The core takeaway from this rsETH bridge exploit should be that app devs and asset issuers should not be expected to be cross-chain infra security experts Protocols like LayerZero that do not provide any guaranteed security assurances (no security floor) make it far too easy to implement insecure bridges When the path of least resistance is a 1-of-1 DVN config (or 2-of-2 as is very common), a meaningful share of integrators will end up there Cross-chain infra should provide a strong minimum level of security and decentralization, while allowing optional additional layers of validation, permissioning, risk management, monitoring, and compliance on top Like @CatfishFishy stated, the modular security design for bridges offers advantages, but the spectrum should range from moderately secure to extremely secure, not zero security to extremely secure The fact that the LayerZero Labs DVN experienced an issue and led to a bridge exploit is concerning, but it really just reveals a flawed architectural design If zero security is a valid point on the spectrum with no guardrails (LayerZero protocol itself is empty scaffolding), someone will ship it and users bear the cost Unfortunately these types of exploits deteriorate public trust in DeFi as a whole, as it’s difficult for retail to discern what is or isn’t secure Referring to centralized node operators as “decentralized verifier networks (DVNs)” only gives a false sense of security to both devs and retail, muddying the waters further A messy situation all around, hoping the recovery goes smoothly(Zach Rynes | CLG)