Original Title: Bitcoin developers are mostly not concerned about quantum risk
Original Author: NIC CARTER
Translation: Peggy, BlockBeats
Editor’s Note: Will quantum computing become the next "test of survival" for Bitcoin? There is no shortage of researchers and technical proposals surrounding this issue in the community, but what ultimately determines the direction of the protocol is the small group of core developers with substantial influence.
This article systematically analyzes the public positions of major Bitcoin developers on quantum risk and finds that: In the highest decision-making circles, the quantum threat is still widely regarded as a distant, theoretical issue rather than an engineering challenge that needs immediate response. The ongoing contributions of a few researchers have yet to translate into consensus or action and are unlikely to shake the inertia of the core governance structure.
Here is the original text:
Recently, some Bitcoin developers have started to refute a view that I and others have put forward, which is that Bitcoin developers do not care about the risks posed by quantum computing.
It should be evident to anyone who has seriously followed the relevant discussions that, with the influence weighted, the majority of Bitcoin developers either provide a long timeline or outright deny the threat regarding quantum computing. However, let us closely examine Matt’s statements.
I had an approximate understanding of the situation, having been following these discussions, but after going through this analysis, I was still surprised by the extent of indifference displayed by those most important developers.
First, let me briefly explain the methodology: If you are not familiar with who holds the "power lever" in Bitcoin development, this is deliberately kept opaque. When Craig Wright legally harassed Bitcoin developers, some chose to "step back" or "retire," but actually continued contributing code to evade his legal maneuvers. The list of "Core Maintainers," meaning those who actually push updates into Bitcoin Core, is not a list of "most important Bitcoin figures," but simply those trusted to execute a bureaucratic task. Since Gavin Andresen, these individuals have deliberately sought to disassociate Bitcoin from responsibility and ownership. They repeatedly emphasize that they do not "control" Bitcoin but rather that everything is determined by a vague consensus of stakeholders. They often make near-Rousseau statements claiming to represent the "will of the people."
Of course, they do not genuinely ask Bitcoin users worldwide if they agree with a proposed change. The reality of the operation is this: if you can convince about five or six of the most influential developers that a change is important, then that change might be pushed through. This, in itself, is remarkably difficult and very rare, and thus the result is that changes almost never occur. Over the past decade, Bitcoin has only had two updates. Because of this structure, any change almost requires consensus among all "important people." It is easy to imagine that this leads to stalemates and inaction. So far, this state of affairs has been barely functional; but when Bitcoin begins to face an uncertain yet rapidly approaching threat that requires significant adjustments, this is precisely the least suitable governance structure. In modern terms, Bitcoin has never truly faced a survival crisis; the last time substantial survival issues arose (in 2010 and 2013), the governance structure was still sufficiently centralized to quickly push out fixes.
Thus, although doing so is nearly "heretical" in the Bitcoin context and will naturally annoy developers, as I am essentially revealing the "unstructured" governance reality they maintain, I still intend to try to assess which developers possess the greatest "perceived authority."
(As a side note about my background: I have studied Bitcoin professionally for ten years, with my master's thesis focusing on Bitcoin governance; I have provided funding to Bitcoin development organizations through Castle Island; I have spoken at several Bitcoin conferences; and I have met and communicated with many of the developers mentioned here. No one can truly paint a complete map of the power in Bitcoin governance, but I am closer to this reality than most.)
I understand that ranking Bitcoin developers by "influence" will certainly disturb many, but for the purposes of this analysis, it is an unavoidable step. We must know who the real gatekeepers are to assess whether the most important Bitcoin developers are truly prioritizing quantum risk. You can certainly question my ranking or propose an alternative set of criteria, but the only thing that matters is whether I accurately identified those core threshold figures.
The reason this matter is so difficult is precisely that Bitcoin developers deliberately keep the power structure opaque to the public. I have long monitored this issue and have a relatively clear judgment of "who is truly important," but even so, this remains an extremely challenging task. And the reason is singular: the developers wish for it to remain difficult to see through.
The green marks indicate maintainers. The list is not exhaustive and may contain errors. The influence ranking is my personal subjective judgment.
