Author: Lawyer Xiao Za's Team
On February 6, 2026, the central bank and eight ministries jointly issued the "Notice on Further Preventing and Handling Risks Related to Virtual Currencies" (referred to as the "2.6 Notice"). In my opinion, the 2.6 Notice is actually an advanced version of the "Notice on Further Preventing and Handling Risks of Virtual Currency Trading Speculation" issued by ten ministries in 2021 (referred to as the "9.24 Notice"):
The regulatory norms regarding virtual currencies remain largely unchanged from the 9.24 Notice, with no substantial changes except for some patches that need attention;
The regulatory norms regarding digital assets such as NFTs and digital artworks are still blank;
Clear but stringent regulatory norms for RWA (Real World Assets) have been established.
Below, the Xiao Za team will elaborate on the interpretation in detail.
I. Detailed Explanation of RWA Regulatory Norms
In summary, the current regulatory approach in China towards RWA can be described as: allowed under strict conditions.
It must be noted that the 2.6 Notice is the first time that China has clearly defined RWA in a normative document: "Tokenization of real-world assets refers to the use of cryptographic technology and distributed ledger or similar technology to convert ownership, income rights, and other rights of assets into tokens (certificates) or other rights and bond certificates with token (certificate) characteristics, and to carry out issuance and trading activities."
In terms of regulatory principles, Article (13) of the 2.6 Notice clearly states: "Without the approval of relevant departments in accordance with laws and regulations, domestic entities and their controlled overseas entities shall not issue virtual currencies overseas." This statement not only restricts RWA but also broadly restricts ICO activities. However, whether NFTs fall within the prohibited scope is worth further discussion. From a textual interpretation perspective, the Xiao Za team tends to believe that this article does not regulate the issuance of NFTs.
In specific regulatory norms, China has clarified the "RWA issuance approval system." The Xiao Za team summarizes it as follows:
When the RWA concept was at its peak in 2025, the Xiao Za team had already repeatedly and clearly warned that regardless of the method (e.g., issuing NFTs as a disguised form of RWA), scale (e.g., small-scale internal directed issuance of RWA), or underlying assets (e.g., issuing RWA with agricultural products), the behavior of issuing RWA in China is difficult to separate from the ICO behavior prohibited by the September 4, 2017 announcement, has poor compliance, and may touch legal red lines. Article (2) of the 2.6 Notice affirms this: "Activities related to the tokenization of real-world assets conducted within the territory, as well as the provision of related intermediary, information technology services, etc., suspected of illegal issuance of token certificates, unauthorized public issuance of securities, illegal operation of securities and futures business, illegal fundraising, and other illegal financial activities, shall be prohibited; except for relevant business activities conducted with the approval of the competent business department based on specific financial infrastructure."
Some partners are optimistic about the exception conditions for domestic issuance in this provision: "Except for relevant business activities conducted with the approval of the competent business department based on specific financial infrastructure." In my opinion, the Xiao Za team believes that in the short term (within a few years), Chinese regulatory authorities will not allow domestic entities to issue RWA projects. It is expected that only after conducting experiments with a considerable scale of overseas projects and accumulating certain regulatory experience will Chinese regulatory authorities be able to truly transform this clause into a feasible path.
As for the concerns of partners regarding what constitutes "overseas entities controlled by domestic entities," specific issuance conditions, and the responsibilities of intermediary institutions, the Xiao Za team will provide detailed explanations in subsequent special articles on RWA compliance issuance.
II. What Important "Patches" Did the 2.6 Notice Add to Virtual Currency Regulation?
Regarding the nature of virtual currencies, the prohibition of related businesses in mainland China, and judicial policies (invalid for violating public order and good customs, risks borne by individuals), the 2.6 Notice is no different from the 9.24 Notice, and the Xiao Za team will not elaborate further. Today, we will focus on analyzing the important new "patches" of the 2.6 Notice.
(1) No issuance of RMB stablecoins without permission
Article (1) of the 2.6 Notice, paragraph three, states: "Stablecoins pegged to fiat currencies perform part of the functions of fiat currencies in circulation. Without the approval of relevant departments in accordance with laws and regulations, no unit or individual, domestic or foreign, may issue stablecoins pegged to the RMB overseas."
