qinbafrank|6月 14, 2026 04:34
The ceasefire memorandum between the United States and Iran should be coming soon, and it is becoming more and more similar to the ceasefire model reached by the US and Iran at the end of May, similar to last year's US China trade war. Looking at the information released by the Pakistani Prime Minister and the Iranian side https://(x.com)/qinba frank/status/2065821838899581192? S=20 should be very close to signing a ceasefire memorandum, of course, this document is not the final nuclear agreement, but the political framework of the first stage of "ending the war+opening the strait+buying 60 days of negotiation time". The nuclear issue has been postponed, which is the most crucial structural change.
1. Why has the probability of signing significantly increased? From a personal perspective:
1) The signing mechanism has been implemented. From the early 'Pakistan Plan' to the current 'electronic signature+next week's technical negotiations', the operability is extremely strong;
2) Iran has not completely denied it. Just denying the US timetable (Sunday), this is to give face to domestic hardliners while preserving the space for signing;
3) The most difficult nuclear issue has been postponed
This greatly reduces the risk of the first stage of negotiations collapsing. The United States will first open up Hormuz and downgrade the battlefield, while Iran will first take some economic space and cease fire;
4) The regional diplomatic chain has been initiated
Pakistan was the most active, Qatar publicly supported, and Saudi Arabia, Oman, Egypt, and Türkiye all participated in endorsement to varying degrees.
5) The terms are already highly specific.
14 articles, 60 days, Hormuz, lifting of blockade, freezing of assets, Lebanese front, reconstruction compensation... These repeatedly appear in multiple reports, and the more specific they are, the less they look like smoke bombs.
2. Memo outline (14 frameworks) Core three group exchange:
1) Iran opens up Hormuz, US lifts maritime blockade (most urgent). The US wants to open up substantially without tolls, while Iran wants to retain management rights and charge reasonable service/security fees (not called tolls);
2) Iran accepts a 60 day negotiation window, while the United States releases some economic pressure. Freeze the release of assets and exempt some oil exports from entering the exchange disk;
3) Post nuclear issues. The United States still wants to ultimately dismantle/dispose of highly enriched uranium, while Iran insists on not negotiating in the first phase and hopes to dilute it domestically.
Other possibilities include: stopping multi front wars (with Lebanon as the focus), non-interference, rebuilding the compensation framework, and the possibility of shelving or downgrading missile issues.
Figure 1 below roughly lists the terms of the memorandum
Israel is not a signatory, this is the biggest execution variable. It depends on the degree of Trump's constraint on Netta in the future.
3. Trump's concession
Unlike most of Trump's eager release of information before, this time it was Iran and Pakistan who released the information first. Trump just forwarded the tweet of the general leader of Pakistan, which shows that Trump has quickly reached the agreement of the terms of the memorandum on the one hand, and Trump has indeed made concessions on the other hand.
He has made substantial concessions, and they are not small concessions,
But the negotiation sequence was dragged back to a more acceptable track by Iran.
The biggest concession: postpone the nuclear issue. Trump's initial reason was the Iranian nuclear threat, but now it has changed to "cease fire and open the strait first, and then talk about the nuclear issue in 60 days". This essentially acknowledges that short-term military pressure cannot quickly resolve the nuclear issue.
The second major concession: the maritime blockade has changed from a tool of oppression to a condition for reciprocal lifting. From 'I'll block you until you surrender' to 'you open the strait, I'll lift the blockade'. The third major concession: economic concessions enter the exchange plate ahead of schedule. The release of frozen assets and partial exemption from oil sanctions are not rewards after the final agreement, but must be given in the first stage.
The fourth concession: having to accept Iran controlling the pace. Trump is eager to "declare victory immediately" in response to oil prices and domestic pressure, while Iran repeatedly emphasizes "caution" and "the next few days", not cooperating with his propaganda schedule.
Figure 2 below lists the concessions of Trump
Why did Trump make concessions?
The core still lies in oil prices, public opinion, time, and the risk of failure. The rise in oil prices has had a significant impact on American consumers, with polls showing that most people hope to end the conflict as soon as possible, and mid-term election pressure is also approaching. Trump can shout hard, but with oil prices, stock markets, and polls all pressing in, his strategic patience is far less than Iran's. Of course, Iran is not a zero cost victory either. It must at least open up Hormuz, enter 60 days of nuclear negotiations, and face domestic hardliners.
He admitted that military and economic pressure cannot be used in the short term to force Iran to surrender according to the White House timetable.
4. Why is it that the May ceasefire between the US and Iran is becoming more and more similar to the ceasefire model of last year's US China trade war
The core is still what we talked about earlier. Both sides do not want the situation to further escalate, but also have the incentive to withdraw: Trump does not want the oil price to continue to drag down inflation and polls, and Iran does not want the coastline to be blocked for a long time and the economic income to be hit hard.
So let's first deal with the most urgent "retaliatory" issue (US Iran Strait blockade vs US China tariffs/rare earths), and exchange phased concessions for cooling down.
The most difficult core issue (US Iran nuclear vs. deeper structural issues between China and the US) is to first blur and then negotiate.
The United States can say that 'the strait has opened up and Iran's path to not possessing nuclear weapons has been cut off'; Iran can say that it has not lost its sovereignty and management, gained economic space, and did not immediately surrender on the nuclear issue. One win over each table
From the above perspective, is it becoming more and more like the ceasefire path of last year's US China trade war. The ceasefire memorandum between the United States and Iran seems to have reached a critical moment, but currently the two sides have not jointly announced the signing, and the ball has not been scored yet.
Of course, as we discussed yesterday, it is estimated that the market is no longer concerned about whether the Strait of Hormuz is open for free or for a fee. The important thing is to restore traffic. The resumption of passage through the Strait of Hormuz may require the resetting of many previous macro assumptions and market logic.
This article is sponsored by @ bitget_zh, titled 'Bitget Buying US Stocks: Instant Entry, Smooth Trading'
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