In my view, the most important Bitcoin developers/founders include: Pieter Wuille (definitely ranked first), Greg Maxwell, Jonas Nick, Anthony Towns, Adam Back, Alex Morcos, Marco Falke, Andrew Poelstra, Mara van der Laan, and Peter Todd. Their associated organizations have been listed in the table.
Pieter Wuille is a co-author of SegWit and the main author of Taproot—these are the only two major upgrades Bitcoin has seen in the past decade. He created libsecp256k1, wrote the Schnorr signature specification, and co-proposed BIP9. In terms of driving significant technical changes, he is by far the most important Bitcoin developer, bar none.
Mara van der Laan (formerly Wlad) served as the Chief Maintainer of Bitcoin Core from 2014 to 2021, officially "retired" in 2023, but has clearly returned in some significant sense.
Michael Ford is one of the longest-serving current Core maintainers, though he does not directly write BIPs, his influence should not be underestimated.
Andrew Poelstra is the most low-key among all "high-influence" developers, yet his impact is enormous—he could be termed a "developer’s developer," somewhat akin to a Steely Dan-like presence. He is a co-author of the implementations of Taproot and Schnorr, and has made many important contributions across the cryptography field.
Morcos is responsible for a significant developer organization, Chaincode. Michael Ford is currently the most prolific Core maintainer. Greg Maxwell is a legendary and outspoken developer. Adam Back is quoted in the Bitcoin whitepaper, is a co-inventor of Hashcash, and is also the head of Blockstream.
Marco Falke was a very active reviewer in Core, although he stepped down as a key maintainer in 2023. Jonas Nick is one of the main authors of Taproot. Peter Todd is a long-active, broad-ranging Bitcoin developer known for inventing mechanisms like RBF to counteract unsafe changes.
I would have included Luke Dashjr in this list, but his recent influence has diminished.
Everyone mentioned here holds a significant degree of "soft power." They collectively determine whether an update will be taken seriously and ultimately enacted. If you cannot convince almost all of the people on this list that your update is "important," then it is fundamentally unlikely to happen. The "High Priests" of Bitcoin that we often refer to are these individuals.¹
The other developers and thinkers in the lower half of the list are certainly important as well—after all, only a few dozen people are jointly guarding an asset worth trillions of dollars, and I bear no intention of belittling their contributions—but in my view, they are not gatekeepers. Nonetheless, their opinions still carry weight, and so I also list them here.
How the Most Important Bitcoin Developers View Quantum Risk
Let us start with the "High Priests."
Pieter Wuille, February 2025
I certainly agree that there is currently no urgency; but if (and only if) quantum computers capable of breaking cryptography become a reality, the entire ecosystem will have no choice but to disable those spending schemes that have been compromised, and this must be accomplished before such machines appear.
April 2025
I am not confident about the feasibility of Ethan Heilman’s proposal, but I am pleased to see thinking and discussion in this direction.
July 2025
I believe that the main quantum-related threat that Bitcoin faces, at least in the medium term, is not the actual emergence of Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computers (CRQC), but rather whether people believe they may appear in the near future.
I am not saying such machines will never appear; I simply think that the fear of their impending arrival will have an earlier and more significant impact. It needs to be made clear that I do not advocate any specific action—be it a BIP, timeline, technical path, or whether action should even be taken.
Pieter engages in discussions about quantum risk but does not believe it is urgent. In his view, the issue is more about people selling off due to concern. (And this situation is indeed happening.)
Mara van der Laan, June 2015
In the most extreme case: if secp256k1 or SHA256 were to show clear weaknesses, or if practical quantum computing were powerful enough to decompose discrete logarithms of that scale, I have no doubt everyone would unanimously agree to introduce new cryptographic algorithms.
Mara long served as a maintainer of Bitcoin Core, later retired and then returned. She had mentioned quantum issues in earlier writings, but did not explicitly state whether she believed there was risk.
Peter Todd, July 2025
Despite many claims about advancements in quantum computing hardware, the fact remains: no one is close to demonstrating quantum computers with cryptographic capabilities. The cryptographic capabilities of real hardware can almost be termed laughable.
