This is a copycat of OlympusDAO/OHM on Robinhood Chain by @NetNetCap: After evaluating it, I’ve decided not to participate. Entering at this stage seems way riskier than rewarding for me. @NetNetCap’s core mechanism is highly similar to OHM, with just a few optimizations. To be precise, it’s not really optimization—it’s more of a trade-off. Trade-off #1: They’ve abandoned the policy committee, which in OHM can decide key protocol parameters like rebase rate and Bond Control Variable. Instead, all parameters are written into the code as immutable formulas. While this eliminates centralized human intervention, it also sacrifices the ability to patch potential vulnerabilities. Trade-off #2: They’ve introduced a theoretical hard floor support. If minting new NET (equivalent to OlympusDAO’s OHM) would cause totalSupply × 1 USDG > RFV, the transaction will directly revert, ensuring there’s enough protocol reserve to theoretically guarantee NET’s rigid redemption against USDG. However, this rigid redemption suppresses the premium potential—currently, NET’s premium is less than 20x, whereas OHM back in the day could easily hit premiums of over 100x. Plus, the team’s most critical monetization path—pTEAM—has planted a major landmine. pTEAM is essentially the team’s options, allowing them to mint NET at a price of 1 USDG/NET through exercising their rights. The minting cap is 15% of the circulating supply at the time. If the circulating supply increases, the team can exercise their rights again to restore their holdings to 15%, effectively granting the team unlimited “anti-dilution rights.” If the protocol’s core parameters don’t encounter issues and the team has the vision to wait for the market cap to break $100M/$1B before exercising their rights for profit, then entering at this stage would be way too early. But there’s no “if.” Betting on everything might just end up hurting you.