The rsETH issue extends to whether the L2 narrative can be falsified, and the answer is definitely no. The so-called 'L2 users aren't treated like real people, assets aren't real assets' essentially stems from the fact that assets transferred via cross-chain bridges aren't native assets but rather assets with a 'bridge version number' attached. This has nothing to do with L2 security itself. If you issue native assets on L2, their security is tied to L1. A prime example of this is USDC. Previously, Circle didn't issue USDC natively on every chain; it relied on various cross-chain bridges. That's why we often saw USDC.e, USDC.a, etc. These assets, transferred by third-party bridges, inherit the security of the bridge itself. For instance, in this recent LayerZero DVN incident, when issues arise within the bridge, these assets are affected. This is entirely outside the scope of L2's inherent security. When Circle later heavily promoted native USDC + CCTP, they explicitly distinguished the risks between bridged and native versions (the native version includes USDC on L2). They even stated in their terms that bridged USDC does not enjoy Circle's official backing and carries additional bridge-related risks. This is the clearest example to illustrate the point: whether on L1 or L2, USDC is real USDC, and its security can be tied to it. However, assets transferred via bridges are theoretically non-native (or 'fake'), and their security depends on the cross-chain bridge itself. So, L2 won't be falsified, but cross-chain bridges might be.