Whether they are physically feasible remains unknown; apart from a few physicists hoping to sell you quantum computers or research funding, the mainstream view is that they do not conform to physical reality.
Adam Back, November 2025
It may be 20–40 years, or they might never emerge. Quantum-safe signatures already exist; NIST standardized SLH-DSA last year. Bitcoin can gradually introduce these as assessments progress, preparing long before cryptographically relevant quantum computers appear.
Although the organization led by Adam Back is indeed conducting post-quantum research, his personal judgment of the risk is: there is no need for concern for at least several decades. He even publicly dismissed my worries as FUD.
In my view, this attitude undermines the credibility of his organization's research outcomes—if the CEO is making such statements, it is hard to understand how Blockstream's research can still manage to prove that "developers are concerned about quantum risk."
Gloria Zhao, August 2024
I think people sometimes worry about quantum computers, and this worry is indeed more interesting than worrying about AI attacks on Bitcoin over a time scale of 30–50 years.
Greg Maxwell, December 2025
Greg has discussed post-quantum signatures in a few communications but has not indicated his assessment of the risk. (I even reviewed his complete Reddit history.) Given his usually strong opinions, this silence is rather unusual.
Jonas Nick, February 2025
Thank you for your work on BIP360. I think now is a good time to develop and discuss concrete post-quantum solutions.
Fortunately, Jonas is one of the most active post-quantum researchers in the Bitcoin community and has published papers on hash-based post-quantum signatures.
Anthony Towns discussed quantum attacks in 2018 but did not make a clear judgement on the risk.
Andrew Poelstra has not publicly commented on the risk, but in 2021, he stated that Taproot will not introduce quantum vulnerabilities.
As far as I know, Alex Morcos, Michael Ford, and Marco Falke have never publicly mentioned quantum risks, so I infer they are not worried (feel free to correct me if I am wrong).
Summary
Overall, the majority of the most influential Bitcoin developers have not even acknowledged quantum risk directly. A few who acknowledge the risk (with the exception of Jonas Nick) also generally consider it to be theoretical, distant, or unmanageable. Peter Todd and Adam Back explicitly deny the risk. Pieter Wuille acknowledges the issue exists and participates in discussions but clearly states this is not a current risk or priority.
Without the nod from these individuals, any Bitcoin upgrade would fail.
The current conclusion is quite simple: the most influential Bitcoin developers do not care about quantum risk.
Other Bitcoin Developers' Views
Luke Dashjr, December 2025
Quantum is not a real threat. Bitcoin has bigger problems to solve.
Luke explicitly states he does not see quantum as a threat. He has historically been one of the more influential and active Bitcoin developers, although he now stands opposed to the Core system.
Matt Corallo, March 2025
(In response to Jameson’s "Opposing Allowing Quantum Recovery of Bitcoin") I think this gives us a strong incentive to do "simple post-quantum cryptography (PQC)" today—while we do not need to decide on the tricky issue of "whether to take over non-PQC coins" right now, we want to keep the option to do so in the future. To make this option feasible in practice, wallets need to embed PQC public keys in their outputs for at least ten years before a "takeover" occurs; any longer lead time provides us with important safety margins. Therefore, it seems it's the right time to add the simplest form of PQC that we can do now—adding a basic P_HASHBASEDSIG (most likely SPHINCS+) to tapscript, thereby allowing wallets to hide PQC keys (including multi-sig) in their taproot.
Matt Corallo does care and indeed believes risks exist. However, he explicitly denies my view that "the most important developers do not care" and referred to my criticism as "FUD." Perhaps Matt has some insider information that I do not have: perhaps behind the scenes, developers are indeed anxious because of quantum issues. But in public, their behavior suggests there is no risk whatsoever.
Robin Linus, July 2025
Dogs are scarier than quantum computers.
Robin is the author of BitVM and a respected researcher in the field.
Mark Erhardt (Murch), November 2025
Among all the things that would keep me awake at night, quantum computers are absolutely not among them.
