This time, I'm really not on CZ's side! In an interview, CZ stated, "If even trading platforms aren't secure, traditional banks will only be worse off." This statement, while seemingly correct, is actually using a "race to the bottom" approach to mask the fatal weaknesses of the cryptocurrency industry and the management problems within Binance's core technical staff. Look at real bank hack cases, and you'll see how ridiculous this logic is: Case 1: The Central Bank of Bangladesh in 2016. Hackers attempted to transfer nearly $1 billion through the SWIFT system. The result? $20 million was returned due to a misspelled recipient's name; $81 million was transferred to the Philippines and quickly laundered in casinos. After all that trouble, the actual loss was far less than expected. Case 2: Fortuneo Bank in France in November 2026. Hackers breached internal risk controls, transferring $133 million in fiat currency into exchange accounts opened with fake identities, immediately converting it into stablecoins, and then into ETH to launder the money. The amount is less than a fraction of Binance's 6.3 billion, and some of the funds have already been frozen with the cooperation of the exchange. In contrast, the Chinese banking system has extremely tight defenses. It's virtually impossible for hackers to break into the system and transfer huge sums of money. Even if they did manage to break in, how would they convert the money into cash? The People's Bank of China's clearing network, real-name registration system, and anti-money laundering risk controls create layers of barriers. It's easy for hackers to transfer money out, but within the fiat currency system, money can be stolen, but not taken out. Trying to convert it to cash immediately leaves a trace and results in freezing. But what about the cryptocurrency world? Once hackers breach Binance's system, they can convert it into BTC and ETH within minutes. There are no borders, no clearing, and no central bank bailout. On-chain money laundering is extremely costly, which is the fundamental reason why 6.3 billion could be stolen so quickly. And the most terrifying thing is that CZ didn't even mention it. In the Chinese banking system, it is extremely difficult for external hackers to breach the defenses and transfer huge sums of money. What truly causes massive bad debts and financial holes in banks is often not external hackers, but rather internal misconduct and collusion. This is why there's an old saying in the financial industry: it's easy to guard against external thieves, but difficult to guard against thieves within the family. The Binance theft of 6.3 billion was clearly revealed in the official report: core engineers were phished by headhunters, downloaded infected test questions, and internal AI tools were used as stepping stones. External hackers were merely the ignition point; the collapse of internal defenses was the real explosive. Comparing a bank's "transfer vulnerability" to the cryptocurrency world's "ease of monetization" isn't security; it's a competition of who's worse. Stop comparing banks; China's banking system isn't as fragile as CZ claims! CZ should seriously examine and restructure Binance's internal management of technical personnel and its security isolation mechanisms.