qinbafrank|7月 01, 2026 14:25
Everyone is discussing the impact of OUSD on the compliant stablecoin landscape, but no one can clarify what kind of company OpenStandard is? This is precisely the most crucial factor, whether a project can be implemented by a company or not, it is necessary to focus on the fundamentals of the company. Let's talk about a few questions:
1. What kind of company is OpenStandard?
The publisher behind OUSD, OpenStandard, has not disclosed its equity structure and management team. The only public announcement now is that Zach Abrams, CEO of the cross chain bridge Brigdge acquired by Stripe, currently serves as the founding CEO of OpenStandard.
So I have reason to believe that OUSD is an "industry shared infrastructure" project led by Stripe (through Zach Abrams) and jointly created by a large number of traditional financial and technology giants.
It has both Stripe's clear strategic intentions (expanding Bridge's capabilities, seizing the stablecoin payment network) and extensive alliance endorsements (140+companies), belonging to the "Stripe leading+everyone playing together" model.
After acquiring Bridge, Stripe extended Bridge's stablecoin infrastructure capabilities to a larger industry alliance through Zach Abrams, essentially using a "neutral shell" to expand Stripe's influence to over 140 institutions such as Visa, Mastercard, BlackRock, Coinbase, and more.
Then Stripe has been vigorously promoting stablecoin payment infrastructure.
It can be considered as a game accumulated by Stripe (especially from the perspective of strategic intent and core operators). Of course, to be more precise, it is an industry alliance project led by Stripe.
2. Since it is an industry alliance led by Stripe, do all these participants genuinely want to play with it?
Among the more than 140 industry partners of Open USD, the level of sincerity may vary greatly,
1) The most likely institution to genuinely build together (high motivation)
These institutions can directly benefit from OUSD's reserve profit sharing mechanism, with the strongest motivation:
When small and medium-sized banks, payment processors, and e-commerce/merchant platforms (such as Shopify, DoorDash, Ramp, Brex, OnePay, etc.) used to use USDC/USDT, the reserve interest was mostly earned by the issuer. After adopting OUSD, the larger the amount of self distribution, the more reserve income can be obtained. This creates a direct economic incentive.
2) Institutions involved in strategic/wait-and-see participation (with complex motivations)
These are big players who participate more in hedging, influence, and option rights:
Visa and Mastercard are the two most critical here, as they have publicly supported and regarded OUSD as an 'open infrastructure'. But most likely, it's a combination of both - sitting on the board to influence rules, gain data insights, prevent being completely dominated by Stripe, while keeping one's existing business unaffected.
BlackRock and other asset management giants
They are more concerned about reserve asset management and compliance. OUSD's multi-party governance and regulatory friendly positioning is attractive to them, but they will not bet all their resources on it.
Traditional large banks (BNY, Standard Chartered, BBVA, etc.) participate mainly for the purpose of "having seats" and future options. At present, stablecoins are still an auxiliary business for them.
3) I have had a detailed discussion with institutions like Coinbase in this afternoon's tweet, and it is evident that USDC provides greater benefits to Coinbase.
3. This creates potential obstacles to 'sincere co construction'
1) Direct competition, Visa/Mastercard and Stripe are competitors in the payment field. They are unlikely to give all their core traffic and influence to projects led by Stripe.
2) Major alliances like Libra/Diem ultimately failed due to significant conflicts of interest among the participating parties.
3) Managing game risks, within the 140+partner board, decision-making may be slow, compromise frequently, and even influenced by a few major players (including Stripe). The core is the governance game brought about by conflicts of interest.
Of course, as Stripe dominates, there will still be many small and medium-sized banks, payment processors, and e-commerce platforms genuinely involved, so we can expect OUSD to achieve a certain scale. But how big can it really be? It also depends on the rhythm and effectiveness of the implementation.
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