For those saying a 2-2 config would have solved everything, you need to understand that LayerZero has a systemic centralization problem Not everything is as it seems, let’s look at the most widely used DVN config that accounts for ~50% of 90-day message volume based on public data: LayerZero Labs + Nethermind Onchain data (confirmed by multiple LZ users and independent security researchers) shows there’s a 94% overlap in the admin keys used for each DVN: "LZ Labs DVN — 24 admins Nethermind DVN — 17 admins 16 of those 17 Nethermind admins are also admins on the LZ Labs DVN — i.e. ~94% overlap. Anyone holding one of those 16 keys has admin power over both DVNs. Contracts: LZ DVN: 0x589dEDbD617e0CBcB916A9223F4d1300c294236b Nethermind DVN: 0xa59bA433aC34D2927232918ef5b2eaafcf130bA5" The ADMIN_ROLE can call the following functions: - setPaused - setPriceFeed - setWorkerFeeLib - setDefaultMultiplierBps - setDstConfig - execute - withdrawFeeFromUlnV2 Regardless of the exact bounds of these permissions, this substantial admin key overlap paints a really bad picture of interdependence between supposedly independent DVN infrastructure And this is just what we can see onchain, who knows what other offchain inter-dependencies exist? We already know LayerZero Labs has sub-par opsec given North Korea was able to infiltrate their centralized DVN infrastructure And yet we still don’t know how exactly they was infiltrated by DPRK so we don’t know what the full risk exposure in the LayerZero ecosystem was exactly The systemic centralization problem in the LayerZero ecosystem wasn't an accident, it's clearly a result of poor incentives, bad protocol design, and really bad opsec practices(Zach Rynes | CLG)