🚨 Recovering Private Keys from 6 Consecutive Observations: Qubic Wallet Vulnerability Analysis During our analysis of @_Qubic_ Wallet, we found that the wallet uses the same non-cryptographically secure Math.random() stream for account seed generation and dejaVu values exposed in network packet headers, potentially enabling private key recovery through network observations. 🔍 Root Cause A shared, non-cryptographically secure random stream → Account seed generation + Network-visible header values ⚠️ Hypothesized Attack Flow 1️⃣ Collect dejaVu values from bridge/peer traffic or the plaintext bridge-to-peer link. 2️⃣ Recover the 128-bit PRNG state using 6 consecutive observations. 3️⃣ Reconstruct the 55-character seed and verify it against the public key exposed in balance requests. 4️⃣ Recover the private key and forge a SchnorrQ signature to transfer assets. Our PoC validated the technical feasibility of this recovery chain. Actual exploitability depends on network trust boundaries, observation continuity, call alignment, and other consumers of Math.random(). 🛡️ Security Recommendations Use cryptographically secure randomness for key generation, conduct comprehensive external security audits before deployment, and review trust boundaries around random number sources and protocol header fields. Read the full analysis ⬇️ https://slowmist.medium.com/recovering-private-keys-in-just-6-connections-qubic-wallet-may-have-leaked-most-of-its-private-d87b520dccf6