an argument to reinforce the domestic regulatory context of "preventing technological hegemony risks" and possibly provides a basis for public opinion and position in future international cooperation, law enforcement collaboration, and standard negotiations. For the industry, the report acts more like an official reference answer on "how to understand the U.S. power role in the cryptocurrency world," rather than a mere compilation of case statistics.
● The frontline of a new round of institutional competition: Consequently, the discourse surrounding the U.S.-China cryptocurrency landscape is evolving into a new frontier of institutional competition. On one end is a compliance, monitoring, and long-arm jurisdiction system centered on the United States; on the other end is an antagonistic narrative emphasizing network sovereignty, technological autonomy, and financial security. Cryptocurrency is no longer just an asset class or technological track but is being incorporated into the grand scene of great power competition, rule-making, and global governance restructuring.
Who Holds the Chips: The Power Reality of Global Cryptocurrency Participants
The comprehensive advantages of the United States in on-chain monitoring technology, compliance infrastructure, long-arm jurisdiction, and asset confiscation mechanisms provide a real foundation for its labeling as the "dealer" in the cryptocurrency field: from controlling key analysis companies to amplifying its influence over global asset flows through regulatory and sanction systems, and undertaking multi-billion-dollar confiscation actions to reshape wealth distribution, the chips the U.S. holds in this emerging field far exceed those of ordinary sovereign nations. However, at the same time, the core figures in the report, such as "over $30 billion confiscated from 2022 to 2025," and the details of the massive Bitcoin in the Chen Zhi case, all have limitations like a single source and need verification, requiring careful interpretation after cross-referencing public judicial documents and market information to avoid treating unverified data as established facts.
In the context of the intensifying U.S.-China competition, regulatory agencies, trading platforms, and individual users in various countries are forced to reassess the balance between compliance, security, and asset sovereignty: should they further integrate into the compliance and clearing systems centered on the U.S. for liquidity and institutional certainty, or actively weaken their ties with infrastructures accessible to U.S. law to hedge against potential confiscation and sanction risks? For the entire industry, the real unavoidable question is: when key technologies, data, and judicial discretion are highly concentrated in the hands of a few countries and institutions, to what extent can a financial system purporting to be "decentralized" truly achieve decentralization of power and asset control?
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