Original Author: Arthur Hayes
Original Translation: Luffy, Foresight News
When Circle CEO Jeremy Allaire had to heed the "command" of Coinbase CEO Brian Armstrong, I hope this article helps those trading any "stablecoin" related assets in the public stock market avoid losses while promoters peddle worthless junk to unsuspecting gamblers. With that in mind, I will begin to explore the past, present, and future of the stablecoin market.
In the capital markets, professional cryptocurrency traders are somewhat unique: to survive and thrive, they need to have a deep understanding of how funds flow within the global fiat banking system. Stock investors or forex traders do not need to know how stocks or currencies are settled and transferred; the brokers they must use provide these services quietly in the background.
First of all, buying the first Bitcoin is not easy, and what is the best and safest option is not clear. At least when I started trading cryptocurrencies in 2013, most people's first step was to buy Bitcoin directly through bank wire or cash from others, before upgrading to trading on exchanges that offered a bilateral market allowing for larger-scale Bitcoin trading at lower fees. However, depositing fiat currency into exchanges has never been easy, both in the past and present: many exchanges lack solid banking relationships or operate in regulatory gray areas in their home countries, meaning you cannot wire funds directly to them. Exchanges find ways to work around this, such as guiding users to transfer funds directly to local agents who issue cash vouchers for the exchange, or establishing a subsidiary that appears unrelated to cryptocurrency to obtain accounts and guide users to transfer funds there.
Fraudsters exploit this friction to steal fiat currency in various ways. The exchanges themselves may lie about the whereabouts of funds, and one day… poof — the website disappears along with your hard-earned fiat currency. If you use third-party intermediaries to transfer fiat currency in and out of the crypto capital markets, these intermediaries could run off with your money at any time.
Due to the risks of transferring fiat currency in the crypto capital markets, traders must have a detailed understanding of their counterparties' cash flow operations. When funds flow through the banking systems in Hong Kong, mainland China, and Taiwan (which I refer to as Greater China), I took a crash course in global payments.
Understanding the flow of funds in Greater China helped me grasp the business models of China and major international exchanges like Bitfinex, which is crucial because all real innovations in the crypto capital markets have occurred in Greater China, especially in the stablecoin space. Continue reading, and you will understand the importance of this. The most successful case of a cryptocurrency exchange in the West is Coinbase, founded in 2012. However, Coinbase's innovation lies in establishing and maintaining banking relationships in one of the most hostile markets for financial innovation (the U.S.). Otherwise, Coinbase is just a very expensive cryptocurrency brokerage account, which is all it needed to make early shareholders billionaires.
The reason I am writing another article about stablecoins is due to the tremendous success of Circle's IPO. It is important to clarify that Circle's market capitalization is severely overvalued, but its stock price will continue to rise. This listing marks the beginning of this round of stablecoin mania, not the end. The bubble will burst after another stablecoin issuer goes public (most likely in the U.S.), which will use financial engineering, leverage, and superb performance to siphon billions of dollars in capital from fools. As usual, most people putting their precious funds into this will not understand the history of stablecoins and crypto payments, why the ecosystem has evolved this way, or what it means for which issuers will succeed or fail. A highly charismatic and trustworthy person will take the stage, ramble on, wave their hands, and convince you that this leveraged nonsense they are selling is about to monopolize a potential market for stablecoins worth trillions of dollars.
If you stop reading here, then the only question you need to ask yourself when evaluating an investment in a stablecoin issuer is: how will they distribute their products? To achieve scalable distribution (i.e., the ability to reach millions of users at an affordable cost), issuers must use channels from cryptocurrency exchanges, Web2 social media giants, or traditional banks. Without distribution channels, they have no chance of success. If you cannot easily verify whether the issuer can promote products through one or more of these channels, then get out quickly!
I hope my readers do not waste their funds in this way, as they have read this article and can think critically about the stablecoin investment opportunities before them. This article will discuss the evolution of stablecoin distribution. First, I will discuss the reasons and ways Tether developed in Greater China, which laid the foundation for its conquest of stablecoin payments in the Southern Hemisphere; then I will discuss how the initial coin offering (ICO) boom created a true product-market fit for Tether; next, I will explore the first attempts of Web2 social media giants to enter the stablecoin space; and finally, I will talk about how traditional banks will get involved.