The reason for this patch is directly related to the "Stablecoin Regulations" formulated and issued in 2025 in Hong Kong, which caused the concept of stablecoins to explode in popularity. Some illegal individuals began to issue air coins in mainland China and Hong Kong under the guise of stablecoins, even "RMB stablecoins," seriously disrupting financial order.
A deeper reason is that Chinese regulatory agencies must maintain the right to issue currency (also known as "economic sovereignty") and prevent virtual currencies from impacting China's economic security. The so-called right to issue currency (Seigniorage) can be intuitively explained as "an exclusive power held and exercised by a specific entity (state or government) to mint, issue, and manage fiat currency," while a more academic and abstract explanation is: "the difference between the face value of currency and the production cost." The Xiao Za team will not elaborate further on this.
In practice, the right to issue currency has had different "roles" in different historical periods: in ancient times, the right to issue currency directly reflected the profits of kings (it is commonly believed that the origin of currency is linked to the establishment of state power and the demand for taxation); in modern times, the right to issue currency is a fiscal tool of the government; and in the modern financial discourse system, the right to issue currency has gradually transformed into a more complex power struggle between different countries or economic entities.
This explains why the first sentence of Article (1) of the 2.6 Notice clearly states: "Stablecoins pegged to fiat currencies perform part of the functions of fiat currencies in circulation…" Therefore, the Xiao Za team believes that, given the extensive promotion of the digital RMB in China, the 2.6 Notice essentially eliminates any possibility for any entity to legally issue RMB stablecoins. Partners should not harbor unrealistic fantasies about the exception of "with the approval of relevant departments in accordance with laws and regulations."
(2) New reporting obligations for internet companies
Article (7) of the 2.6 Notice states: "Strengthen the management of internet information content and access. Internet companies shall not provide network operating venues, commercial displays, marketing promotions, paid traffic diversion, and other services for virtual currencies and activities related to the tokenization of real-world assets. Any discovered clues of illegal activities must be reported to the relevant departments in a timely manner and provide technical support and assistance for related investigations and inquiries."
This provision adds another "Buff" to internet platform operators and service providers who are already heavily constrained. In fact, based on the practical experience of the Xiao Za team, there are currently quite a number of cryptocurrency merchants, overseas project parties, and cryptocurrency KOLs who are promoting cryptocurrency projects and services through internet platforms and social media groups. For example, certain forums and groups are among the largest "traffic distribution centers," where many victims of virtual currency theft and fraud learned about virtual currency-related "services" and "projects" before being directed to overseas platforms and ultimately suffering financial losses.
It can be anticipated that after the issuance of the 2.6 Notice, major internet companies will urgently conduct another round of self-inspection and correction activities. It is worth noting that to implement the requirements of the 2.6 Notice, internet platforms cannot simply delete relevant content as they did in previous rectifications; instead, they should assess and organize the relevant content and provide "clues" to the relevant departments (cybersecurity, telecommunications authorities, public security departments, or financial regulatory departments) and provide technical support and assistance for subsequent investigations and inquiries (if any).
Of course, it currently seems that major internet platforms are still unable to effectively implement this obligation, as there is no specific agency in China dedicated to handling risks related to virtual currencies.
According to the requirements of the 2.6 Notice, this specialized agency should be established under the leadership of local financial regulatory departments, working in coordination with telecommunications authorities, public security, market supervision, and other departments, as well as collaborating with cybersecurity departments, people's courts, and people's procuratorates. Currently, local financial regulatory departments still need time to designate management plans and clarify internal responsibilities, and related work may be difficult to complete in the short term.
In Conclusion
In terms of content, the 2.6 Notice is not a completely independent normative document; it has a traditional aspect: re-examining the basic regulatory ideas of the 9.24 Notice, continuing to patch the original norms; but it also has a pioneering aspect: incorporating RWA, which had not entered the regulatory view in 2021 but exploded in popularity in 2025, into regulatory norms and issuing regulatory guidelines with a certain degree of operability.
This means that Chinese regulatory authorities are deepening their understanding of virtual assets and, based on understanding, experimentation, and observation, are gradually beginning to accept this new phenomenon. Although the progress of this process is extremely slow due to the continuous emergence of negative events, it can be confirmed that Chinese regulatory authorities have recognized the potential of virtual assets. For partners in the virtual asset industry, this is undoubtedly a significant positive development.
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