Let's briefly review the issues of Iran, the Strait of Hormuz, and oil prices. Over the weekend, due to the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps announcing the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, crude oil that had not officially opened surged to nearly $80 on cryptocurrency exchanges. During this period, news continued to spread that Iran did not go to Switzerland, refused to take photos with the US, and refused to shake hands. The information flow throughout the weekend was clearly biased towards the breakdown of negotiations and the escalation of conflicts. However, based on subsequent information, the Iranian delegation actually went to Switzerland, but no public joint photo was arranged, and no public interaction between the Iranian Foreign Minister and Vance was seen. The so-called 'refusal to shake hands' is closer to interpreting diplomatic scenes rather than a confirmed formal event. After today's opening, the discussion information quickly shifted towards the direction of significant progress in the first round of negotiations. However, the so-called 'obvious progress' here is currently mostly procedural progress. Both sides are at least willing to continue negotiations and have initially established a roadmap for follow-up negotiations and a communication mechanism around the navigation of the Strait of Hormuz. However, the nuclear issue, lifting of sanctions, asset unfreezing, ceasefire in Lebanon, and Israel's operational boundaries, which are the real decisive issues, have clearly not been resolved yet. Therefore, a more accurate statement now is not that peace has already emerged, but that both sides have temporarily established a framework for continued bargaining. From a political perspective alone, the Revolutionary Guard's announcement of the blockade of the strait once again is indeed very similar to the call before the negotiations began. Because from the clear navigation situation in the strait, there has not been a complete blockade in the traditional sense, nor has there been a scene where all merchant ships have stopped sailing. But this does not mean that the strait remains completely unchanged. More precisely, the Strait of Hormuz is entering a state of ambiguous blockade or selective passage. Some ships pass through normally, some ships wait, and some ships turn off their answering machines before proceeding with covert navigation. On the surface, the strait may not be sealed off, but in reality, the insurance policies of shipping companies, the willingness of crew members, the risk preferences of ship owners, and the delivery arrangements of cargo owners have all been affected. This is also why simply counting 'how many ships pass through' cannot fully reflect the true state of the strait. What really matters is not whether there are ships passing through, but who can pass through, how to pass through, how much cost needs to be borne, and whether Iran can change the rules at any time. There have indeed been more news in the market about shadow fleets passing through the strait with AIS responders turned off, and there are also claims that some Gulf countries have privately paid protection fees to Iran in exchange for vessel passage. But such news is currently neither verifiable nor easily falsified. However, even though the claim of secret protection fees cannot be confirmed, Iran's attempt to institutionalize the right of passage through the Strait of Hormuz is becoming increasingly clear. What Iran really wants to do may not be to permanently seal off the strait, but to establish a system of passage that allows it to decide who can pass, when to pass, and whether to charge fees in the future. If completely blocked, Iran would simultaneously offend Gulf countries, China, India, and other Asian energy importing countries, and may also directly provoke larger scale military intervention from the United States. But if fully open, Iran's most important bargaining chip will disappear. So for Iran, the optimal strategy is not to completely shut down or open up, but to maintain a controlled leak style blockade. Allow enough ships to pass through to avoid the situation getting completely out of control; At the same time, it also maintains sufficient uncertainty in navigation, allowing the global energy market to continue paying risk premiums. The role played by the Revolutionary Guard here is to create a credible but dangerous alternative plan for the Iranian representatives at the negotiating table. From this perspective, the blockade statement of the Revolutionary Guard and the participation of the Iranian diplomatic delegation in negotiations are not contradictory, but rather a complete negotiation strategy. Responsible for raising prices while discussing discounts. In terms of oil prices, the short-term logic of short positions in crude oil has indeed been consumed to a considerable extent, but it cannot be simply said that there is only one remaining: complete peace. Thorough peace is certainly the strongest empty logic, but in reality, empty talk does not need to wait until permanent peace is achieved in the Middle East. As long as there is partial reflow, continued release of strategic inventory, and demand disruption caused by high oil prices, oil prices may also be under pressure. The problem is that all of these factors require time and data validation. Strait navigation needs to be continuously restored, rather than occasionally passing through a few ships; The release of strategic inventory should be able to cover the actual supply gap; Demand disruption must also be reflected in refinery operation, refined oil consumption, and import data. In contrast, multi head logic only requires one news blockade, one negotiation breakdown, or one ship accident to quickly reprice. So the current oil price structure is not a complete disappearance of bearish logic, but rather a clear asymmetry in short-term risks. Short positions require a series of facts, while long positions only require an unexpected event. The current price around $75 cannot be simply understood as the market having fully priced peace. It is more like a price formed by fragile negotiations, partial navigation, sustained demand disruption, and higher geopolitical risks. In other words, the current oil price is not a peace price or a full-scale war price, but an intermediate state where the market believes that both sides are temporarily unwilling to completely overturn the table, but may overturn it at any time. In addition to the risk of the Taiwan Strait, another core of the bullish logic is the demand for countries to replenish their reserves, which