Cryptocurrency Banking in Greater China
Currently, successful stablecoin issuers Tether, Circle, and Ethena have the ability to distribute products through large cryptocurrency exchanges. I will focus on the evolution of Tether and briefly discuss Circle to illustrate how nearly impossible it is for any new entrants to replicate their success.
Initially, cryptocurrency trading was overlooked. For example, from 2014 to the late 2010s, Bitfinex was the largest non-Chinese global exchange, owned by a Hong Kong operating company with various local bank accounts. This was fantastic for arbitrage traders like me living in Hong Kong, as I could wire funds to the exchange almost instantly. Across the street from my apartment in Sai Ying Pun, there were almost all local banks, and I would walk between banks to deposit and withdraw cash to minimize fees and transfer times, which was crucial as it allowed me to rotate funds once a day on weekdays.
Meanwhile, in mainland China, the three major exchanges OKCoin, Huobi, and BTC China all had multiple bank accounts with large state-owned banks. It took me only 45 minutes by bus to Shenzhen, and with my passport and basic Chinese skills, I opened various local bank accounts. As a trader with bank accounts in both mainland China and Hong Kong, you could access global liquidity, and I was confident my fiat currency would not be lost. In contrast, every time I wired funds to certain Eastern European-registered exchanges, I was on edge because I did not trust their banking systems.
However, as the popularity of cryptocurrencies rose, banks began closing cryptocurrency-related accounts. Every day, you had to check the operational status of each bank's relationship with the exchanges, which was detrimental to my trading profits: the slower the funds moved between exchanges, the less money I made through arbitrage. But what if you could transfer electronic dollars on the blockchain instead of through traditional banking channels? Then dollars could flow between exchanges almost for free, 24/7.
The Tether team collaborated with the founders of Bitfinex to create such a product. In 2015, Bitfinex allowed the use of Tether USD on its platform. At that time, Tether used the Omni protocol as a layer on the Bitcoin blockchain to send Tether USD (USDT) between addresses, which is a native smart contract layer built on Bitcoin.
Tether allowed certain entities to wire dollars to its bank account, and in return, Tether would mint USDT, which could be sent to Bitfinex to purchase cryptocurrencies. Why was it so exciting that only one exchange offered this product?
Like all payment systems, stablecoins only become valuable when a large number of economically meaningful participants become nodes in the network. For Tether, besides Bitfinex, cryptocurrency traders and other large exchanges needed to use USDT to solve real problems.
Everyone in Greater China faced the same dilemma. Banks were closing accounts for traders and exchanges, coupled with the desire of Asian residents to obtain dollars due to their local currencies being prone to significant devaluation, high inflation rates, and low domestic bank deposit interest rates. For most Chinese people, obtaining dollars and trading opportunities in U.S. financial markets was very difficult, if not impossible. Therefore, Tether, a digital version of the dollar that anyone with an internet connection could use, became extremely attractive.
The Bitfinex and Tether teams capitalized on this. Jean-Louis van der Velde, who became CEO of Bitfinex in 2013 and had previously worked for a Chinese automotive manufacturer, understood Greater China and worked to make USDT the preferred dollar bank account for Chinese cryptocurrency enthusiasts. Although Bitfinex never had any Chinese executives, it built tremendous trust between Tether and the Chinese cryptocurrency trading community. Therefore, it is certain that the Chinese trust Tether. Meanwhile, in the Southern Hemisphere, overseas Chinese are running businesses that require Tether to provide "banking services."
If Tether had only one large exchange as a distributor, it might not have succeeded. The market structure changed so dramatically that trading altcoins against the dollar could only be done using USDT. Let's go back to 2017, at the peak of the ICO boom, when Tether truly solidified its product-market fit.
The ICO Boom and the Rise of Tether
August 2015 was a very significant month, as the People's Bank of China (PBOC) devalued the yuan against the dollar, while the native token ETH of the Ethereum network began trading. The macro and micro stages transformed in sync, marking the beginning of a legendary period that drove the crypto bull market from then until December 2017. Bitcoin soared from $135 to $20,000; Ethereum rose from $0.33 to $1,410.
During this time, the macroeconomic environment was always favorable. Since Chinese traders were the marginal buyers of all cryptocurrencies (at that time, only Bitcoin), if they felt uneasy about the yuan, Bitcoin would rise. At least that was the case back then.
