I'm surprisingly calm after the liquidation. As long as I realize it's just my own incompetence, that's enough. I woke up the dog at 4 AM to take it for a walk. I'll get a good night's sleep and then have a proper meal. It seems like long-tail asset arbitrage has absolutely no risk-reward ratio. I seriously considered my previous risk management ideas: 1. Short positions are only opened on Binance, less likely to encounter unexpected problems. 2. An automatic liquidation system is used, starting to automatically reduce positions when the liquidation price is 4x. 3. The initial margin for opening positions is around 10x, so a tenfold increase could liquidate the short position. After this IRYS incident, I realized it's all meaningless. 1. Binance can also see contract prices 50%+ higher than spot prices, basically meaning huge losses. 2. 4x liquidation and 10x... Margins can only reduce the probability of extreme situations; if they do occur, the losses are still significant. The arbitrage system has been shut down, and all funds have been withdrawn. The risk-reward ratio is even worse than subjective trading. Actually, I think I trusted Binance too much. I've never seen a project directly generate positive basis for arbitrage on Binance contracts. When I entered this market, there was already a 5% positive premium, and I initially thought it was the corpse left by short liquidations. I didn't expect Binance contracts to have so little risk control, allowing malicious short liquidations with a 50% positive premium. They didn't even have a hard cap; even TradFi contracts know to give a price deviation hard cap. Currently, it seems Binance's approach is inferior to Bitget's. Previously, Bitget's TUT contract index deviated too much, and Bitget directly controlled the market manipulators and compensated them. Won't they consider a correction mechanism? If this is how it works, who would dare to suppress the positive rate of contracts? @binancezh @heyibinance @sisibinance @cz_binance @Bitget_zh @xiejiayinBitget