is indeed similar to the previous central bank purchases of gold. Whether it's gold or crude oil, countries will reassess the importance of safety stock after experiencing supply chain shocks. In the past, countries were more concerned about the cost of holding inventory, but now they are more concerned about the cost of not having inventory. When security shifts from a cost item to a strategic asset, purchasing behavior becomes more price insensitive. But the replenishment of crude oil reserves and the central bank's purchase of gold can only be said to be similar, and cannot be completely analogized. Gold is not consumed on a daily basis and has almost no storage period, allowing for long-term accumulation. Crude oil requires storage tanks, funding, transportation, and regular rotation, and once the inventory reaches the target, purchasing behavior will cease. So the central bank's purchase of gold may be a structural demand that lasts for many years, while the replenishment of crude oil inventories is closer to the readjustment of one or several inventory targets. This means that replenishing crude oil reserves may have a strong driving force on oil prices, but it may not be as long-lasting as gold. At the same time, attention should be paid to the chronological order of replenishing inventory. The current release of strategic inventory is a short-term bearish trend for oil prices; The consumption of inventory to a lower level is a positive factor for the risk premium; Re stocking in the future will be beneficial for mid-term demand. But countries usually do not massively replenish during times of high oil prices and chaotic navigation, and are more likely to wait until the situation stabilizes and prices fall before buying again. So the support of replenishment demand for forward prices may not immediately be reflected in short-term contracts, but it will limit the downward space of oil prices after the conflict ends. Several options for Trump are becoming clear. Since the media broke that Trump said Fuck to Netanyahu on the phone, it has shown that there is an obvious logic of cutting between the United States and Israel. From the more public statements made by Vance in recent days, it appears that the United States is indeed attempting to limit Israel's ability to continue escalating the conflict. But a more accurate judgment here may not be that the United States is preparing to abandon Israel unprecedentedly, but rather that the United States is preparing to abandon Netanyahu's autonomy in action. The national alliance between the United States and Israel will not end immediately because of a war. The domestic political structure of the United States also determines that Trump is difficult to really abandon Israel. But Trump is likely to reduce his personal support for Netanyahu, restrict Israel's access to intelligence, arms and diplomatic protection, and even acquiesce in the emergence of a more obedient substitute in Israel. The United States cannot directly replace the Israeli Prime Minister, but the cost of allowing Netanyahu to continue in power rapidly increases. This is essentially a conflict between the principal and the agent. Trump believes that Netanyahu is putting Israel's war goals above the interests of the United States, and transferring all the high oil prices, inflation, regional runaway and domestic political costs of the United States to Washington. For Netanyahu, once the United States and Iran reach an agreement and the war ends, the political and judicial pressure he faces domestically in Israel will return. Therefore, he may be more motivated than Iran to break the agreement. This is also the most dangerous part of the current situation. The more the United States tries to cut off Netanyahu, the more likely he is to create a fait accompli before losing space for action. That is to say, the division of US Israel relations may contribute to a ceasefire in the long run, but may actually increase tail risks in the short term. For Trump, high oil prices are obviously not in his interests. High oil prices will push up inflation again, lower residents' real income, undermine consumer confidence, and increase the difficulty of the Federal Reserve cutting interest rates. More importantly, Trump apparently did not stock up enough low-cost oil before the war began, and the US strategic oil reserve itself was relatively low. This means that he does not have a thick enough inventory buffer to continue suppressing oil prices in long-term conflicts. The direction of the war also clearly exceeded his expectations. Trump may initially believe that Iran can be forced to return to the negotiating table quickly through military pressure, sanctions and short-term energy shocks. But the reality is that Iran not only did not quickly lose its negotiating ability, but also used the Strait of Hormuz to transmit the cost of war to the United States, Europe, and Gulf countries. This makes Trump now have to choose between two conflicting goals. On the one hand, he needs a strong enough agreement to assert domestically that the United States has won; On the other hand, he must quickly lower oil prices to avoid war from harming the US economy and his own political support. Therefore, Trump's most realistic choice at present is not to abandon Israel completely, nor to continue to support Netanyahu indefinitely, but to gradually lower Netanyahu's power from the US decision-making chain in the Middle East, forcing Israel to accept an imperfect agreement that can lower oil prices. Overall, the short end of crude oil still has a clear upward convexity, while the medium-term price remains two-way, and the long end is not naturally bullish. The bulls have low inventory, uncertainty in cross-strait passage, recovery cycles, replenishment by various countries, and tail risks of Israel breaking the deadlock. The bears have gradually released inventory from Iran and Gulf countries, partially reopened the strait, deployed strategic inventory, disrupted demand, and potential future oversupply. So what really needs to be observed at present is not whether the word "peace" appears in news headlines, but three more specific issues: Can the navigation in the Strait of Hormuz be continuously restored, can insurance and freight rates truly decrease, and does Netanyahu still have the ability to undermine the agreement. As long as these three issues are not resolved simultaneously, it will be difficult for oil prices to truly return to pre war logic. This content is sponsored by @ BITstocks_CN. Buy BIT-16000+US stocks and ETFs on the US stock market, hold real positions, and enjoy dividends.