There's a technical detail in Binance's hack report that I don't know if you've noticed— Through EIP-7702, the attacker packaged 50 signature authorizations into a single transaction. Therefore, even after Binance suspended withdrawals, funds continued to flow out, with a single wallet losing approximately 167,464 ETH + $1.6 billion USDT. Before EIP-7702, exchange hot wallets were ordinary wallets (EOAs): whoever held the private key held control. The exchange's ability to freeze funds relied on the premise—money wouldn't move unless I signed. However, EIP-7702 allows EOAs to execute smart contract code. So the path is: EOA Hot Wallet └── Sign a 7702 delegation └── Account behavior is now determined by the delegated contract code └── This code can automatically transfer assets └── Even if the exchange stops signing, it cannot stop it Now, the industry-wide problem arises: Binance took nearly 4 hours to discover and remove this malicious delegation. Do other exchanges' custody designs have the same problem?