I saw some people questioning the completeness of the @ base fraud proof mechanism, which is the lifeblood of Base as ETH L2. This tweet will discuss this issue. The conclusion is written at the beginning: The fraud proof mechanism of Base is comprehensive, and after Azul upgrade, it is more robust than traditional fraud proof mechanisms, which is also one of its most essential differences from Robinhood Chain. Under the traditional fraud proof mechanism, there is usually a one week challenge window during which challengers can challenge the state roots submitted by the official sorting machine of the L2 chain by submitting a fraud proof, in order to prevent the sorting machine from submitting invalid state roots to steal funds from the L2 chain. 1/Let's first take a look at @ RobinhoodApp Chair: The fraud proof mechanism has indeed been deployed on the main network, which is not to be underestimated, but its completeness is far inferior to Base. The reason is that the challenger perspective on RH Chain requires permission, and currently only two officially authorized whitelist challengers are eligible to initiate challenges. There is a significant risk of centralization, that is, the risk of official operation of sequencers and challengers collaborating to commit evil. It can be said that such a fraud proof mechanism is just a facade, virtually non-existent. 2/Let's take a look at the base again: The fundamental difference between the fraud proof mechanism of Base and RH Chain is that: Challengers are permissionless, and anyone can become a challenger. After the Azul upgrade in May, Base no longer uses traditional fraudulent proofs, but upgrades to a more efficient and secure AggregateVerifier hybrid multi proof system (TEE+SP1 ZK proof). The challenge period can be shortened to as fast as 1 day without sacrificing security. The above.