加密小师妹|Monica|11月 18, 2026 06:31
After reviewing these recent security incidents, I have a somewhat tentative suggestion: cryptocurrency exchanges and wallets should really take some time to look at how major internet companies handle security.
Just a couple of days ago, I finished a video explaining cryptocurrency security, specifically the question of "where do you keep your keys?", and then Lighter and Aster both suffered incidents within a single day.
It feels like this period is truly the darkest hour for the cryptocurrency world, and a bull market for hackers.
Some Lighter traders had their funds transferred due to a leaked API key. The official response was that "the problem stemmed from the user's use of unofficial signature code; the same random number for the signature was reused repeatedly, and the attacker deduced the private key from the publicly available signature data." Aster users have also reported that their BTC was forcibly sold, and approximately $4.56 million in USDT was transferred out within 44 minutes. This user claimed that a proxy key generated during a web transaction was used to sign the transfer, and the official investigation is still pending.
I'd like to take this opportunity to share something our studio encountered last year, which was quite an interesting security experience.
It was during the World Cup, and our studio was researching @Top_nod's World Cup prediction points activity. We figured it was a low-cost, even zero-cost, project to earn tokens, with an expected return of at least 10 USDT per account.
The problem was that TopNod is a mobile app. To create multiple accounts, we needed to simulate mobile devices. We couldn't just buy a bunch of phones to earn rewards, could we? It was too costly and troublesome.
So, our team's tech whiz, whom I consider a tech genius, started researching how to bypass this restriction. We tried several methods:
❶ Using an emulator to simulate a mobile environment;
❷ Using debugging tools;
❸ Using a proxy to capture network packets.
The results were mostly detected by the app. Mild cases resulted in pop-ups and network disconnections, while more severe cases even caused the app to crash.
But at the time, we thought the activity was really good and didn't want to give up so easily. So we asked many acquaintances in the industry for help, and even posted on Xianyu (a second-hand marketplace app) and some technical forums to find people.
The technicians who came to take on the job were initially quite confident; they were all seasoned veterans with years of domestic development experience and who also took on technical outsourcing. However, after a lot of effort, no one could solve it in the end. Fortunately, everyone was trustworthy, and those who couldn't complete the task refunded their money, so there was no actual loss.
Later, our team disassembled and studied the code ourselves, and determined that this protection likely used a mobile security solution from the Ant Financial ecosystem.
This isn't surprising, since TopNod itself is said to be a wallet produced by Ant Financial, an Alibaba affiliate, backed by security technology accumulation from the traditional internet and payment industries.
Although this project ultimately failed, it certainly left a deep impression on our team.
We even specifically researched Alibaba's security technology at the time, and in the process, we heard a rather interesting anecdote:
It's said that in the Chinese tech community, if you try to crack Alibaba's website, you might only get to the second step before a pop-up appears asking you to leave your contact information, inviting you to join Alibaba.
Of course, whether this story is true or not is unknown, but it demonstrates the significant position Alibaba's technology holds within the domestic developer community.
This security capability wasn't developed overnight; it's the result of long-term experience combating various malicious actors.
For example, client-side debugging and injection prevention, as well as the identification of abnormal operating environments. Once an abnormal device environment is detected, operation can be directly restricted.
These are considered basic skills in the traditional internet and payment industries. Bringing this experience to Web3 wallets was indeed somewhat frustrating for those of us who were initially trying to figure out how to mass-login accounts.
However, from another perspective, if you're an ordinary user, knowing that your wallet app has such protection provides some peace of mind.
Of course, client-side security isn't a panacea. It primarily addresses the device and key usage environment. Whether the underlying financial products and on-chain protocols integrated into the wallet pose inherent risks still needs to be assessed separately.
Looking back at the recent Lighter and Aster incidents, it serves as a reminder:
Blockchain can ensure the transparency of the on-chain ledger and make transaction records difficult to tamper with, but it cannot control how your keys are generated, where they are stored, or who accesses them.
These off-chain aspects are precisely where many security issues arise.
Therefore, I've always believed that Web3 security cannot rely solely on on-chain technology. The experience accumulated by the traditional internet and payment industries over many years in device security, access control, and anomaly detection is worth leveraging.
Ultimately, security isn't simply about putting assets on-chain, nor is it about how many layers of protection an app has to guarantee absolute security.
A truly reliable security system should ensure that even if one layer fails, attackers cannot easily gain control of assets beyond the scope of user authorization.
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