Event Overview

Recently, the TrustWallet browser extension version 2.68 was exposed to a security vulnerability, with multiple users reporting that their wallet assets were "swept clean" within hours. Security companies and on-chain analysts quickly intervened. According to data released by PeckShield, this incident has confirmed the theft of over $6 million in crypto assets, with approximately $2.8 million initially detected being rapidly transferred across multiple chains, including Bitcoin, EVM-compatible chains, and Solana. Further statistics show that about $2.8 million remains in wallets associated with the hackers, while over $4 million has been transferred to various centralized exchanges and third-party exchange services. Notably, there is still significant uncertainty regarding the root cause of the vulnerability; it is unclear whether the browser extension's supply chain was compromised or if it was limited to certain user-side devices or private key management being breached. This article will explore the incident from three dimensions: news, funding, and sentiment, observing how this "version-level" security event influences TrustWallet itself, TWT, and the broader Binance ecosystem assets through on-chain fund flows and social discourse.

Attack Path

From public intelligence, this attack is highly concentrated on the TrustWallet browser extension version 2.68. Multiple users reported asset anomalies almost simultaneously, with on-chain addresses exhibiting a clear "multi-address distribution + cross-chain diversion" modus operandi: a group of EVM addresses controlled by the attackers received tokens and stablecoins from different users, which were then split into Bitcoin, Solana, and other chain addresses through cross-chain bridges or exchange services, forming multiple layers of jumps. PeckShield, ZachXBT, and others disclosed some suspicious addresses and transfer trajectories on social platforms, but the community remains divided on whether "the vulnerability lies in the extension code itself, third-party dependencies, or if the user's local environment was compromised." Some speculate it could be a supply chain attack triggered by the browser extension update, while others believe it may involve malicious plugins implanted in some users' signing environments; currently, there is no conclusive evidence. Confirmed information mainly focuses on on-chain activities: addresses related to the attack show significant receipt and redistribution behaviors on Bitcoin, EVM, and Solana chains, with funds being split into multiple small transfers in a short time, some of which have entered centralized services for exchange. Beyond the surface characteristics already tracked by security companies, the specific technical details of how hackers obtained user keys and what underlying vulnerabilities were exploited have not been disclosed, and analysis can only be conducted based on the information available, without further speculation on undisclosed attack methods.

Fund Destination

In terms of funding, the total amount stolen exceeds $6 million, with approximately $2.8 million still residing in wallets suspected to be controlled by the hackers, becoming a key target for subsequent tracking and freezing actions. The remaining over $4 million has been rapidly transferred to multiple centralized platforms and third-party instant exchange services: structural data provided by PeckShield indicates that about $3.3 million flowed into ChangeNOW, approximately $340,000 into FixedFloat, and about $447,000 into KuCoin, with the rest distributed among other smaller services or still in on-chain transit. Historically, in similar incidents, some platforms would freeze and mark suspicious assets upon receiving intelligence, but the ability to freeze and the amount that can be frozen depend on the hackers' splitting speed, whether off-chain exchanges have been completed, and the platforms' compliance attitudes. Therefore, the current ability to determine "how much can be recovered" can only be referenced against past cases and cannot be considered a foregone conclusion in this case. Cross-chain and multi-platform splitting significantly increases the difficulty of asset recovery: hackers frequently jump across Bitcoin, EVM, Solana, and other chains, combined with the use of instant exchange services that do not require KYC, enhancing their anti-tracking capabilities in terms of time and cost, which also raises their cash-out costs and operational risks. In the short term, this type of selling pressure has limited direct impact on the price of a single token; the larger impact lies in the sentiment of "security discount": some investors may tend to reduce their holdings of governance tokens or ecosystem assets related to the incident, fearing subsequent compensation, lawsuits, or regulatory pressure, thus reflecting a liquidity discount in secondary market quotes.

News and Sentiment

In terms of news rhythm, the dissemination path of this incident roughly went through four stages: first, users scattered feedback in communities and social media about their "wallets being emptied"; then, on-chain analysis KOLs like ZachXBT compiled multiple victim cases, issued warnings, and listed suspicious theft addresses; next, security agencies like PeckShield provided more systematic loss statistics and analyses of cross-chain fund flows, elevating the scale of theft from early scattered cases to a "systemic event of over $6 million"; finally, TrustWallet's official team and third-party auditing firm CertiK released announcements confirming security issues in the browser extension version 2.68 and urged users to immediately disable that version and upgrade to 2.69, while emphasizing that mobile and other extension versions were unaffected. Public sentiment in the early stages leaned towards panic and anger: the narrative of assets being indiscriminately emptied easily triggered associations with "systemic risk," leading to high-frequency sharing on social media; as the official clarified that the scope was limited to the browser extension version 2.68 and provided an upgrade path, the proportion of rational discussions began to rise, with inquiries into attack details, responsibility allocation, and subsequent compensation becoming the main focus. The key information that "only affects a specific version and does not impact the mobile end" played a buffering role in sentiment recovery, but the limited transparency from the official side regarding root cause disclosure and timeline restoration has caused some long-time users to waver in their brand trust, putting pressure on its long-term ecosystem stickiness.

