Extending the thought on the logical possibility of the Venus Protocol being attacked:

1) Security experts say that a large holder was phished. The conventional understanding is that if the private key is obtained, the hacker could simply withdraw funds, so why involve a flash loan?

It is highly likely that the hacker obtained the updateDelegate authorization through social engineering, gaining operational access to the large holder's account. However, there was no immediate liquidity to withdraw. In simple terms, the hacker had the permission, but the large holder only had collateral, and the borrowed funds were not present. The hacker needed to find a way to obtain the large holder's collateral.

2) Is it a matter of the large holder being phished personally, unrelated to the Venus contract? As mentioned earlier, if the hacker discovers that the large holder has no liquidity, they should normally be wasting their efforts. But why could they withdraw collateral through a simple flash loan attack? The answer lies in the mechanism of the Venus contract. The hacker might have used a flash loan and a series of vToken cross-platform exchange rate differences to help the large holder repay the borrowed funds and retrieve the collateral, even taking out a bit more.

In simple terms, the large holder's collateral was indeed stolen, but it is highly likely to become a bad debt for the Venus contract platform, unless the large holder is foolish enough to repay the platform.

3) Other users' funds are temporarily safe, but the responsibility issue for the Venus platform is significant. Although the trigger for this attack was the large holder being phished through social engineering, it ultimately resulted in a successful profit. The stolen $30 million will likely become a bad debt for the Venus platform, compounded by the temporary panic-induced run on the platform, which could have a substantial impact on Venus.

However, the greater impact lies in the fact that this incident has stirred up terrifying memories of Venus's "habitual attacks," such as the manipulation of XVS prices and its degradation into a money laundering tool for cross-chain bridges involving BNB, all stemming from fundamental flaws in Venus's security engineering. As the largest lending protocol on BSC, such a situation is hard to justify. Note: The above content is based on logical speculation according to currently disclosed information, with specifics subject to the actual details disclosed.

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