The significant devaluation by the Chinese central bank exacerbated capital flight. To hell with the yuan, give me dollars, cryptocurrencies, gold, and foreign real estate. By August 2015, Bitcoin had fallen from its historical high of $1,300 before the Mt. Gox bankruptcy in February 2014 to a low of $135 on Bitfinex earlier that month, when China's largest Bitcoin OTC trader Zhao Dong faced the largest margin call in history on Bitfinex, amounting to 6,000 BTC. The narrative of capital flight from China opened the door to an upward trend: from August to October, BTC/USD more than doubled.
The micro level is always the most interesting place. After the Ethereum mainnet and its native currency ETH went live on July 30, 2015, altcoins began to flood the market. Poloniex was the first exchange to allow ETH trading, a foresight that propelled it to become an industry leader in 2017. Interestingly, Circle acquired Poloniex almost at the peak of the ICO craze and later sold it to Justin Sun at a significant loss.
Poloniex and other Chinese exchanges seized the opportunity in the emerging altcoin market by launching pure cryptocurrency trading platforms. Unlike Bitfinex, they did not need to interface with the fiat banking system and could only deposit and withdraw cryptocurrencies for trading against other cryptocurrencies. However, this was not ideal, as traders instinctively wanted to trade altcoin/USD pairs. How could exchanges like Poloniex and Yunbi (which was the largest ICO platform in China until it was shut down by the People's Bank of China in the fall of 2017) provide these trading pairs without accepting USD fiat deposits and withdrawals? Enter USDT!
After the Ethereum mainnet launched, USDT could circulate on that network using the ERC-20 standard smart contract, allowing any exchange that supported Ethereum to easily support USDT. Therefore, pure cryptocurrency trading platforms could offer altcoin/USDT trading pairs to meet market demand, which also meant that digital dollars could flow seamlessly between major exchanges like Bitfinex, OKCoin, Huobi, BTC China, and more interesting and speculative venues like Poloniex and Yunbi.
The ICO frenzy gave rise to Binance, which later became a giant. Changpeng Zhao (CZ) resigned as CTO of OKCoin a few years ago due to a personal dispute with CEO Xu Mingxing, and after leaving, he founded Binance with the goal of becoming the largest altcoin exchange in the world. Binance did not have a bank account, and to this day, I still do not know if you can deposit fiat currency directly to Binance without going through any payment processor. Binance used USDT as its banking channel and quickly became the preferred place for trading altcoins, and the rest is history.
From 2015 to 2017, Tether achieved product-market fit and built a moat against future competitors. Due to the trust of the Chinese trading community in Tether, USDT was accepted across all major trading venues. At this point, it was not yet used for payments, but it was the most efficient way to transfer digital dollars both within and outside the crypto capital markets.
By the late 2020s, exchanges faced significant difficulties in maintaining bank accounts. Taiwan became the de facto crypto banking hub for all the largest non-Western exchanges (controlling most of the global crypto trading liquidity) because a few Taiwanese banks allowed exchanges to open dollar accounts and somehow maintained agency banking relationships with large U.S. banks like Wells Fargo. However, as the agency banks demanded these Taiwanese banks expel all cryptocurrency clients or risk losing access to the global dollar market, this model began to crumble. Thus, by the late 2020s, USDT was the only way to transfer dollars on a large scale in the crypto capital markets, solidifying its position as the dominant stablecoin.
Many Western players raised funds by touting cryptocurrency payments and created competitors to Tether. The only survivor is Circle's USDC. However, Circle is at a clear disadvantage because it is a Boston-based company with no connection to the Greater China crypto trading scene. The unspoken message from Circle is: China = scary; the U.S. = safe. This message is quite ironic, as Tether has never had any Chinese executives but has always been associated with the Northeast Asian market and today's Southern Hemisphere market.
The Entry of Social Media
The stablecoin frenzy has been long in the making. In 2019, Facebook (now known as Meta) decided to launch its own stablecoin, Libra, which was attractive because Facebook could offer dollar bank accounts to the entire world outside of China through Instagram and WhatsApp. This is what I wrote in my June 2019 article about Libra:
With Libra, Facebook began to venture into the digital asset space. Before we start analyzing, let’s be clear: Libra is neither decentralized nor censorship-resistant; Libra is not a cryptocurrency. Libra will destroy all stablecoins, but who cares? I do not feel sorry for those who somehow believe that a project created by some unheard-of sponsor to establish a blockchain-based fiat market fund has value.
Libra could put commercial banks and central banks in a difficult position. It could diminish their roles, reducing them to a regulated digital fiat currency warehouse. And that is precisely what these institutions should face in the digital age.