Expansion and Security

Looking back over the past year, TrustWallet has been evolving from a "light wallet tool" to a "comprehensive DeFi entry point": first introducing savings features for the stablecoin USDS, then integrating RWA (real-world asset) products, and recently partnering with MyriadMarkets to launch built-in prediction market features, further integrating trading, speculation, and asset management into a single entry point. This expansion is not happening in isolation but is highly tied to Binance's ecosystem layout—during this period, Binance has gradually shut down BNB Chain Wallet (BEW), guiding users to migrate to TrustWallet and publicly supporting new features like prediction markets through high-level figures like CZ, signaling it as the "official favorite." In the process of frequent new releases and multi-chain support, whether security audit resources and engineering practices can match the speed of expansion becomes a key issue. The vulnerability that erupted in the browser extension version 2.68 coincidentally occurred after TrustWallet entered high-complexity scenarios like prediction markets, creating a stark contrast in timing: on one side, functionalities are continuously added, and collaboration frequency is increasing, while on the other side, the extension experiences asset losses exceeding $6 million, exposing the tension between expansion pace and security capabilities. Other multi-functional wallets or DeFi entry points in the industry have also experienced security incidents due to cross-chain bridges, plugin systems, or authorization management issues, and these cases point to a structural risk: the more blurred the functional boundaries and the broader the callable permissions, the larger the attack surface becomes, and any lapse in one link can amplify into systemic asset losses rather than controllable risks at the single dApp level.

Bull-Bear Game

From a bullish perspective, there is room for this incident to be framed as a "controllable security event": first, the impact scope has been limited by the official and security agencies to the browser extension version 2.68, with no large-scale anomalies seen on mobile and other versions, indicating that it is not a global collapse of the underlying protocol or mnemonic system; second, TrustWallet and CertiK quickly launched version 2.69 as a fix and reminded users to disable the old extension through announcements, providing a clear path for subsequent risk control from an operational standpoint. Under this narrative, bulls are more willing to view this incident as a "single-point accident" in a high-frequency iteration process, believing that as long as some funds are recovered later and auditing and risk control are strengthened, the long-term logic of TrustWallet and TWT can still be maintained. Conversely, from a bearish perspective, the stolen amount exceeding $6 million is not only an absolute figure issue but also a symbolic blow: as a key wallet entry point in the Binance ecosystem, a large-scale theft involving cross-chain and multiple addresses directly erodes its "security premium," thereby dragging down the valuation imagination of related assets like TWT and BNB. In the short term, the market may reflect this distrust by selling TWT and reducing allocations to the DeFi wallet sector; in the medium to long term, there is greater concern about whether TrustWallet will face pressure from regulatory agencies or collective user actions demanding compensation and risk mitigation, thus altering its profit and token value distribution model. Considering that approximately $2.8 million remains in the hacker's address and social media discussions remain heated, it can be inferred that the current bull-bear forces have not formed a one-sided overwhelming advantage: if there are successful asset freezes, partial recoveries, or clear compensation plans in the future, the sentiment turning point may lean towards the bulls; if hackers successfully cash out and similar security incidents recur, it will more easily trigger a new round of concentrated selling pressure and valuation discounts.

Market Outlook

Looking ahead, to assess the ultimate impact of this incident on the market, several key variables are worth continuous tracking: first is the progress of asset recovery—whether the approximately $2.8 million still in the hacker's address can be timely frozen and partially recovered through collaboration between trading platforms and on-chain; second is the official stance on compensation and user protection—whether TrustWallet will provide compensation, insurance, or fee reductions for victims will directly affect the breadth and speed of sentiment recovery; third is the transparency of security audits and information disclosure—whether stronger third-party audits are introduced and the causes and repair processes of vulnerabilities are made public will determine whether the entire Binance ecosystem can rebuild security trust. In a relatively optimistic scenario, if some funds are recovered, risk control and auditing processes are significantly upgraded, and the official maintains high transparency in communication, then the incident may be viewed by the market as a "tuition fee" security lesson, potentially strengthening Binance's investment and standards for security in the long run, with the valuation impact on TWT and BNB being more reflected in short-term discounts rather than long-term re-evaluations. Conversely, in a pessimistic scenario, if hackers successfully complete cross-chain cash-outs, related platforms fail to effectively freeze assets, and similar vulnerabilities or delayed information disclosures occur again, this case may evolve into a negative example for the multi-chain wallet sector, undermining the business model of directing users from centralized exchanges to self-custody wallets, prompting some users to revert to centralized custody or more decentralized multi-wallet strategies. For ordinary investors and heavy wallet users, practical executable advice includes:
• In terms of version management, try to avoid using the browser extension immediately after an update; first, test the new version's stability with a small amount;
• In terms of asset management, diversify large long-term holdings across multiple wallets and devices to reduce systemic risks from single points of failure;
• In terms of information acquisition, pay attention to whether wallet projects consistently adhere to third-party security audits and report disclosures, and remain vigilant about projects with rapid security update rhythms but scarce audit records. By upgrading both tools and habits, individual users can control their exposure to losses from black swan events within acceptable limits.

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