Yishi
Yishi|11月 17, 2026 07:06
onekey is not affected by the optimizely supply chain compromise. our client code, web app, and website do not use optimizely. if you visited any of the 178 affected organizations (188 snippets, including ledger, gitlab, zoom, salesforce, bbc, and hsbc...) over the last 24 hours, here is the technical breakdown and what you need to check. attackers compromised optimizely web experimentation and injected a loader into Project JavaScript, served via optimizely's main cdn (/js/<projectid>.js). it pulled second-stage payloads from external c2 servers (track.js) and iterated through 26 versions over 13 hours. standard csp setups with strict-dynamic or whitelisted cdn domains failed to block it because the trusted first-party snippet executed the fetch itself. once in the browser context, the payload does four things: 1)runtime and network hooking: overrides http://Function.prototype.call, Function.prototype.apply, window.fetch, XMLHttpRequest, and navigator.clipboard. instead of a basic clipboard regex swap, it intercepts network responses and mutates the dom in memory. it replaces btc, evm, sol, tron, ton, ltc, bch, and doge addresses with checksum-valid attacker addresses before they even render on your screen. 2)form skimming: hooks form submissions and POST bodies, running luhn validation to exfiltrate card pan, expiry, and cvv from native checkouts. cross-origin payment iframes like stripe and adyen remain isolated via sop. 3)session capture: dumps document.cookie (exposing any session tokens missing the HttpOnly flag) alongside html/canvas dom snapshots. 4)ios exploit delivery: injects hidden iframes serving browser exploit chains targeting webcontent sandbox escape and kernel r/w. it routes ios 13 to 17 to coruna and ios 18.0 to 18.6 to darksword (ios 26.x currently only triggers the /C10/ fingerprinting module). a telltale sign on ios 18.6 and below is the tab reloading every 60 seconds as the exploit retries. remediation steps if you browsed any affected sites: 1)treat your host screen as untrusted. when js primitives and network calls are hooked in the browser runtime, the address rendered on your monitor is already spoofed. verify the full recipient address on your hardware wallet's independent screen before signing. 2)clear your browser disk cache immediately. optimizely cdn assets are cached locally, meaning the poisoned <projectid>.js file can still execute on repeat visits even after upstream cleanup. 3)explicitly log out and log back into affected platforms to rotate server-side session tokens, in case your cookies lacked HttpOnly and got exfiltrated. 4)update iphones to ios 18.7.3 or 26.3+ to patch the underlying webkit and kernel vulnerabilities.
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