Most people who think the quantum threat is imminent are often looking for more funding to "burn" their research.
If we really see CRQC in 20 years, feel free to laugh at me.
Antoine Poinsot, March 2025
(In response to my claim that "influential BTC developers downplay threats") I think this exaggeration actually undermines your (originally reasonable) point about "uncertainty."
It also heightens what I believe is the real threat in the coming decade: the very perception that key stakeholders believe the quantum threat is imminent.
Olaoluwa Osuntokun (roasbeef), July 2025
Laolu gave a talk on hash-based post-quantum signatures at the Presidio Bitcoin Quantum Summit. He maintained a technical perspective throughout and did not assess the level of risk.
Tadge Dryja, July 2025
(In response to Jameson’s post-quantum proposal) Certainly, CRQC may pose risks. But this proposal is going in the opposite direction: disabling important functions preemptively for something that may never happen, even destroying coins in advance.
Tim Ruffing, July 2025
Tim published a paper titled "Post-Quantum Security of Taproot as a Commitment Mechanism." But to my knowledge, he has not directly commented on the risk itself. It’s certain that he began this type of research early, having published a paper on post-quantum confidential transactions as far back as 2017.
Gregory Sanders (instagibbs), December 2025
(In response to Scott Aaronson's comments about rising quantum risks) Evidence will tell; I will change my tune then. Until then, I remain skeptical.
Jeremy Rubin, July 2021
As a fun fact: Satoshi removed Bitcoin's post-quantum security in a hard fork in 2010.
The good news is: by re-enabling OP_CAT or similar mechanisms, Bitcoin can become quantum secure again.
Jeremy's worries about quantum issues surfaced earlier than most.
Amiti Uttarwar, January 2026
I find discussions about quantum threats very interesting. There are several people I consider very smart and who have been involved in discussions for a long time who believe quantum poses a survival threat to Bitcoin.
Augustin Cruz, February 2025
In 2025, Augustin released a quantum migration proposal called QRAMP, which was later deleted.
Mikhail Kudinov, 2025
Mikhail co-authored "Hash-Based Signature Schemes for Bitcoin," with a research agenda primarily focusing on post-quantum cryptography, so it is reasonable to assume he is paying attention to this.
Ethan Heilman, February 2025
I am firmly convinced that Bitcoin must migrate to post-quantum signatures in the near future.
Ethan has proposed several post-quantum solutions for Bitcoin and has recently become a signatory of BIP360. He is one of the most ardent advocates for post-quantum transition.
Jameson Lopp, July 2025
We want to protect the value of the UTXO set and minimize the incentive for quantum attacks. Bitcoin has never before faced a survival threat against its cryptographic primitives. If a quantum attack succeeds, it would cause severe economic disruption and chaos throughout the entire ecosystem. NIST has approved three post-quantum signature schemes for production environments as of 2024; some academic roadmaps even estimate that cryptographically relevant quantum computers may emerge as early as 2027–2030.
Jameson has also been actively sounding the alarm about quantum risks: promoting formal migration plans and encouraging public discussion around "how Satoshi coins will be handled." While he is not technically a Core developer, he is undoubtedly one of the fiercest advocates for the transition.
Jonas Schnelli, December 2025
(In response to a tweet saying "quantum computers will not arrive tomorrow") "Everyone predicting quantum doomsday, look at this article."
Jonas is a former influential Core maintainer who has now withdrawn from Bitcoin development. He tends to downplay the risks.
Anthony Milton
Anthony is a low-profile but very active researcher in post-quantum Bitcoin. He co-authored an important report, "Bitcoin and Quantum Computing," at Chaincode and operates PQ-Bitcoin.org, advocating for Bitcoin upgrades.
Clara Shikhelman
Clara is the research lead at Chaincode, co-authoring the quantum report with Anthony Milton and jointly operating PQ-Bitcoin with him.
Hunter Beast, December 2025
Industry roadmaps led by companies like IBM, Google, Microsoft, Amazon, and Intel indicate that quantum computers may break the ECDSA encryption used for Bitcoin public-private key cryptography within 2–5 years.
