This Binance security incident has exposed an increasingly difficult-to-avoid problem in the crypto finance sector: the ability to freely flow assets far outpaces the ability to provide post-incident relief. Let's first review the incident. In the early hours of October 30th (Beijing time), multiple Binance wallets experienced large abnormal outflows. Binance disclosed that the affected amount was approximately $6.3 billion, with about $3 billion frozen. Deposits and withdrawals were temporarily suspended, and the platform stated it would bear all losses. The affected amount does not equal the final net loss, and freezing does not equate to recovery. In terms of market performance, there has been some recovery from the initial sharp drop. Public opinion mainly focuses on two aspects: some believe that Binance's ability to compensate is relatively restrained compared to the scale of the incident; others report that institutions are re-evaluating the risks of exchange custody and withdrawing funds from other platforms. Whether a platform can bear the losses and whether users will continue to trust their assets are two separate issues. More noteworthy is the significant speed difference between the flow of funds and post-incident relief. Bitquery's on-chain tracking shows that approximately $729 million in stolen USDT had already been converted into assets such as ETH and TRX through on-chain exchange services before Tether's freeze took effect. Simultaneously, Bitquery tracked approximately $2.7 billion in assets that were frozen by issuers or rescued through on-chain governance mechanisms. This data reveals a reality: USDT and USDC issuers can freeze assets at specific addresses, but before the freeze takes effect, funds can still be converted into native assets lacking similar freezing mechanisms through permissionless exchange services. On-chain transparency can aid in tracking, but it doesn't guarantee timely prevention of losses. Asset transfers can be completed in minutes, while freezing, recovery, and compensation often require more time and collaboration. In the past two years, we've observed a gradually emerging change: in areas like stablecoins, payments, and asset tokenization, projects are increasingly emphasizing efficiency, compliance, liquidity, and practical use; decentralization is no longer always the primary selling point. This change isn't necessarily driven solely by security incidents; commercial viability and regulatory requirements are equally important. However, frequent losses are making the costs behind "permissionless" and "irreversible transactions" increasingly tangible. The power to freeze funds can certainly be abused and requires boundaries and oversight. However, when centralized institutions are preventing losses while decentralized services are still processing the funds, "technological neutrality" struggles to answer all the victims' questions. More and more people, including myself, are beginning to re-examine the statement that "decentralization inherently represents better finance." It offers genuine freedom, but also creates real gaps in redress. In the past, we were eager to promote the former; now we must seriously confront the latter.