Libra and the stablecoins launched by other Web2 social media companies were supposed to steal the spotlight; they have the most customers and almost complete knowledge of customer preferences and behaviors.
Ultimately, U.S. politicians took action to protect traditional banks from real competition in the payments and forex space. At the time, I said:
I have no sympathy for the foolish remarks and actions of U.S. Congresswoman Maxine Waters in the House Financial Services Committee, but her and other government officials' concerns are not driven by altruistic feelings for the public but by fear of disruption in the financial services industry, which is what allows them to line their pockets and remain in power. The eagerness of government officials to condemn Libra tells us that the project holds potential positive value for human society.
That was in the past, but now the Trump administration will allow competition in the financial markets. Trump 2.0 has no fondness for the banks that stripped his family of their platforms during the Biden administration. Therefore, social media companies are restarting projects to embed stablecoin technology within their platforms.
This is good news for shareholders of social media companies. These companies can completely absorb the payment and forex revenue streams of the traditional banking system. However, this is bad news for any entrepreneur creating new stablecoins, as social media companies will build everything they need to support their stablecoin businesses themselves. Investors in emerging stablecoin issuers must be cautious and see if their founders claim to collaborate with any social media companies or distribute through them.
Some other tech companies are also rushing to catch the stablecoin wave. Social media platforms like X, Airbnb, and Google have been in early discussions about integrating stablecoins into their business operations. According to a report last month in Fortune magazine, Mark Zuckerberg's Meta (which previously attempted blockchain technology but failed) has been discussing with crypto companies the introduction of stablecoins for payments.
The Demise of Traditional Banks
Whether banks like it or not, they will no longer be able to continue earning billions of dollars each year by holding and transferring digital fiat currency, nor can they earn the same fees through forex trading. Recently, I spoke with a board member of a large bank about stablecoins, and they said, "We're done." They believe stablecoins are unstoppable and cited the situation in Nigeria as proof. I was previously unaware of the extent of USDT's penetration in that country, but they told me that even after the central bank attempted to ban cryptocurrencies, one-third of Nigeria's GDP was conducted through USDT.
They continued to point out that because the adoption of USDT is bottom-up rather than top-down, regulators are powerless to stop it. By the time regulators notice and try to take action, it is too late, as adoption has already become popular among the public.
Despite having people like them in senior positions at every large traditional bank, the banking organism does not want to change, as it means the death of many cells (i.e., employees). Tether has no more than 100 employees but can perform key functions of the entire global banking system by leveraging blockchain technology for scalability. In contrast, JPMorgan, the best-operating commercial bank in the world, employs just over 300,000 people.
Banks are at a critical moment: adapt or perish. But what hinders them from streamlining their bloated workforce and providing the products needed for the global digital economy is regulatory oversight, which dictates how many people must be hired to perform certain functions. For example, in my experience trying to open a Tokyo office and obtain a crypto trading license at BitMEX, the management team considered whether to open a local office and obtain a license to conduct some limited types of crypto trading outside of the core derivatives business. Compliance costs were an issue because you could not leverage technology to meet the requirements; regulators mandated that for each listed compliance and operational function, you must hire a person with the appropriate level of experience. I do not remember the exact number, but I recall needing about 60 people, each with a minimum annual salary of $80,000, totaling $4.8 million per year to perform all mandated functions, while all this work could be automated for less than $100,000 a year in SaaS vendor fees, and it would be less error-prone than hiring fallible humans. Oh… and in Japan, you cannot fire anyone unless you shut down the entire office.
The global issue is that bank regulation is a "job creation" program for the educated elite, who have been educated in "nonsense" rather than what truly matters; they are just high-paid clock-pullers. Although bank executives would like to reduce their workforce by 99% and increase productivity, as regulated entities, they cannot do so.
Stablecoins will eventually be adopted in traditional banks in a limited form; they will operate two parallel systems: the old slow and expensive system and the new fast and cheap system. The extent to which they are allowed to truly embrace stablecoins will be determined by the prudent regulators in each office. Remember, JPMorgan is not an organism; rather, each country's JPMorgan branch is subject to different regulations, and data and personnel often cannot be shared between branches, making company-wide technology-driven rationalization impossible. Good luck, bankers; regulatory protection shields you from the impact of Web2 but will stifle your survival in Web3.
