Revisiting the Binance $6.3 Billion Hack: Is the Core Issue System Security or Technical Staff Security Management? I carefully reviewed Binance's latest security incident analysis report, and I believe the core issue for Binance is the security management of its technical staff; system security is merely a scapegoat. Binance's official report clearly states that the hackers didn't use any alien technology; their method of breaching the defenses was extremely primitive: First, they tricked people, then used those people's privileges to trick the system. In June, Engineer A downloaded a tampered installation package; In September, Engineer B was tricked by a fake HR video interview and ran a malicious "test" on his work computer; In October, the hackers used B's computer, through an internal AI tool, to gain access to two other wallet engineers; Finally, they used the stolen privileges to operate the system. Did you notice? Throughout the entire chain, the hackers never directly challenged Binance's code defenses. No matter how sophisticated the system's encryption, multi-signature, and firewalls were, the hackers didn't even touch them. They bypassed the system entirely, opening a door through the "person." This is like a bank with a titanium vault and the highest-level password, only for the security guard to be tricked into opening the vault door himself. This exposes three extremely critical vulnerabilities in Binance's internal management: First, the devices of high-privilege personnel are completely unprotected. A core wallet engineer was able to freely download a compressed file of "test questions" sent from outside on a computer with access to sensitive data. For positions at this level, work devices should be disconnected from the internet, whitelisted, and physically isolated. They were using them like ordinary office computers. Second, lateral movement was effortless. After gaining control of Engineer B's computer, the hacker was able to use internal AI tools to directly gain access to two other core wallet engineers. This demonstrates that the internal "zero-trust" architecture is completely ineffective. Third, the antivirus and monitoring systems are practically useless. The malicious code bypassed endpoint protection and even erased traces after implantation; Binance's security system was completely blind to it. The alarm only went off when the huge sums of money in the hot wallet started flowing out. So, is system security important? Yes, it is. But Binance this time, it suffered a devastating blow at the most basic level of human security. Even the most robust code cannot prevent human negligence and gullibility. This is why hackers always prefer to target "people," because technology can be patched. But people are always the easiest vulnerability to exploit. Deep concern breeds deep criticism. As a loyal Binance user, after reading the official report of the $6.3 billion theft, I felt extremely disheartened and pained. Binance really needs a thorough overhaul and rebuilding of its technical team's security isolation mechanisms and internal system security architecture! @heyibinance @cz_binance @sisibinance