The official report on the Binance $6.3 billion theft is incredibly revealing and shocking! It turns out the attack started with North Korean hackers penetrating Binance's internal technical staff! This report exposes the entire attack process in its entirety. This wasn't just an ordinary hacking intrusion; it was an extremely sophisticated, four-month-long "espionage thriller"! It also exposed several major problems within Binance's internal technical staff! Let me break down the most crucial and fatal details for you: The North Korean hackers' core attack chain (a four-month-long series of attacks): 1. June: Phishing Begins A Binance engineer (A) searched for AI programming tools online and downloaded a tampered Homebrew installation package (supply chain attack). Although Binance immediately replaced the device, the hackers had already identified A and his colleagues (the wallet infrastructure team). 2. September: Deep Social Engineering (The Most Terrifying Step) Another software engineer (B) was targeted by scammers on a job recruitment platform. The scammer impersonated a project director, conducted a genuine video interview, and even shared a social media account with a personal photo to build trust. Finally, under the pretext of "taking a test," they tricked engineer B into downloading a compressed file containing malicious code. This zero-day malware went undetected by even the endpoint's antivirus software. 3. October: AI Tool Turns Against Us The hacker used B's computer to compromise Binance's internal AI tool and, through this tool, gained control of the permissions of two other wallet engineers (A and C). 4. October 29th: Lightning-Fast Harvest Using stolen permissions, hackers transferred the following from Binance's hot wallet within 4 minutes (20:05-20:09): 233 million XRP 970,000 SOL and 44.2 million OP 18,270 BTC (worth over $1 billion) 5. The Most Critical Vulnerability: EIP-7702 Hackers used stolen signing permissions to exploit Ethereum's EIP-7702 mechanism, granting Binance's hot wallet "partial execution rights." Because Binance uses MPC (Multi-Signature Wallet), there is no single private key that can be instantly revoked, allowing the hacker to continue transferring funds on-chain independently of Binance's withdrawal system. The hack was finally stopped at 23:56 when the final transaction of 2,961.9 ETH was completed. This major Binance hack exposed three stark truths: Truth 1: The biggest security vulnerability is always "human." Even the most sophisticated underlying code and the most advanced MPC multisignature wallet couldn't prevent an engineer from being tricked into running a fake "test" on their computer during a video interview. Hackers didn't break in through code vulnerabilities; they broke in through people's minds. Truth 2: Internal AI tools became a "Trojan horse" for hackers. This is the most surreal detail of the Binance case. After gaining control of the engineer's computer, the hackers used Binance's internal AI tools to bypass the permissions of two other core engineers. While we embrace AI to improve efficiency, hackers are also using AI as a springboard. Truth 3: Decentralized code cannot prevent "centralized" malicious acts. EIP-7702, originally intended for convenient account abstraction, became a "get-out-of-jail-free card" for hackers to bypass exchange risk controls and withdraw funds. Once on-chain authorization takes effect, the exchange's suspension of withdrawals is unstoppable; a new on-chain transaction must be issued to reverse it. This time lag represents a black hole that allows billions of dollars to slip through. Finally, let's briefly discuss Binance's problems: 1) Don't be too cunning in blaming hackers. As the world's largest exchange managing tens of billions of dollars in assets, Binance's internal security defenses are practically nonexistent: 2) Allowing high-privileged engineers to use their personal work computers for headhunter interviews and casually running compressed files of unknown origin? 3) Internal cross-departmental AI tools with privileges large enough to directly control core wallet colleagues? Didn't they even achieve the most basic physical isolation and zero-trust network? A bank managing tens of billions of dollars, with the key to its vault simply in the lobby manager's unlocked drawer. Incredible! This isn't just a technical system collapse; it's a complete breach of internal security management! Binance needs to seriously reflect on this, establish new rules, and clean house!