These banks will certainly not collaborate with third parties on the technical development or distribution of stablecoins; they will do everything in-house, and in fact, regulators may explicitly prohibit such actions. Therefore, this distribution channel is closed to entrepreneurs building their own stablecoin technology. I do not care how many proofs of concept a certain issuer claims to be conducting for traditional banks; they will never lead to bank-wide adoption. So, if you are an investor, when a stablecoin issuer claims they will partner with traditional banks to bring products to market, run away quickly.
Now that you understand the difficulties new entrants face in gaining large-scale stablecoin distribution channels, let’s explore why they would attempt this impossible task. Because becoming a stablecoin issuer is incredibly lucrative.
The profitability of stablecoin issuers depends on net interest income (NIM). The cost base for issuers is the fees paid to holders, while revenue comes from cash investment returns (such as Tether and Circle investing in government bonds) or some form of crypto market arbitrage (like Ethena). The most profitable issuer, Tether, does not pay any fees to USDT holders or depositors and earns all net interest income based on treasury yield levels.
Tether is able to retain all NIM because it has the strongest network effect, and customers have no other options for dollar bank accounts. Potential customers will not choose other dollar stablecoins because USDT is widely accepted. For a personal example, let me explain how I made payments during the ski season in Argentina. Every year, I ski in rural Argentina for a few weeks, and when I first went in 2018, it was a hassle to pay if the vendors did not accept foreign credit cards. But by 2023, USDT had been adopted. My guide, driver, and chef all accepted USDT as a payment method, which was great because even if I wanted to, I couldn't pay in pesos: the bank ATMs only allowed a maximum of $30 worth of pesos per transaction and charged a 30% fee. Damn criminals—long live Tether. For my staff, receiving digital dollars in a crypto exchange or mobile wallet is fantastic, as it can be easily used for goods and services both domestically and internationally.
Tether's profitability is the best advertisement for social media companies and banks to create their own stablecoins, as neither has to pay for deposits since they already have a solid distribution network, meaning they can capture all NIM, potentially making it a massive profit center for them.
Tether makes more money each year than this chart estimates. This chart assumes that all AUC (issued circulation) is invested in 12-month treasury bills, indicating that Tether's earnings are highly correlated with U.S. interest rates. You can see that due to the Federal Reserve raising rates at the fastest pace since the early 1980s, earnings surged significantly from 2021 to 2022.
Above is a table I published in the article "Dust on Crust Part Deux," which uses 2023 data to prove that Tether is the highest profit-per-capita bank in the world.
Unless stablecoins are owned by exclusive exchanges, social media companies, or traditional banks, distributing stablecoins can be very expensive. Bitfinex has millions of users, so Tether has had millions of customers from the start. Tether does not need to pay issuance fees because it is partially owned by Bitfinex, and all altcoins can trade against USDT.
Circle and any later stablecoins must somehow pay for distribution through exchanges. Social media companies and banks will never collaborate with third parties to build and operate stablecoins, so crypto exchanges are the only option. Crypto exchanges can build their own stablecoins, like Binance's attempt with BUSD, but ultimately many exchanges find building a payment network too difficult and distracting from their core business. Exchanges require equity from issuers or a portion of the issuer's NIM to allow trading of their stablecoins, but even so, all crypto/USD trading pairs will likely still trade against USDT, meaning Tether continues to dominate. This is why Circle had to cozy up to Coinbase, the only major exchange not on Tether's track, as its customers are primarily Americans and Western Europeans. Before U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnik took an interest in Tether and provided banking services through his company Cantor Fitzgerald, Tether had been criticized in Western media as some sort of foreign-created scam. Coinbase's existence depends on whether it can appease U.S. political institutions, so alternatives must be found. Thus, Jeremy Allaire came into the picture.
The deal is that Circle pays 50% of its net interest income to Coinbase in exchange for distribution within the Coinbase network.
The situation for new stablecoin issuers is dire, with no open distribution channels, as all major crypto exchanges either own or collaborate with existing issuers Tether, Circle, and Ethena, while social media companies and banks will build their own solutions. Therefore, new issuers must return a large portion of their NIM to depositors in an attempt to lure them away from other stablecoins with better adoption. Ultimately, this is why investors will suffer heavy losses on nearly all publicly listed stablecoin issuers or technology providers by the end of this cycle, but this will not stop the frenzy. Let’s delve into why investors' judgment is clouded by the enormous profit potential of stablecoins.