Hunter is the lead researcher of BIP360—this is currently the only named BIP explicitly aimed at promoting quantum migration.
The Following Influential Figures Have Recently Not Expressed Opinions on Quantum Risk
Satoshi Nakamoto (last discussed: 2010)
Gavin Andresen (last discussed: 2010)
Hal Finney
Mara Van Der Laan (last discussed: 2015)
Marco Falke
Michael Ford (fanquake)
Hennadii Stepanov (hebasto)
Ryan Yanofsky (ryanofsky)
TheCharlatan
Alex Morcos
Ava Chow (last discussed: 2019)
Suhas Daftuar
Neha Narula
Samuel Dobson (meshcollider)
Rusty Russell
Gleb Naumenko
Cory Fields (cfields)
Overall Question: How Do Bitcoin Developers View Quantum Risk as a Whole?
Based on the initial developer list I ranked according to influence, and the public statements summarized above, we can now finally answer this question: What is the overall level of concern about quantum risk among Bitcoin developers after weighting by influence?
This will lead to the conclusion drawn next.
Unfortunately, those at the top who truly decide whether Bitcoin will be updated almost unanimously believe that there is no imminent threat, the sole exception being Jonas Nick.
As the indisputable "number one" key developer, Pieter Wuille has participated in discussions regarding quantum issues multiple times, but he too believes there is no real risk currently.
Among developers of medium influence, there is a wide array of positions. On one hand, there are a group of researchers focused on quantum issues, such as Hunter Beast, Jameson Lopp, Clara Shikhelman, Anthony Milton, Ethan Heilman, Mikhail Kudinov, Augustin Cruz, Laolu, and Tim Ruffing.
On the other hand, there are some Core maintainers with actual power who remain silent about this threat; or some well-known developers—such as Luke Dashjr, Greg Sanders, Jonas Schnelli, or Tadge Dryja—who explicitly downplay or even deny the quantum risk.
While the work done by researchers like Hunter Beast, Anthony Milton, Jonas Nick, and Jameson Lopp is crucial, these outcomes have not gained any substantial traction among the highest-level, most elite "gatekeeping" developers. Don't believe it? Just take a look at Hunter's announcement of a significant update to BIP360—there was only one reply on the mailing list. Hunter's proposed roadmap also received merely polite acknowledgment, with no follow-up action. Nothing will happen until influential developers formally express support for a proposal.
Conclusion
If you have read this far, the conclusion should be very clear: among the group of developers who truly decide whether changes to the protocol happen, quantum issues are viewed as theoretical, distant, or speculative concerns rather than a real problem that is occurring and requires engineering solutions.
Peter Todd, Adam Back, and Luke Dashjr explicitly deny their feasibility or real relevance; Pieter Wuille, Gloria Zhao, and Adam Back categorize quantum issues as worries to be faced at least 30–50 years later; Van der Laan, Poelstra, Maxwell, Towns, Morcos, Falke, and others either never comment or refuse to participate in public discussions.
In the most important group, only Jonas Nick has explicitly expressed concern.
Serious attention exists below the power line. Researchers like Heilman, Shikhelman, and Milton are seriously dedicated to this work; Lopp is also continuously and rationally pushing the discussion—this is something I sincerely acknowledge. Hunter Beast and his team are among the most involved at the practical level, attempting to tackle a specific aspect of the problem through a named BIP (the quantum vulnerability of Taproot signatures). But so far, BIP360 has faced sheer indifference from "opinion makers."
Do not be misled by Adam Back or Matt Corallo’s statements. Among the most influential Bitcoin developers, there indeed exists a pathological indifference. Despite a few bright spots, it is evident that quantum migration is not a priority for Bitcoin Core or its major development funding institutions.
免责声明：本文章仅代表作者个人观点，不代表本平台的立场和观点。本文章仅供信息分享，不构成对任何人的任何投资建议。用户与作者之间的任何争议，与本平台无关。如网页中刊载的文章或图片涉及侵权，请提供相关的权利证明和身份证明发送邮件到support@aicoin.com，本平台相关工作人员将会进行核查。
