The previous article completed the complete path of "Founder demonstrates wallet buying $1", but this one only discusses one question: Is it possible that this wallet has been stolen? First, let's talk about my assessment after researching the Agent: It is possible, but currently it is not a high probability. The probability of the agent being able to recover and take over the wallet by a third party after the mnemonic word is leaked is approximately 30%. Why isn't it 0? Because at the Robinhood launch event in 2025, Vlad did indeed import this wallet in front of the live broadcast camera. About 8 consecutive mnemonic words can be identified in the picture. If this is a common 12 word mnemonic, then there are still 4 words missing. With just these 8 words, ordinary people cannot directly import into their wallets, but the security strength has been significantly weakened. In theory, there are still trillion level effective combinations for missing four words, which cannot be easily cracked by running a script; But for a wallet whose address is already public, the target is clear, and there may be high narrative value, it is not completely impossible for a professional team to invest computing power in targeted cracking. A more dangerous situation is: Remaining mnemonic words have also appeared in other frames of the complete video, live footage, or internal materials. If different images can spell out the complete 12 words, it is not 'possibly stolen', but rather that this wallet has actually lost its security since the day of the press conference. The behavior on the chain is also somewhat suspicious. This wallet has been dormant for nearly 10 months. After being reactivated, it did not immediately proceed with formal operations, but instead transferred a very small amount to itself. This kind of 'self transfer' transaction has no economic significance and is more like testing: Can the private key be signed properly, and is the wallet control really available. About 40 minutes later, there was a new address that had only been used once, and approximately 0.0808 ETH was transferred to it. Subsequently, the wallet began to perform cross chain operations. The entire sequence is: Silent for nearly 10 months → Small scale rotation test → New address to supplement funds → Start cross chain → Transfer the funds to the new wallet again If viewed from the perspective of 'wallet theft', this process is very similar to: Someone restored the wallet through mnemonic words, first tested control, then replenished operational funds from their new address, and finally used this public demonstration wallet to create on chain signals. This is also the reason why I am willing to assume a 30% probability of theft. But why don't I think it's a high probability? Because true account theft usually leaves very obvious traces of clearance. If someone obtains the complete mnemonic, they not only control the address on Arbitrarum, but also the same address on Robinhood Chain. But as of now, the old wallet still holds: Approximately 0.167 ETH; About 3 WETH on Robinhood Chain; And enough ETH and other assets to pay for transaction fees. The operator has proven that they can use Robinhood Chain, but did not transfer these 3 WETH. The old wallet has not been emptied, there has been no batch authorization, and assets have not been collected to unfamiliar addresses. The new wallet purchased about 6409 $1 coins, which have not been sold yet. So the current behavior is not like ordinary hackers: Get the private key Scan all assets Cross chain aggregation → Quickly monetize This is also the core reason why the probability of theft has not yet exceeded 50%. Of course, there is a more complex possibility: The attacker doesn't care about the few ETH in the wallet at all. What he really wants to use is the identity tag of this wallet. A wallet used by Vlad at the official launch event, which only requires a symbolic purchase of 0.01 ETH, may be understood by the market as: Robinhood founder personally stepped down. Attackers can easily ambush $1 with other wallets in advance, then use the public demo wallet to complete a small purchase, creating a narrative of the founder entering the market, and finally ship from other addresses. If this is the gameplay, not clearing the old wallet or selling the $1 in the new wallet can actually make the signal look more realistic. So now we cannot simply use the phrase 'assets have not been swept away' to completely exclude third-party takeover. The most reasonable conclusion at present is: Ordinary coin stealing attacks have a low probability; The operation by the original controller or Robinhood related personnel is still a relatively more likely explanation; But third parties gain control by leaking mnemonic words and then use their wallet identity to create market signals, which deserves to be guarded by about 30%. What really needs to be monitored next is: Have the 3 WETH coins in the old wallet been transferred; Has the new wallet started selling for $1; Can adding a startup address of 0.0808 ETH to the old wallet form a funding loop with the early chip wallet of $1; And whether anyone can spell out the remaining mnemonic words from the complete press conference video. Before these pieces of evidence appeared, the most rigorous statement was not 'Vlad bought it', nor 'the wallet must have been stolen'. But rather: We confirm that this wallet has regained active control. But it cannot be confirmed at the moment that it is still controlled by the original person. In short, this is a suspense drama, and from a behavioral perspective, there is a greater possibility of insider manipulation.