Narrative
In addition to holding Bitcoin and other junk coins, there are three business models that can create crypto wealth: mining, operating exchanges, and issuing stablecoins. For my part, my wealth comes from my stake in BitMEX (a derivatives exchange), while Maelstrom (my family office) has its largest position and absolute return source in Ethena, which is the issuer of the USDe stablecoin. In 2024, Ethena went from nothing to becoming the third-largest stablecoin in less than a year.
The uniqueness of the stablecoin narrative lies in its potential market, which is the largest and most obvious among traditional finance (TradFi) puppets. Tether has already proven that an on-chain bank that merely holds people's funds and allows them to transfer can become the highest profit-per-capita financial institution in history. Tether has succeeded in the face of enforcement actions from various levels of the U.S. government. What would happen if U.S. authorities were at least not hostile to stablecoins and allowed them a degree of operational freedom to compete with traditional banks for deposits?
Now let’s consider the current situation: U.S. Treasury officials believe that the issuance of stablecoins could grow to $2 trillion. They also believe that dollar stablecoins could become the vanguard of advancing/maintaining dollar hegemony and serve as price-insensitive buyers of U.S. Treasury bonds. Wow, that’s a strong macro advantage. Even more surprisingly, let’s not forget that Trump harbors deep resentment against large banks, as these banks stripped him and his family of their platforms after his first presidential term. He is not inclined to stop the free market from providing better, faster, and safer ways to hold and transfer digital dollars. Even his sons have joined the stablecoin ranks.
This is why investors are so eager for investable stablecoin projects. Before we explore how I can turn this narrative into capital investment opportunities, let me first define the criteria for investable projects.
Issuers can be publicly listed in some form on the U.S. stock market. Next, the issuer will launch a product for trading digital dollars; this is not some foreign thing, this is "America." That’s it, as you can see, there is plenty of room for creativity here.
The Path to Destruction
The most obvious IPO issuer is Circle, which is a U.S. company and the second-largest stablecoin issuer by issuance volume. Circle is currently severely overvalued; remember that Circle gives 50% of its interest income to Coinbase, yet Circle's market cap is 39% of Coinbase's. Coinbase is a one-stop crypto financial store with multiple profitable business lines and tens of millions of customers worldwide.
Should you short Circle? Absolutely not! Perhaps if you think the Circle/Coinbase market cap ratio is problematic, you should buy Coinbase. Although Circle is overvalued, when we look back at the stablecoin frenzy in a few years, many investors will wish they had just held Circle, at least they would still have some funds left.
The next wave of listings will be imitators of Circle, and relatively speaking, these stocks' price-to-AUC ratios will be higher than Circle's, and their revenues may never surpass Circle's. Promoters will tout meaningless TradFi credentials, trying to convince investors that they have enough connections and capabilities to disrupt the global dollar payment space by collaborating with traditional banks or leveraging their distribution channels. The ruse will work, and issuers will raise massive amounts of capital. For those of us who have been in the trenches for a while, it is comical to watch those suited clowns deceive the public into investing in their garbage companies.
After the first wave, the scale of fraud will entirely depend on the stablecoin regulations enacted by the U.S. The more freedom issuers have regarding the stablecoin's backing and whether they can pay returns to holders, the more financial tools they can use to cover up the ugliness. If you assume a lightly regulated or even completely unregulated stablecoin environment, you might see a replay of Terra/Luna, where issuers create some sort of fake algorithmic stablecoin Ponzi scheme, allowing issuers to pay high returns to holders, with those returns coming from leveraging a portion of their assets.
As you can see, I have relatively little to say about the future because new entrants' distribution channels are closed, and there is no real future.
But don’t short these new stocks; they will cause significant losses for shorts. Macro and micro are in sync, just as Chuck Prince, former CEO of Citigroup, said when asked if his company was involved in subprime mortgages: "When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will get very complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you have to get up and dance. We are still dancing."
I am not sure how Maelstrom will dance, but if it can make money, we will do it.
Any opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and should not be taken as the basis for investment decisions, nor should they be construed as recommendations or advice to engage in investment transactions.
免责声明：本文章仅代表作者个人观点，不代表本平台的立场和观点。本文章仅供信息分享，不构成对任何人的任何投资建议。用户与作者之间的任何争议，与本平台无关。如网页中刊载的文章或图片涉及侵权，请提供相关的权利证明和身份证明发送邮件到support@aicoin.com，本平台相关工作人员将会进行核查。
